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THE TENUOUS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY
LAUNDERING AND THE DISRUPTION OF
CRIMINAL FINANCE
MARIANO-FLORENTINO CULLAR*
This article examines the fight against money laundering as a
case study of the separation between an enforcement system's
objectives and performance. To launder money is to hide its illegal
origin. The fight against money laundering is supposed to disrupt
laundering in its various forms-especially what is done by third
party launderers and leaders of criminal organizations. In the
process, the fight is supposed to undermine the process of financing
and profiting from crimes ranging from drug trafficking to terrorism.
Yet this fight delivers less than what it promises. Like many other
enforcement systems, the fight against money laundering involves
three major components: statutes with criminal penalties charged by
prosecutors, rules administered by regulators, and detection systems
primarily run by investigators. A close analysis of its three
components reveals the fight to have quite a limited scope, involving
(1) the disproportionate imposition of severe penalties on predicate
offenders who are easily detected; (2) lax and narrowly-focused
regulatory authority; (3) limited capacity to detect a range of
chargeable domestic and international offenses; and (4) global
diffusion of a fight against money laundering that leaves
. Assistant Professor, Stanford Law School. For their comments and insights, I am
indebted to Bob Weisberg, Richard Craswell, Barbara Fried, Mark Kelman, David Mills,
George Fisher, Lawrence Friedman, Bill Simon, Pam Karlan, Ian Ayres, Deborah Hensler,
Robert Rabin, Richard Steinberg, Jeff Stmad, Michele Dauber, Rick Banks, Miguel M~ndez,
Mitch Polinsky, Joe Grundfest, Joe Bankman and Kathleen Sullivan. Thanks to Ian Haney-
Lopez, David Medina, Hector Garcia-Molina, Alex Hanson, Ted Senator and to the agents,
regulatory officials and prosecutors who discussed the subject of this article with me. I
appreciate the fine research assistance of Jamon Bollock and Everett Green, and particularly
Brigham Daniels, along with the tremendous dedication of the Stanford Law School library
staff, especially Erika Wayne and Paul Lomio. I refuse to launder my sole responsibility for
any errors and omissions. This article is dedicated to my brother, Maximo.
MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUELLAR
implementing authorities plenty of room for discretion and lax
enforcement. These limitations probably arise not because of
blindness or bad intentions but because the major players involved in
running the system-including legislators, prosecutors, investigators,
and regulators-face a tangle of incentives that leads them to dilute
the intensity and scope of enforcement against some targets and to
enhance the sanctions faced by other targets. While there is some
evidence that suspicious activity reporting probably helps identify
drug money placement in banks, the system seems ill suited to
detecting and disrupting the larger universe of criminal financial
activity that is so often vilified by the rhetoric justifying the fight
against money laundering. All of this makes it hard to target terrorist
financing using the anti-laundering system, even though it is easy to
freeze assets allegedly linked to terrorism. Some changes in the
system such as enhancing audit trails and strengthening suspicious
activity reporting and analysis could be defended in the name of
making the system work, though politics would make them difficult
to achieve and their ultimate consequences are hard to predict. In the
meantime, any inequities in the detection of predicate crimes end up
being reproduced in money laundering prosecutions, and the system's
most compelling objectives-detecting crimes in a new way, and
targeting third-party launderers and leaders of criminal networks-
seem mostly beside the point.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TRO D U C TIO N .......................................................................................... 3 13
I. THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING .......................................... 323
A. HOW TO LAUNDER M ONEY .......................................................... 324
B. COMPONENTS OF THE ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM .................... 336
1. Criminal Statutes Charged by Prosecutors ......................... 336
2. Rules Administered by Regulators ...................................... 352
3. Detection Systems (Primarily) Run by Investigators ........... 364
C. THE SYSTEM'S GLOBAL DIFFUSION .......................................... 374
II. JUSTIFYING THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING AS AN
ATTACK ON CRIMINAL FINANCE .......................................................... 380
A. THE CAUTIOUS CASE FOR DISRUPTING CRIMINAL
F IN A N C E ........................................................................................... 3 80
[Vol. 93
TENUOUS RELATIONSHIP
1. Disruption of the Financial Activities of (and the Supply
of Services to) Criminals, Especially Leaders of
Crim inal O rganizations ...................................................... 381
2. Aid to Detection of Predicate Offenses ............................... 388
3. Cleansing the Financial System of Benefits Derived from
C rim e .................................................................................. 3 8 9
4. Assessing the Justifications and the Goals They Imply ....... 391
B. THE "OFFICIAL" STORY: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND
EXECUTIVE JUSTIFICATION ......................................................... 394
III. THE SYSTEM 'S CONSEQUENCES .......................................................... 403
A. THE REALITY OF THE FIGHT AGAINST LAUNDERING .......... 404
1. Result #1: Severe Penalties Focused on Predicate
Offenders and Activity Involving Aggregations of
C u rren cy .............................................................................. 4 0 4
2. Result #2: Regulations of Limited Scope ............................ 425
3. Result #3: Lax Enforcement of Existing Regulatory
A u th o rity .............................................................................. 4 3 3
4. Result #4: Globalization of the Fight Against Money
L a u n d ering .......................................................................... 4 3 8
B. W HAT GOES UNDETECTED ........................................................... 440
IV. THE FATE OF THE EFFORTS TO DISRUPT CRIMINAL FINANCE ............. 444
A. FORCES SHAPING THE SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF DISCRETIONARY ENFORCEMENT ................... 444
B. CHANGES TO THE SYSTEM ........................................................... 453
1. Incremental Changes in Substantive Criminal Statutes
and R egulatory P olicy ........................................................ 453
2. Radical Changes (and the Questions Raised) ..................... 455
C O N C LU SIO N ............................................................................................. 4 60
INTRODUCTION
Here is a classic description of the "money laundering" game.'
A drug dealer has a large amount of currency earned from the sale of
' The term "money laundering" became ubiquitous in law enforcement discussions of
drug and organized crime during the 1980s after a Reagan Administration report highlighted
the perceived impact of money laundering on crime. See U.S PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REP'T TO THE PRESIDENT AND ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH
CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING 7
(1984) (cogently defining money laundering as "the process by which one conceals the
2003]
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crack and heroin.2 His immediate problem is getting someone to turn
stacks of crumpled $10 and $20 bills into balances at a local bank
branch that can be easily transferred around the world, or across town
to pay his supplier.' Once the money is credited to an account and
moved around enough, it can be plowed back into more of the same
criminal activity, invested in the legitimate economy, used to finance
other criminal activities such as terrorism (so we are told in a post-
September 11 world), or simply enjoyed by someone as profit.
To fight this system of criminal finance, governments aver a
commitment to use a combination of criminal investigators-
including undercover agents who offer to launder money and then
existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income, and disguises that income to make
it appear legitimate"). The report ascribes the term to "the argot of criminals, who refer to
'dirty' or 'black' cash being 'washed' so that it can be used openly." Id. at 84 n.4. Yet, the
practice of hiding money's origin has a long history. See INGO WALTER, THE SECRET MONEY
MARKET 4-6 (1990). Indeed, the term "money laundering" appears in federal cases well
before criminal "money laundering" statutes were passed. Even in the absence of specific
statutes criminalizing laundering, federal prosecutors used money laundering theories to seek
convictions against defendants involved in organized crime and drug trafficking. See, e.g.,
United States v. Freedson, 608 F.2d 739, 740 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Negotiations among
appellant, Jackson, and the agents continued over the next five months, and culminated in a
meeting in San Francisco at which the agents handed appellant a suitcase containing one
million dollars in funds to be 'laundered."'); United States v. Metz, 608 F.2d 147, 152 (5th
Cir. 1979) (referring to the "money-laundering scheme"). For sources of the "classic"
description of money laundering, see generally infra notes 2-10.
2 In 1992, the National Institute of Justice used a supply-based methodology and
reported that United States illegal drug sales generated approximately $100 billion.
BARBARA WEBSTER AND MICHAEL S. CAMPBELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTERNATIONAL
MONEY LAUNDERING: RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION JOIN FORCES I (Sept. 1992). A study
from the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), using a demand-based
methodology, estimated that spending in 1988 was $64 billion, which had declined to
approximately $49 billion in 1993. Not all of this ends up being laundered. See generally
WILLIAM RHODES ET AL., OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, WHAT AMERICA'S USERS
SPEND ON ILLEGAL DRUGS, 1988-1993 (1995) [hereinafter ONDCP REP'T]. Meanwhile, $1
million in U.S. currency weighs 111 lbs. in $20 bills, or, for example, 444 lbs. in $5 bills.
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD PUB. 91-130, MONEY LAUNDERING: THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT IS RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM 13 (1991). Assuming that only two-
thirds of ONDCP's estimated money spent on drugs was going to be placed in U.S. banks,
and all of it was in $20 bills, traffickers would have to place currency weighing
approximately 1,685,000 lbs.
3 See Anti-Money Laundering Efforts in Texas; Field Hearing Before the Comm. on
Banking, Fin. & Urban Affairs, H.R., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1993) (Statement of Rep.
Gonzalez) ("It was not too long ago that money launderers could simply deposit suitcases
full of money in local banks without fear of being identified .... Currency smugglers
should also be wary of moving cash into Mexico. While this technique seems to be growing
in popularity, the smugglers may soon find out that they are losing a great deal of
money .... ).
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catch the criminals who accept their generosity-as well as
informants and regulatory tools, such as reports of large currency
transactions to supplement traditional methods of criminal
investigation.4 Banks insist they cooperate with investigators and
regulators by telling the government about suspicious transactions
and trying to ensure that their accounts do not become coffers for
laundered money.5 Banks, along with other financial institutions, are
especially vigilant when confronted with large currency
transactions-which subject them to government-mandated reporting
requirements. Cash evinces such suspicion because it is anonymous.6
With it, a person can pay for an airline ticket, a box cutter, a
chemical, a rented car, or a baseball bat without leaving much of a
paper trail. With cash reporting requirements and the vigilant
cooperation of financial institutions to help keep an eye on other
transactions, the authorities can "follow" dirty money back to its
nefarious source,7 freeze assets and punish predicate crimes like drug
trafficking, terrorism,8 and corporate fraud. In short, the fight against
laundering allows authorities to disrupt financial activity linked to
crime and to deter future offenses.9
Or does it? It turns out the preceding scenario gives a radically
incomplete picture of money laundering, the fight against it, and the
broader patterns of criminal financial activity that might in principle
be motivating the fight against laundering. For example, the picture
above assumes enforcement to be relatively effective, and obscures
the larger question of what it means for the fight against money
4 As used here, "traditional" law enforcement methods of investigation include
informants, undercover agents, and police patrol methods targeting predicate crimes like
drug trafficking, corrpution, and terrorism.
5 See, e.g., Press Release, American Bankers Association Statement on Money
Laundering Legislation (Oct. 4, 2001) (stating "ABA strongly supports the ongoing
congressional efforts to strengthen existing money laundering laws"), available at
http://www.aba.com/Press+Room/statementonmoneylaundleg100401.htm (last visited June
3, 2002).
6 See infra Part IV.B.
7 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE NAT'L MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY FOR 2000
6 (2000) ("The importance of money laundering to criminals creates opportunities for law
enforcement to detect crime, as it forces criminals to interact with the commercial and
financial sectors.") [hereinafter 2000 ANNUAL STRATEGY].
8 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE 2002 NAT'L MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY 4
(2002) [hereinafter 2002 ANNUAL STRATEGY] ("The overriding goal of the 2002 Strategy is
to deny terrorist groups access to the international financial system, to impair the ability of
terrorists to raise funds, and to expose, isolate, and incapacitate the financial networks of
terrorists.").
9 See generally infra Part II.A.
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laundering to be effective. Neither does the preceding account
recognize that the fight against laundering-like many other
enforcement systems-is the product of statutes, rules, and detection
strategies each controlled by different institutions and individuals. In
fact, we know precious little about how the fight against money
laundering really works, either in the United States, where the fight
was first christened and aggressively instituted, or across the world
where it is has been fast adopted either in principle or practice."0 Nor
does most of the scholarly work on money laundering really address
this question, as most of it focuses on whether banks and the
government strike the right balance between disrupting financial
activity connected to crime and protecting financial privacy and
autonomy,1" what precise interpretation should be given to the
complicated federal laws criminalizing money laundering, 2 whether
10 Although few official sources admit that little is known about the day-to-day reality
of the anti-money laundering enforcement system, a number of sources instead (1)
acknowledge how little is known about the size of the problem (which logically places limits
on what can be inferred about the success of anti-laundering efforts), or (2) use anecdotal or
descriptive information to draw questionable conclusions about the system's success. For
examples of uncertainty about the size of the problem, see 2002 ANNUAL STRATEGY, supra
note 8, at 3 ("We still do not know the full magnitude of the money laundering problem.");
Ronald K. Noble & Court E. Golumbic, A New Anti-Crime Framework for the World:
Merging the Objective and Subjective Models for Fighting Money Laundering, 30 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 79, 86 (1997-98) ("It is difficult to quantify the amount of criminal profits
that enter into the international financial system each year."). For an example of
justifications offered for the system, see Bank Secrecy Act Reporting Requirements: J.
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gen. Oversight and Investigations and Fin. Insts. &
Consumer Credit of the Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serv., 106th Cong. 69-97 (1999)
(testimony of Mary Lee Warren, supra note 10) (justifying the collection of suspicious
activity reports of financial transactions on the basis that the FBI reported in FY 1998 that
98% of its financial institution fraud investigations used the reports, without explaining what
such use involved).
" See, among others, Robert S. Pasley, Privacy Rights v. Anti-Money Laundering
Enforcement, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 147 (2002); KRIs HrNTERSEER, CRIMINAL FINANCE 1
(2002) (arguing for the prioritization of anti-money laundering enforcement, despite the fact
that it raises "various civil liberty related issues"); Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Money
Laundering and Wire Transfers: When the New Regulations Take Effect Will They Help?, 14
DICK. J. INT'L L. 413 (1996); Steven A. Bercu, Toward Universal Surveillance in an
Information Age Economy: Can We Handle Treasury's New Police Technology?, 34
JURIMETRICS J. 383 (1994); Matthew N. Kleiman, Comment, The Right to Financial Privacy
Versus Computerized Law Enforcement: A New Fight in an Old Battle, 86 Nw. U. L. REv.
1169 (1992).
12 See, e.g., Rachel Ratliff, Third-Party Money Laundering: Problems of Proof and
Prosecutorial Discretion, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y Rev. 173 (1996).
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there is enough international cooperation to fight money laundering, 13
or what form that cooperation should take. 4
So who or what is caught with the fight against laundering? 5
After all, the scenario of the drug trafficker with bags full of
crumpled paper currency to deposit does not even begin to describe
the full extent of criminal financial activity that the federal
government says it has an interest in disrupting. 6 The core anti-
money laundering criminal statutes have a long list of predicate
offenses that may have little if anything to do with drugs, and perhaps
even little to do with currency. 7 Money from these predicates, such
as wire fraud in the course of running an energy-trading company,"
can trigger criminal liability under the money laundering statutes just
as surely as drug money laundering can. 9  Nor are currency
13 See, e.g., HINTERSEER, supra note 11, at 32.
14 See, e.g., Noble & Golumbic, supra note 10, at 79.
15 U.S. Sentencing Commission statistics indicate that about 985 defendants were
convicted under the two major federal anti-money laundering statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 1956,
1957) in 2000. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS 24 (2000). But this understates the number of federal criminal convictions
involving money laundering-related conduct, since activities such as breaking down
currency deposits to evade reporting requirements can be charged under separate statutes.
States also engage in some money laundering prosecutions, though no one appears to have
studied the number or outcome of such prosecutions. Moreover, convictions do not reflect
the impact of money laundering charges that do not lead to convictions, such as prosecutorial
practices that depend on charging defendants with money laundering and then obtaining
pleas to lesser charges. See infra Part IV.A.
16 Russian individuals used the Bank of New York to launder billions of dollars, some of
which apparently came from the Russian Central Bank. See United States v.
$15,270,885.69, No. 99 Civ. 10255(RCC) 2000 WL 1234593, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31,
2000) ("According to the complaint, from 1996 to 1999, billions of Russian dollars have
been transferred from the Sobinbank and DKB correspondent accounts at BONY into the
Benex and Becs BONY Accounts, despite the fact that neither Benex nor Becs conducted
any legitimate commercial activity.").
17 A number of predicate offenses for 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957 involve fraud, white-
collar offenses, and specialized crimes such as the sale of counterfeit aircraft parts.
18 Cf Kurt Eichenwald, Ex-Enron Official Admits to Payments to Finance Chief, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2002, at Al.
19 See, e.g., United States v. Villarini, 238 F.3d 530 (4th Cir. 2001) (defendant
embezzled $83,000 from bank where she worked and deposited money in small transactions
of less than $3,000 at two-to-four week intervals); United States v. Lee, 232 F.3d 556 (7th
Cir. 2000) (where defendant fraudulently obtained a $280,000 loan from a bank, the deposit
of loan into account of one of defendant's companies was enough to constitute money
laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1957). Moreover, some statutes designed to deter money
laundering do not even require that the money involved come from a specific predicate
crime. For example, the anti-structuring law, 31 U.S.C. § 5324, criminalizes the knowing
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transactions necessarily the only ones that are anonymous or nearly
so.2" Using bank accounts sheltered by protective bank and corporate
secrecy laws in offshore financial havens, individuals can move and
exchange resources without leaving an easy trail for law enforcement
to follow. 1 Indeed, the growing concern over terrorist financing in
the wake of September 11 poignantly illustrates the disconnection
between the rhetoric about the fight against money laundering and the
larger challenge of disrupting criminal finance. While federal
government officials emphatically describe the targeting of terrorist
financing as a major part of the fight against laundering,22 sponsors of
terrorism may start with money that originates from non-criminal
sources and is never in physical currency form.23 The terrorist
hijackers funded their life and learned to fly using money that itself
separation of deposits into amounts that can evade the $10,000 reporting requirement.
Violations of these kinds of laws do not depend on where the money originates.
20 In theory, transactions that break up deposits might run the risk of provoking banks to
file suspicious activity reports that do not have inflexible currency amount thresholds. In
practice, such reports may not be completely effective in revealing currency-based
laundering. See infra Part 11. Moreover, a substantial proportion of criminally-derived
funds are moved between accounts through wire transfers. See also Federal Government's
Response to Money Laundering. Hearings Before the Comm. on Banking, Fin., & Urban
Affairs, 103d Cong. 397-406 (1993) (testimony of John E. Hensley, Assistant Commissioner
for Enforcement, U.S. Customs Service) (contending the vast majority of money laundered
is "going through financial institutions" for "wire transfer" purposes); DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
DEP'T OF JUSTICE ALERT: WIRE TRANSFER LAUNDERING 14 (1992).
21 Consider the example of Bermuda. Even in the late 1980s, Bermuda common law was
interpreted to infer a contract of confidentiality between a Bermudan bank and its customer,
resulting in a rule that "'no Bermuda bank may release information in its possession
concerning its customers' affairs unless (I) it is ordered to do so by a court of competent
jurisdiction in Bermuda, or (2) it receives a specific written direction from its customer
requesting the bank to release such information."' Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 203
n. I (1988) (citation omitted).
22 See, e.g., 2002 ANNUAL STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 4 ("The overriding goal of the
2002 Strategy is to deny terrorist groups access to the international financial system, to
impair the ability of terrorists to raise funds, and to expose, isolate, and incapacitate the
financial networks of terrorists.").
23 See James Risen, Money Transfers by Hijackers Did Not Set Off Alarms for Banking
Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at A16 (indicating that none of the September II
hijackers' financial activities, which primarily involved receiving international wire
transfers, appeared to trigger any regulatory "alarms"). See also John L. Lumpkin, Al-
Qaeda Activity Suggests More Attacks, Official Says, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 17, 2002, at
32A (offering description of alleged links between AI-Qaeda and honey merchants, some of
whom are engaged in legitimate business producing clean money). The recent concern over
charities funneling money to terrorists shows it does not matter if the money comes from
crime or not, or whether it begins as physical currency or not. These activities might violate
the core anti-money laundering laws or some other provisions of federal criminal law. Even
so, terrorist financing hardly seems to fit the basic pattern described above.
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flew across the world from the United Arab Emirates to the U.S.
through almost a dozen wire transfers, not bulk currency shipments. 4
Neither are financial institutions consistently reliable partners in the
search for laundered money, because they might have at least as
much of an interest in getting business as they do in supporting the
government's policy objectives.25 All of which reveals a gap between
the simple picture of laundering described above and the more
heterogeneous universe of what one could term "criminal finance,"
which includes the obvious scenario of simple cash placement
laundering but also encompasses more complex schemes of currency
laundering, non-currency laundering of proceeds from fraud or
corruption, and the financing of crimes such as terrorism-whether
the money comes from crime or not.
Abandon the more simplistic description of the laundering, and it
starts to become plain just how much of the actual results of the fight
against laundering depend on the intersecting effects of ambiguous
criminal statutes, regulatory provisions, and detection strategies, all
of which interact to produce the output of an enforcement system.
Supposing that criminal statutes give prosecutors substantial
flexibility regarding the conduct that counts as "laundering" (they
do), then the sort of conduct that will end up being punished as such
will depend on what sort of criminal activity is detected (it does).
The more that the regulatory and investigative systems used to detect
laundering or its close cousins rely on traditional investigative
methods such as victim reports (for fraud) and undercover
investigations (for drugs), the more that prosecutions for laundering
and closely related crimes will tend to mimic the patterns of detection
of the underlying predicate crimes. This dynamic should make one
skeptical about the claim that the fight against money laundering is
likely to be an effective means of detecting despised predicate
offenses or disrupting the infrastructure of criminal finance that
makes the underlying offenses possible.
24 See Indictment, United States v. Zacarias Moussaui (E.D.Va. 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/moussaouiindictment.htm (summarizing U.S. allegations on how
the September l1th hijacking was financed through wire-transfers from Europe and the
Middle East). The point is not that physical currency movement is unimportant, but that it
would be unreasonable to seek a disruption in criminal finance through an exclusive focus on
physical currency movement.
25 Of course, this depends on whether the financial institution believes its acceptance of
funds linked to crime (or meant to finance crime) will be detected, and whether that
detection will lead to some sort of sanction from the institution.
20031
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That skepticism seems odd juxtaposed against the enthusiastic
statements of the legislators who designed the system and many of
the officials who run it. If one tries to make sense of these statements
in light of the law, then the purpose of the fight against laundering
can be best summed up in three words: disrupting criminal finance.26
Just as the now-infamous federal RICO statute sought to deny
criminals the opportunity of using an "enterprise" organizational
form to carry out their crimes,27 in principle the focus of the fight
against money laundering appears to center on affecting the allegedly
troubling intersection between crime and financial activity-not just
laundering in its various forms, but also the overall financing of
criminal activity.28 As the reader will better grasp after the discussion
of the system's characteristics in Part I, this does not clarify things
completely, since even a cursory analysis of the rhetoric suggests
there could be several quite different rationales for why criminal
finance would be harmful. Maybe the ease of using the machinery of
the financial system-banks, wire transfers, money exchanges,
brokerage houses, and commodities traders-can lower the cost of
perpetrating crime and increase its returns, particularly to the higher-
level criminals who enjoy the largest profits from crime. Perhaps the
financial activity associated with some kinds of predicate crimes is a
smoking gun that makes it easier to detect such offenses, such as
major drug smuggling or a terrorist plot-unless of course the
smoking gun is camouflaged by professional third-party launderers
whose stock in trade is moving money from the Bahamas to Basle.29
The harm caused by money laundering could even have systemic,
adverse consequences on the economy by distorting the incentives to
engage in economic activity considered legitimate and productive, or
26 See infra Part I1.
27 See S. REP. No. 91-617, at 76 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 57 (1970) (discussing
the objective of denying criminals the ability to use the private business organization as a
means of perpetrating crime).
28 See infra Part II.
29 The most plausible version of this argument is not that all predicate crime is detectable
through a financial paper trail (or its digital equivalent), but rather that the financial sector
has the capacity to keep records and implement procedures that assist in the detection and
punishment of criminals who want or need the convenience of bureaucratized finance, either
before or after their crime is completed. Cf, e.g., U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR CONTROL OF MONEY LAUNDERING 35-36 (1995)
[hereinafter OTA REP.] (discussing the expectation implicit in the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970
that "banks would be vigilant in identifying suspect customers and transactions"). See also
infra note 305 (discussing the legislative history of the Bank Secrecy Act and emphasizing
the point about the importance of detection).
[Vol. 93
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by making it more difficult to formulate and implement economic
policy.30 Finally, the link between crime and financial activity may
be so intimate-and disturbing-for a moral reason: it makes society
complicit in crime by spreading (i.e., as legitimate economic
investment in society) the gains from an activity considered so
despicable that no one should profit from it. 31
The preceding rationales imply that the law should have practical
goals other than merely enhancing the punishment of run of the mill
criminal offenders-a goal that would make the elaborate structure of
the system targeting criminal finance a waste of time. Instead,
virtually any effort to take the most plausible objectives of the fight
against laundering seriously-that is, as something more than just
political symbolism 32-would yield a list of three concrete goals: (1)
detecting crime through the "trail" of dirty money (i.e., raise the
probability of being caught for both predicate crimes and
laundering); 33 (2) targeting the laundering professionals who make it
easier for criminals involved in predicate offenses to launder money
(thereby raising the cost of laundering and eating into the profit from
predicate crimes);34 and (3) targeting the higher-level criminals that
benefit the most from laundered money (lowering the return of
financing, supporting, and engaging in the predicate crimes). 35
The system to fight laundering can respond in ways other than
meeting these goals, though, and it does. The principal anti-money
laundering criminal statute and the doctrine interpreting it makes it
easy for federal prosecutors to use laundering offenses to increase the
sanctions that a large number of defendants face.36  Detection
30 See generally VITO TANZI, INT'L MONETARY FUND, MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, WORKING PAPER 96/95 (1996).
31 See infra Part II.
32 Of course, symbolic politics (defined infra Part IV) may have played a role in the
development of the fight against laundering. But that does not settle the issue of whether the
proffered justifications for the fight have any merit.
33 See H.R. REP. No. 91-975, at 3 (1970), reprinted in Federal Deposit Insurance Act,
Pub. L. No. 91-508, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4394, 4395 (discussing the justification for anti-
money laundering currency reporting requirements and emphasizing the value to regulators
and law enforcement of documenting a trail of financial transactions to capture criminals).
34 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 99-433, at 3 (1986) (noting that large amounts of cash generated
by illicit activities linked to organized crime "pose a serious problem for which the services
of launderers have been needed"). See also infra Part II.B (generally discussing legislators'
professed interest in targeting third-party launderers).
" See id.




strategies make it hard to develop cases against higher-ups and third-
party launderers because of the reliance on currency enforcement as
well as informants and undercover operations.37 Regulations and
regulatory enforcement appear to be diluted because of interest group
pressure from financial institutions, which regulators, legislators, and
prosecutors have incentives to accept.38 The result is that the lofty
goal of disrupting the larger universe of criminal finance seems of
little relevance to the main output of the system-reports that lead to
few investigations, and severe penalties used against predicate
offenders caught through traditional law enforcement methods with
nothing that makes them particularly distinctive in terms of their
financial activity. The disconnection between the justifications for
the fight against laundering and its actual operation raises the most
basic questions about criminal enforcement, such as whether people
actually punished for an offense deserve it, whether people who are
not punished deserve to get off because they are harder to catch,39 and
how elaborate enforcement schemes might be advanced by rationales
that bear a loose relationship to how those schemes are used in the
course of everyday legal practice.
The balance of this Article pursues two related lines of inquiry: it
uses the framework of analyzing criminal statutes, regulatory rules,
and detection strategies to examine the limitations of the fight against
laundering, and it treats that fight as a case study in the law and
politics of affecting complex enforcement systems. To this end, Part
I explains what money laundering is by giving the reader a tour of
some of the ways that money's illegal origin is hidden and by
explaining the tangle of laws and regulations designed to interfere
with that process. Part II considers possible approaches to justifying
the obsession with money laundering, surveying both theoretical
justifications and the legislative and executive history. Part III uses
quantitative and qualitative data to contrast the consequences of the
37 See infra Part .B.2 (discussing the regulatory scheme).
38 See infra Part I.B.3 (discussing detection strategies).
39 One could turn these questions into simple problems of optimizing the use of scarce
detection and enforcement resources to maximize some attractive-sounding goal, like
deterrence or punishment of lawbreakers. But the simplicity begins to disappear the moment
one acknowledges the possibility that the importance of a particular criminal offense (either
for deterrence or for some other purpose) is not randomly distributed, nor does it necessarily
correspond to the ease with which an offense can be detected. The more that different
crimes justify different responses in principle (and different degrees of priority to address),
the more troubling it is to allow an enforcement system to be driven primarily or exclusively
by ease of detection.
[Vol. 93
TENUOUS RELATIONSHIP
fight against laundering with the lofty objectives of disrupting
criminal finance cited by legislators and executive branch officials.
The most striking result of this evaluation is that criminal penalties
for money laundering are used overwhelmingly against people
already subject to punishment for a predicate offense. Although
suspicious activity and other reports probably also pick up drug and
stolen vehicle cash placement, there is no indication that they pick up
anything else, nor is there any comprehensive system to analyze all
the information relevant to detection that the government already has.
Part IV briefly considers some of the forces shaping the system's
actual operation and considers possible changes to the fight against
money laundering. Without changes in the system-and perhaps
even despite them-the relationship between fighting money
laundering and disrupting criminal finance will remain tenuous at
best, making the asserted goals of the system mostly beside the point.
I. THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING
A petty thief, a drug trafficker, a corrupt businessman who gives
kickbacks for contracts, and the crooked politician who gets those
kickbacks might each have committed vastly different underlying
offenses and boast strikingly different social backgrounds and skills.4"
But we might easily imagine they have something in common: their
crimes involve money. A substantial proportion of criminal activity
makes money, consumes money, or both. The petty thief may not
have a difficult time using the cash gained from selling a stolen
diamond ring to his fence, compared to a drug trafficker with a literal
ton of cash to deposit. But given the link between crime and money,
it would seem on the surface that one plausible way to combat crime
is to pursue the people and activities that make it possible to profit
from or to finance crime.4" The Supreme Court endorsed this
reasoning when it found constitutional a system of recordkeeping that
40 Cf LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 15
(1993):
There are many ways to look at the causes of crime ... Some people blame crime on poverty, on
social disorganization, on injustice in society; others reject these theories. There are economic
theories, psychological theories, psychoanalytical theories, cultural theories, genetic theories, and
so on. We can label some of them right-wing or left-wing or middle-wing or multiwing ....
Probably no one big, sweeping theory is ever going to work. Nobody is likely to discover the
cause of "crime"; people are much too complicated for that.
Id.
4 As I discuss later, the assumption that successfully disrupting criminal finance leads to
decreases in predicate crimes should not be taken for granted. See infra Part II.
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would help the government target criminal activity by detecting its
financial component.42 The laws at issue in that case were not
criminal penalties against money laundering, but reporting
requirements designed to help the government detect and disrupt
financial activity linked to crime. When Congress approved new
criminal money laundering statutes some years later, they were also
framed as tools to help the government disrupt financial activity
linked to crime. Since then, anti-money laundering laws have begun
proliferating throughout the world.43 Of course, money laundering
and criminal finance are overlapping but different concepts, made all
the more difficult to separate because government officials insist that
the fight against money laundering is designed not just to punish a
few people who happen to get caught with money after committing a
crime, but to punish instead the larger infrastructure that allows
domestic and global criminal networks to profit from and finance
crime.44 So the question that arises is whether there is a difference
between what the system promises and what it delivers. Because the
system is more than just the criminal statutes and the doctrine
interpreting them, the answer to the question means we should also
consider how bureaucracies make and enforce regulations meant to
combat money laundering, and how investigators actually detect the
activity.
A. HOW TO LAUNDER MONEY
The laundering metaphor refers not to any financial transaction
linked to crime, but specifically to the process through which money
received from crime is rendered more useful by two means:
converting it into a desirable medium (i.e., a bank balance or equity
in a company) and erasing its more obvious links to crimes.45 This
narrow definition tracks quite closely the approach taken in the major
federal statutes targeting money laundering, which primarily focus on
criminalizing transactions involving the proceeds of crime.46 The
42 Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, Sec'y of the Treasury, 416 U.S. 21, 47-49, 61 (1974);
United States v. Miller, 435 U.S. 435 (1976) (focusing on the justifications for the
recordkeeping requirements).
43 See infra Part I.C.
44 See infra notes 308-12 (explaining the arguments for disrupting criminal financial
activity through the fight against money laundering and reviewing the rationales offered by
the legislative and executive branches for this activity).
45 See, e.g., WALTER, supra note 1, at 38-44.
46 See infra notes 90-115 and accompanying text, for a discussion of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956
and 1957, and related federal anti-money laundering statutes. But note that § 1956(a)(2)
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concept of criminal finance refers to something broader; activities
related to profiting from or financing criminal activity. Obviously
this includes the narrow definition of money laundering, including
the laundering that is most likely to be picked up by existing
enforcement methods (discussed below) as well as other types of
money laundering that do not involve physical currency and may be
more difficult for the existing system to detect. The concept of
criminal finance also encompasses the financing of criminal activity
such as terrorism with financial resources from whatever source-
including crime as well as legitimate activity.
Official sources sometimes take even the narrow definition of
money laundering as a paradigmatic example of criminal financial
activity, and the laundering cash proceeds from drug sales as the most
cogent illustration of money laundering.47 One reason why this sort
of laundering matters is that money from crime is not worth as much
when it is in the form of bulky currency, when it is easily traced back
to the crime, or when it shows up in some individual or company
bank account that easily attracts suspicion because the owner of the
account is under surveillance. 8 Much of what criminals get from
selling drugs, for example, is physical currency. Common sense
suggests that the higher up one travels in a criminal network, the
more cumbersome it is for a trafficker to receive compensation in
physical currency form." Cash is bulky and ill-suited for use in most
criminalizes the movement of money into or out of the United States to promote a specified
unlawful activity, even if that money does not come from any crime.
47 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 1, at 7 (stating "Law
enforcement agencies recognize that narcotics traffickers, who must conceal billions of
dollars in cash from detection by the government, create by far the greatest demand for
money laundering schemes").
48 We might imagine a broader definition of laundering that makes reference simply to
activity that hides money's origin when someone uses money for crime. In fact, federal law
prohibits the movement of money into or out of the U.S. with the intent to promote the
carrying on of a specified unlawful activity (such as drug trafficking). 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(2)(A) (2000). But it is helpful at this stage to contrast traditional money laundering
with the larger category of activity that could be called criminal finance, which involves
engaging in financial transactions connected in some way to the profit or financing from
crime.
49 The problems with using currency arise not only from the kingpins' ostensible desire
to enjoy profits at the lowest cost, but also from the need of criminal networks to pay off
people who provide valuable services, such as corrupt customs officials. A kingpin can use
bank balances to transfer money to an account in a bank secrecy haven, or to any number of
locations, where money might be withdrawn or otherwise transmitted through an appropriate
reintegration scheme that helps the corrupt official minimize the probability of detection and
solve his own logistical problems to enjoy the money.
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legitimate economic transactions of any substantial value. Reporting
requirements make cash transactions the object of possible
government attention." Even once the money is in a bank account,
the money is hardly useful if the account belongs to someone the
government suspects, or if the frequency of currency deposits to the
account triggers government suspicion. A simple example helps
illustrate the challenges criminals face in using currency. If a drug
trafficker and the people he supervises sell $1 million worth of heroin
in Chicago, they must transport and distribute about twenty-two
pounds of heroin."1 Yet the sale of $1 million can produce over 250
pounds of currency. 2 So the trafficker's first challenge is to place the
money into the financial system and thereby change its physical form
from paper bills into a balance at a financial institution. 3 A common
technique to accomplish placement is to break up a large deposit into
a number of smaller deposits. This technique, known as structuring,
lets the trafficker solve the logistical problem of transporting physical
amounts of currency, which minimizes the logistical problems of
making large currency deposits and avoids the suspicion created by
large deposits. Structuring deposits helps the trafficker avoid
currency transaction reporting requirements that kick in when a
person uses over $10,000 in a transaction.54  In some cases,
traffickers use the cover of an existing cash-intensive business, such
as a money exchange business or a restaurant, to help justify large
currency deposits-even if they exceed the reporting threshold."
50 See infra note 281 (discussing the cumbersome nature of cash).
5' Taking the Profit Out of Drug Trafficking: The Battle Against Money Laundering:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 19-42
(1997) (Testimony of Mary Lee Warren, supra note 10).
52 If the trafficker possesses $1 million in an equal mix of $5, $10, and $20 bills, the
street cash weighs 256 pounds. Id. at 20. If the $1 million were all in $20 bills, it would still
weigh about 150 pounds. Even if the money were exclusively in $50 bills, it would weigh
about sixty pounds. Obviously, criminals other than drug traffickers might encounter the
challenge of placing large sums of currency.
53 See, e.g., infra Part II.A.
14 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311, 5312, 5318 (2000). Filing a report does not mean that a person
will be investigated, but it appears to raise the risk of investigation enough that criminals
seek to avoid the filing of forms. See OTA REP., supra note 29, at 53-55 (describing
existing monitoring systems for currency transaction reports and certain other filings
required by the Bank Secrecy Act). Currency transaction records can also help prosecutors
build an ex-post case against a person even if the crime is detected in another way.
55 A classic placement scheme is for a cooperating cash-intensive business to justify




Once the placement is complete, the criminal will probably want
to separate the ultimate destination of the funds from their initial
placement site to make using the funds more convenient and reduce
the possibility of detection. To do this, the criminal engages in
"layering," a process that blurs the connection between the origin of
the funds and the destination. The goal of this activity is to create a
layer of transactions separating the ultimate destination of the bank
balances that have been created as a result of the currency's
placement.56 What makes layering possible is the fact that money can
be moved around, even across the world, in a series of relatively
routine and inexpensive transactions.57 But the fact that layering is
possible does not necessarily make it useful to criminals. Most bank
transactions leave a record of some kind, either in paper or electronic
form.58 Presumably, each wire transfer would leave some record, as
would an analogous operation to create layering of transactions
between the placement account and the destination account. If
investigators knew where to look, they could in fact probably
A ring based in the Los Angeles jewelry district, for example, laundered $1.2 billion for
Colombian drug kingpins in 18 months-more than $2 million a day, $90,000 an hour, 24 hours
a day. Drug money poured in from New York, Miami, Phoenix, Houston and Los Angeles.
Cash was stacked on pallets before being deposited in local banks as business earnings and wired
out of the country. The operation was nicknamed La Mina-the gold mine.
Douglas Frantz, Crushing Waves of Dirty Cash, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1991, at Al. The
success of such a voluminous scheme depends not only on the existence of some plausible
explanation for the cash (i.e., substantial revenues from wholesale and retail jewelry sales),
but also on practical mechanisms to process the cash and account for its whereabouts as it
moves from retail drug sale (for example) to a central location for accounting to a bank
account.
56 For a discussion of "layering" to increase the difficulty of tracing funds from initial
account used for placement or commission of a crime, see U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
LAYERING, MONEY LAUNDERING UPDATES 9 (1991), cited in United States v. Garcia-
Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1474 (10th Cir. 1994). For a description of layering in the context
of a case, see United States v. Morris, 286 F.3d 1291, 1292 (11 th Cir. 2002) (describing the
facts of the case presumably in the light most favorable to the verdict, in which the
prosecution prevailed):
Morris and four others were indicted and charged with various counts stemming from investment
fraud. In the scheme, Morris' co-conspirators obtained investors' funds by falsely representing
the investments as legitimate high-yield opportunities. The co-conspirators then would use
bank wire transfers to send funds to other persons and entities, including Morris, thus concealing
the money trail and promoting the investment fraud.
Id.
57 See Raj Bhala, The Inverted Pyramid of Wire Transfer Law, 82 KY. L.J. 347, 351-52
(1994) (discussing the relative ease with which money can be moved around the world).
58 See OTA REP., supra note 29, at 36 (documenting that, in principle, non-currency
transactions over a certain amount are required to leave some trail).
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reconstruct the pattern of transactions. The problem is investigators
do not necessarily know where to look. 9 If the layers of transactions
involved include the transmission of money to accounts in so-called
"bank secrecy" havens, which make it difficult to learn the identity of
account holders, then layering makes it more difficult to reconstruct
where money has been before it gets to where it is going.6" Even if
the layering strategy did not rely on bank secrecy havens, the number
of transactions can make it difficult to figure out money's origin.6"
This makes it possible for the criminal to engage in the final stage of
traditional laundering, which could be described as integration. Once
placement has turned "dirty" currency into bank balances, and
layering has obscured the connection between the placement account
and the destination account, the criminal can integrate the funds into
any number of streams of economic activity, including legitimate
financial activity such as investments in securities and derivatives,
government bonds, direct investment in a legitimate enterprise, or
further financing of criminal activity.62 When integration involves
some legal economic activity, there must be some justification for
where the new funds originated. But this justification is relatively
easy to accomplish when the layering process has done its work.63
Bank accounts controlled by a businessman in Colombia seem far
59 See infra Part L.C (explaining why investigators would have difficulty detecting money
laundering activity); OTA REP., supra note 29, at 9 (discussing the difficulties of identifying
suspicious wire transfers under existing laws regulating record-keeping for transfers).
60 See infra notes 441-43 (discussing bank secrecy havens and their incentives).
6 1 An example: suppose that investigators have reason to suspect that a construction
company (D) is a front for laundered money, by helping its owner justify income from illegal
sources. The authorities further suspect that the construction company receives money from
account A, which belongs to a suspected criminal. If investigators have specific-enough
suspicions, they can subpoena records of the construction company's financial activity. A
wire transfer from a company B allegedly paying for construction services will not attract
suspicion, unless investigators also decide to examine the sources of company B's funds,
or-perhaps even more unlikely-the difference between the fair market value of the
services provided by company D to company B and the fee paid by B. If investigators had
examined company B's transactions, they might have discovered a wire transfer from
account C, which in turn received a transfer from account A. But unless investigators
examine at least three accounts (from the construction company D, company B, and account
C), they would not discover the link between the construction company and account A.
62 See infra Part II.A.
63 One of the major reasons for layering is that it allows criminals to spread, transform,
and reintegrate proceeds in a manner consistent with any number of legitimate justifications
for the money, thereby making it easier for the hypothetical criminal to choose between
enjoying the proceeds through direct consumption, reinvesting them in illegal activity, or
investing them in the legitimate economy for portfolio diversification purposes.
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removed in space and subject matter from the dozens of accounts at
U.S. financial institutions that were first used to place the money.
Sometimes launderers vary the basic three-step process for
disposing of currency if they want to outsource the risk of placing
currency or simply want to engage in a mix of different strategies to
confound law enforcement.64 A money transmitting business like a
Western Union branch can serve as a bank for the initial placement of
currency, which is one reason why currency and suspicious activity
reporting requirements now apply to these "money services
businesses" as well as banks. 65 In the so-called "Black Market Peso
Exchange" scheme, a drug seller gives currency to a currency
exchange business, which then launders the money for a fee. 66 A
common method for getting rid of the currency often associated with
the currency exchange businesses is the use of currency to purchase
consumer goods, such as televisions or kitchen appliances, for export.
These products can then be dumped on the Colombian market and
produce what appear to be legitimate commercial revenues.67
64 Some of what launderers do is reminiscent of the notion of a "mixed strategy" in the
parlance of game theory. In the formalistic language associated with game theory, a mixed
strategy is a response that assigns some probability of being chosen to two or more pure
strategies (i.e., traditional laundering versus alternative methods) and then involves choosing
between the pure strategies in some proportion to the prior assigned probabilities. If we
imagine the situation as a game of some sort, where one player (i.e., law enforcement) is
trying to anticipate what the other player (i.e., the launderer) will do, then the details of the
mixed strategy (i.e., the probabilities assigned to the pure strategies) will depend on what the
launderer thinks will be the best reply to the other player. The right mixed strategy can
neutralize the advantages of the opposing player's best strategy. See, e.g., JAMES MORROW,
GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS (1995).
65 See Proposed Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations-Definition and
Registration of Money Services Businesses, 62 Fed. Reg. 27,890, 27,893-94 (May 21, 1997)
(to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
66 Anecdotal accounts frequently emphasize the existence of third-party launderers. See,
e.g., Current Trends in Money Laundering. Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 102d Cong. 89-93 (1992) (testimony
of Arturo Gomez, Previous Owner of a "Casa de Cambio") (discussing cash businesses'
frequent role in laundering money, and predicate criminals' reluctance to get involved in the
process). The expansive meaning that courts have given the anti-money laundering criminal
statutes should raise doubts that their use can be easily focused on just a few third-party
launderers. See also United States v. Medina Cuartes, 155 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (S.D. Fla.,
2001) (example of scheme similar to the "Black Market Peso Exchange").
67 See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FINCEN
ADVISORY No. 9, COLOMBIAN BLACK MARKET PESO EXCHANGE (1997) (for a detailed
analysis of the "Black Market Peso Exchange"). See also United States v. $57,443.00, 42 F.
Supp. 2d 1293 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (where the government used the "totality of the
circumstances" to establish that currency delivered by a known money launderer to a third
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Another approach is for the launderer to use currency to supplement
an apparently legitimate transaction. The launderer could pay for a
piece of commercial real estate worth $780,000 with a wire transfer
of $500,000 and $300,000 in currency. The currency might be given
to the seller under the table, effectively outsourcing the responsibility
of placing the currency to the seller, who might be someone operating
a currency-intensive business such as a restaurant. The buyer can
then easily justify his added wealth because of the difference between
the purchase price and the subsequently-appraised value of the
commercial property. What all these schemes have in common is
that someone ends up placing the currency in a bank account, and at
some point the money produced from the crime is integrated into the
financial system. This gives the owner of the funds the convenience
to decide how to spend the money, but also creates tax liability just as
if the money were legitimately earned (unless, of course, the owner
of the funds engages in the sort of tax fraud that might defeat the
convenience of justifying the existence of the funds in the first place).
To the extent that criminals procure assistance from third-party
launderers operating businesses that appear legitimate, criminals tend
to pay a fee to the launderer. 8 If third-party launderers are behaving
rationally, the fee or commission charged should be high enough to
offset the additional tax liability that would arise from reporting the
criminally derived funds as legitimate income-just as the owner of
the laundered funds should be expected to derive a benefit from
laundering that exceeds the cost from the tax liability imposed on
legitimate income.69
party was connected to a Black Market Peso Exchange transaction, involved proceeds, and
was subject to forfeiture).
68 See 2002 ANNUAL STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 12 ("The commission rate averages
between four to eight percent with a high of 12 percent of the principal involved.").
69 To the extent the criminal herself operates or controls the apparently legitimate
business, she might gladly pay the added tax liability in exchange for obtaining funds that
could be plowed into a greater range of legitimate investments (with higher rates of return
and none of the risk that comes from reinvesting in criminal activities) and for avoiding the
declining marginal utility of cash. If third-party launderers and others using legitimate
businesses to launder do not seem to systematically pass their marginal additional tax
liability generated from extra laundering-related earnings, there may be a few ways to
explain this: (1) third-party launderers may be grossly underreporting the full extent of their
tax liability, making it possible to avoid reporting the additional income derived from
laundering activity; (2) third-party launderers may be involved in continuing relationships
with the criminal seeking laundering, allowing the launderer either to derive further benefits
from the entire relationship (i.e., helping out a family member), or to avoid coercive actions
from laundering clients who may want to pressure the launderer into service through threats
or perpetration of racketeering activity. In any case, it would seem highly unlikely that
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Despite the challenges involved, the incentive to do it efficiently
and reduce the overhead as well as the risk of detection can lead to
laundering operations of substantial size. For example, an extensive
money laundering operation focusing primarily (but not exclusively)
on currency laundering was investigated by the U.S. Customs Service
in 1998 in an effort known as "Operation Casablanca." In this
operation, "brokers" who were actually U.S. law enforcement agents
specializing in criminal finance worked in concert with
representatives from Mexican drug cartels. For a fee, the criminal
finance brokers placed the currency in U.S. bank accounts or
smuggled the currency across the border to Mexico.7" Using wire
transfers and money smuggled into Mexico, the criminal finance
brokers could then consolidate the money at banks with lax internal
controls. 1 The money laundering scheme was described as follows
by the government in a civil penalty complaint against a bank, with
the government's own agents sometimes doing the laundering in the
undercover sting operation:
[T]he Mexican bank would establish bank accounts in the names of straw owners at
one of its branches. When the government wished to launder money, it would wire-
transfer the money (in the form of U.S. dollars) into these straw accounts. This
frequently involved wire-transferring the money to one of the Mexican bank's
accounts at a U.S. Bank (referred to as a "correspondent account"), for further credit
to the straw account.The Mexican bank would then issue cashier's checks, again in
U.S. dollars, to whatever fictitious names the informant or undercover agent would
specify .... The Mexican banker involved would receive a commission for his
participation in the money laundering.
72
In contrast with Operation Casablanca, where money began as
currency and was eventually wired or carried across borders, some
either predicate criminals or launderers engaged in criminal activity for profit would not
consider to some degree the tax consequences of their laundering choices. This suggests that
tax laws may have both indirect effects on the choice of laundering strategies, as well as
some potential for control of laundering activity (i.e., by heavily taxing businesses that might
be more likely to be used as fronts for laundering activity).
70 In many cases, individuals smuggling currency into Mexico in connection with the
laundering operation-including U.S. investigators-violated Mexican law, which requires
the reporting of large currency transactions. See Art. 115, Codigo Fiscal de la Federaci6n
{hereinafter C.F.F.], Diario Oficial de ]a Federaci6n, 28 de diciembre de 1989.
71 See United States v. Banco Intemacional/Bital, S.A., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274-75
(C.D. Cal. 2000).
72 See id. at 1274 (quoting U.S. government complaint, 16-18). See also H.R. 4005-
Money Laundering Deterrence Act of 1998 & H.R. 1756-Money Laundering and Financial
Crime Strategy Act of 1997: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking and Fin.
Services, 105th Cong. 87-96 (1998) (statement of Raymond W. Kelly, Under Secretary for
Enforcement, Department of the Treasury) [hereinafter Kelly statement].
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criminal offenses produce money that is not in currency form at all.
In United States v. Piervinanzi, the Second Circuit affirmed a
conviction for international money laundering involving a fraudulent
funds transfer scheme.73 The facts showcase the challenges and
opportunities faced by perpetrators of a crime that does not directly
involve currency.
In March 1988, Anthony Marchese told DelGiudice that he and
Piervinanzi were planning to rob an armored car. DelGiudice
suggested a less violent alternative-an unauthorized wire transfer of
funds from Irving Trust into an overseas account. DelGiudice
explained that he could use his position at Irving Trust to obtain the
information necessary to execute such a transfer. DelGiudice also
explained that it would be necessary to obtain an overseas bank
account of the scheme to succeed, because (1) United States banking
regulations made the rapid movements of proceeds difficult, and (2) a
domestic fraudulent transfer could, if detected, be readily
reversed.... Tichio then told DelGiudice that he would be able to
provide access to accounts in the Cayman Islands, and emphasized
that the strong bank secrecy laws there would prevent tracing of the
purloined funds. Tichio told DelGiudice that the $10 million they
were then planning to steal could be repatriated in monthly amounts
of $200,000.1
4
Without suggesting that the facts in Piervinanzi exemplify
laundering schemes relating to fraud, the case highlights the
relationship between the laundering scheme and the underlying
crime,75 and the role that bank secrecy havens play in making it more
difficult to recapture the funds and detect the perpetrators even if the
underlying scheme is discovered. One might envision similar
7 23 F.3d 670 (2d Cir. 1994).
I d. at 672-73.
75 The doctrine interpreting the principal anti-money laundering criminal laws (18
U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957) considers whether Congress intended to punish the underlying
predicate offense and the laundering transaction separately, a requirement that is easily
satisfied if there is even a small distinction between the action necessary to complete the
predicate offense (for example, moving money on an electronic ledger balance from one
account to another), and to engage in any transaction giving rise to the money laundering
offense (for example, withdrawing cash from one of the accounts). For an example of
merger doctrine in action, see United States v. O'Connor, 158 F. Supp. 2d 697 (E.D. Va.
2001) (wire fraud scheme involving movement of funds across borders did not "merge" with
international money laundering offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i)). The




patterns for embezzlement involving public corruption instead of
private financial institutions.76
The contrast between the Piervinanzi case and Operation
Casablanca again shows how money laundering is not just about
physical currency. Where a person seeks to launder funds that are
not in currency form, as in the case above, there is no need to bother
with placement.7 7  The challenge is layering. Once the funds are
suitably distanced from the original account (perhaps through one or
more layers of protection arising from bank or corporate secrecy
laws), the launderer can reintegrate them and justify their use. The
name of the game is to distance the funds from the account from
which the funds were taken.7"
Layering might include more than simple wire transfers.
Imagine, for example, a shell corporation set up in Liechtenstein, a
jurisdiction that protects the secrecy of a certain kind of corporate
entity's officers and directors.79 Once the funds in question have
76 See, e.g., JAMES ROAF, INT'L MONETARY FUND, CORRUPTION IN RUSSIA, PAPER
PREPARED FOR THE APR. 2000 MOSCOW CONFERENCE (2000), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2000/invest/pdf/roaf.pdf.
77 While a launderer of non-currency dirty money need not be concerned with currency
transaction reporting requirements (unless she withdraws money from the "hot" account and
tries to withdraw it in cash), laundering money even after it has been placed in the financial
system may create demand for money laundering schemes. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 1, at 7 ("It must be noted ... that numerous other types of
activities typical of organized crime, such as loansharking and gambling, also create an
appreciable demand for [money laundering] schemes."). See also 132 CONG. REC. S 9627
(daily ed. July 24, 1986) (statement of Senator Joseph Biden) (upon introduction of S. 2683,
legislation to deter money laundering, "Without money laundering, drug traffickers would
literally drown in cash. Drug traffickers need money laundering to conceal the billions of
dollars in cash generated annually in drug sales and to convert this cash into manageable
form.").
78 Both layering of transactions to hide their origin and some underlying fraud schemes
would have similar, overlapping steps, raising the question of whether the fraud "merges"
into money laundering. Predictably, courts facing these questions have most often seen
enough of a distinction between the elements of international-concealment money
laundering under § 1956 and the elements of financial institution fraud, that they have
determined the offenses do not merge. See United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670, 679
(2nd Cir. 1994) ("Contrary to Piervinanzi's assertion, this reading of the statute does not
'merge' the underlying criminal activity and promoting through laundering into one. The act
of attempting to fraudulently transfer funds out of the banks was analytically distinct from
the attempted transmission of those funds overseas, and was independently illegal.").
79 An Anstalt (or "establishment") under Liechtenstein law is a certain kind of
corporation which in practice serves as an international holding company (i.e., holding
controlling or financial interests in foreign corporations), with a residence in Liechtenstein.
A single founder, who could be a Liechtenstein representative acting for an anonymous
owner, is enough to form an Anstalt. See W. DIAMOND & D. DIAMOND, TAX HAVENS OF THE
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been siphoned off from an account where they belonged, the
launderer might wire transfer them to an account controlled by the
shell corporation. The shell corporation then makes a loan to the
launderer, who pays the loan essentially back to himself. From an
investigator's perspective an obvious problem with this sort of
laundering is that the launderer does not face the difficulty of placing
the funds in the financial system. What partly offsets this problem is
that the victims of financial frauds that produce non-currency
balances sometimes have an incentive to report the fraud so that the
siphoned funds can be recovered."0
The foregoing picture of money laundering-involving hiding
the origins of money obtained from crime-demonstrates its overlap
with the larger concept of criminal finance, defined earlier as
including all the various forms of laundering as well as the financing
of crime. If money laundering is the process through which
criminally derived funds are rendered usable, then surely any
definition of criminal finance should at least encompass all activities
that would be defined as money laundering. Sometimes money
laundering would allow a criminal to reinvest in criminal activity,
thereby providing a ready source of capital for the maintenance or
expansion of criminal activity.81 Even if this were not the case, the
cost of laundering presumably is still an expense for the criminal and
may reduce the fruits of the crime. 2 By the same token, the
financing of crime might involve funds that begin entirely clean, with
WORLD 5 (1989). See also ANTHONY GINSBERG, INTERNATIONAL TAx HAVENS 446 (2d ed.
1997) ("Like corporations, Anstalts need a board of directors, which may consist of just one
member provided he is domiciled in Liechtenstein .... Their advantage ... lies in the...
flexibility of secrecy of their operations-in fact, the CIA is known to have used them.").
80 Thus, Piervinanzi's scheme was uncovered when bank employees involved in a
transaction suspected fraud against their institution and reported it. See United States v.
Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670, 674 (2d Cir. 1994). Nonetheless, reporting is far from guaranteed.
Financial institutions might decide that disclosure could create concerns about their safety
and soundness. Cf OTA REP., supra note 29, at 68 n.29.
81 See STEVEN LEVITT AND SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON.
RESEARCH, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A DRUG-SELLING GANG'S FINANCES, WORKING
PAPER No. 6592 (1998) (documenting the meager return of drug sales to low-level gang
employees on the basis of extensive data for a single gang, and thereby suggesting that
reinvestment in criminal activity by gang leaders can purchase a lot of illicit labor at lower
wages than what is offered in the legitimate sector); Interview with IRS Agent # 1, in
Washington, D.C. (Aug. 31, 1998) (notes on file with author).
82 Thus, the challenge of laundering not only decreases the marginal utility of cash, but
also has the potential to increase the risk of detection. But see infra notes 282-83 and
accompanying text (suggesting that changes in the expense of laundering money do not
necessarily result in reductions of predicate crime).
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no link to crime other than the nefarious intent of someone who
comes to control the funds at some point and chooses to use them to
further some crime. A person financing a crime such as terrorism
with clean money might still be engaged in some sort of laundering
(or obscuring of the source of funds) in order to achieve anonymity or
at least pseudonymity, but the soil being washed away is not the
crime that produced the money, but the person who finances it.83 The
techniques to pull this off involve something like traditional money
laundering in reverse. Since there is no reason to assume the money
would begin as currency, assume it is in a bank account somewhere
outside the target country, where the money must arrive in order to be
useful for the commission of the crime. To move the money into the
target country, the criminal financier has a few choices. He can
simply wire the money to an account in the target country. The wire
transfer leaves an audit trail that might extinguish the financier's
anonymity, 4 but only to the extent that the recipient's account is
identified. Non-traditional alternatives include the use of an informal
money broker. In South Asia, the so-called Hawala system allows
someone to send money across the world without a paper trail by
paying the principal and a fee to a broker in the country of origin and
designating someone with a pseudonym to receive the money in the
targeted country.85
In all cases, the owner of an account with bank balances has
substantial advantages over the drug money launderer with crumpled
bills or the fraudster trying to hide hot money stolen from a victim
soon to miss it: there is almost never a need for placement, nor is
there a clearly identifiable financial victim tending to have an
incentive to report the offense. To the extent that anti-money
laundering enforcement depends in some measure on creating
logistical and legal impediments to placement, then the aspect of
criminal finance that involves criminal financing might be quite
difficult to detect. Neither is there a clearly identifiable victim with
83 The perpetrator might value anonymity in order to avoid responsibility for the crime,
or simply (as in the case of someone with a profound ideological commitment to a cause) to
protect his ability to engage in more of the same activity.
84 See OTA REP., supra note 29, at 32 ("Treasury ha[s] always required that wire
transfers be kept as part of deposit account records...").
85 Stefan D. Cassella, Money Laundering Has Gone Global: It's Time to Update the
Federal Laws, FED. LAWYER 24, 30 (Jan. 2002) (describing the workings of the "hawalas"
system and its potential usefulness to individuals trying to finance crime). The recipient




an incentive to report an offense that does not involve fraud. In short,
it is not at all clear whether any efforts to fight money laundering
could easily come to disrupt terrorist financing or similar activities
not necessarily involving cash, or whether such efforts would be
likely to put a substantial dent even in cash placement. That depends
on the details of the enforcement system targeting money laundering,
to which we turn next.
B. COMPONENTS OF THE ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM
The near-relentless focus of legal scholarship on substantive
laws and constitutional regulation of criminal procedures obscures a
tripartite structure defining the law's efforts against many complex
crimes or offenses.86 Substantive criminal statutes obviously matter.
Assuming a system that tends to encourage legal interpretations that
meet some threshold of intellectual honesty, then the language of a
statute shapes a court's decision over what to instruct the jury and a
prosecutor's decision to charge a particular defendant. But a
prosecutor cannot charge a defendant if she does not suspect that a
particular defendant has committed an offense. Discovering this
depends on what investigators do, and particularly how they gather
information about the universe of possible violations, which depends
in part on regulatory systems. The following pages provide an
overview of these three components."
1. Criminal Statutes Charged by Prosecutors
Our first stop is the core criminal statutes themselves, which
bring us back into the rarified world of statutory text and judicial
pronouncements about legal doctrine. The most often-studied
federal anti-money laundering statutes are 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and
1957, known among prosecutors and commentators as "the" money
86 Examples of other domains of law and policy that could be analyzed using the
tripartite focus on criminal statutes, regulations, and detection systems include immigration,
natural resources management, and pollution control.
87 The point of this overview is not to provide an encyclopedic discussion of the statutes
and case law pertaining to money laundering enforcement. Instead, the goal is to highlight
the most important elements in the statutes and case law to provide a basis for evaluating
how the enforcement system compares to its stated goals. For a more comprehensive
discussion of the recent doctrine interpreting the core federal anti-money laundering
criminal statutes, see Daniel H. April & Angelo M. Grasso, Money Laundering, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1051 (2001).
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laundering statutes.88  Section 1957 targets conduct involving
knowing transactions with certain kinds of criminal proceeds.
Section 1956 criminalizes the concealment of criminal proceeds or
the promotion of particular kinds of crime with monetary proceeds.
The structure of the statutes appears to reflect two seemingly
contradictory concerns. Since money laundering penalties extended
criminal liability in a way that seemed strange and unusual, one
objective was to narrow the scope of conduct subject to criminal
penalties under the statutes.89  At the same time, investigators and
prosecutors clamored for more discretion, resulting in the inclusion of
certain vague terms (such as "monetary transaction" and "financial
transaction") that enlarged the statutes' scope to the point that almost
any post-crime activity undertaken by someone with money
generated from some list of crimes risks criminal liability for money
laundering. As discussed below, this ability to use the money
laundering statutes to cover such a broad range of conduct can prove
irresistible to prosecutors trying to enhance the sentence of someone
who has already been detected for an underlying offense. What
follows elucidates the structure of the statutes and how they have
been interpreted.
Begin with § 1956, which demonstrates some of the tension
between limiting and expanding the scope of laws criminalizing
'8 See, e.g., id. at 1054 (referring to The Money Laundering Control Act as "consist[ing]
of two sections, §§ 1956 and 1957" as "the statute"). Nonetheless, the federal government
can use other statutes to charge people with conduct colloquially referred to as "money
laundering," including conspiracy to import narcotics, the Travel Act, and criminal
violations of currency reporting requirements. Although figures show federal prosecutors
have steadily increased the number of money laundering charges filed and convictions
achieved, the number is still small compared to the total number federal convictions
specifically involving drug crime. For example, in FY 2000, 1106 defendants were
convicted where the most severe charge involved an offense under §§ 1956 and 1957, and
another 1565 were convicted where at least one offense of conviction was a core laundering
offense. 2002 ANNUAL STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 27. Meanwhile, about 23,155 defendants
were convicted of drug trafficking. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 15, at 14.
But as discussed below, these figures understate the impact of money laundering charges
because they do not reflect: (1) instances where the defendant was convicted of a number
offenses, including money laundering, but laundering was not the primary offense; (2)
convictions for related statutes other than the core anti-money laundering statutes, such as
the law against breaking down deposits to evade currency reporting requirements (see 31
U.S.C. § 5324 (2000)); or (3) instances where prosecutors use money laundering charges to
obtain more favorable pleas.
89 See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. E3827 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1986) (statement of Rep. Hughes)
("The new 1956 offense is a pure money laundering offense. The new 1957 offense is an
offense involving transactions in the proceeds of crime and is much broader than money
laundering.").
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laundering. Section 1956(a)(1) focuses on domestic financial
transactions designed to conceal or promote a specified unlawful
activity,9" while § 1956(a)(2) prohibits certain international transfers
meant to conceal or promote the specified activities. Since the
statute's drafters appear to have recognized the difficulty of
investigating some of these offenses-particularly if the statute was
going to be used to punish money laundering activities of third-
parties who specialize in this-§ 1956(a)(3) explicitly authorizes
sting operations to catch violators. The paragraphs below discuss
each of these sections in detail to give a sense of how this principal
anti-money laundering statute works.
The intuitive logic behind the crime of money laundering is that
financial transactions can help further a crime or make it easier to
enjoy the fruits of it.9' The first part of § 1956 addresses that type of
situation. A person violates § 1956(a)(1) if she conducts a financial
transaction (or tries to) involving proceeds of specified unlawful
activity, knowing that the property involved in such a financial
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity,
and acting with a specific kind of intent.92 The violator's intent must
include one of the following: (a) promoting the carrying on of the
specified unlawful activity,93 (b) intending to violate 26 U.S.C. §§
7201 and 7206 (tax offenses not included as specified unlawful
offenses), 94 (c) knowing that the transaction is meant to confuse the
90 The long list of predicates that apply both to §§ 1956 and 1957 includes, among
others: destruction of aircraft, counterfeiting, bribery, espionage, "prohibited transactions
involving nuclear materials," a bevy of fraud offenses, kidnapping, hostage taking, and of
course, drug offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (2000).
9' See infra Part II.B (discussion of legislative history).
92 Thus, a prosecutor trying to convict someone of an offense under § 1956 must prove:
(1) knowledge, (2) the existence of proceeds derived from a specified unlawful activity, (3) a
financial transaction, and (4) intent (discussed above). See, e.g., United States v. Sayakhom,
186 F.3d 928, 942-43 (9th Cir. 1999) (listing the elements that must be proven to achieve a
conviction under § 1956). Moreover, the transaction must involve some link to interstate
commerce.
13 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i) (2000). The range of different activities included in the
list of predicates triggering liability means that the intent to promote the carrying on of a
specified unlawful activity can lead to criminal liability for a whole range of different types
of offense. See, e.g., United States v. Febus, 218 F.3d 784, 790 (7th Cir. 2000) (defendant
faced criminal liability when intending to reinvest the proceeds of an illegal lottery to
promote its continuing operation); United States v. Ross, 210 F.3d 916, 921 (8th Cir. 2000)
(concluding defendant violated § 1956 when intending to use the proceeds of wire fraud to
facilitate the continuation of a wire fraud scheme).
94 Section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code provides: "Any person who willfully
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment
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source or control of proceeds of specified unlawful activity, " or (d)
acting with knowledge that the transaction is designed to avoid some
of the Bank Secrecy Act's reporting requirements, or state reporting
requirements, discussed below.96 From the language of the statute
one might conclude that a typical violation could involve not only the
drug trafficker breaking down currency deposits to hide their origin,
but also persons involved in the third-party laundering of non-
currency criminal proceeds that have to do with offenses such as the
sale of counterfeit aircraft parts.97 After the new USA Patriot Act
("USAPA"), which radically expanded federal authority to engage in
the fight against money laundering, the category of specified
unlawful activity has expanded dramatically. It now includes, among
other things, any crime of violence, bribery of a public official,
smuggling of munitions, any offense for which the United States is
obligated to extradite or prosecute someone by multilateral treaty,
firearms trafficking, computer fraud, and "terrorism offenses" as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332(b).98 If the specified unlawful activity
category had the potential to serve as a means of focusing the use of
criminal money laundering statutes, what little remained of that
thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony.." I.R.C.
§ 7201 (West 2002). Section 7206 allows the government to prosecute taxpayers
committing fraud or making false statements when attempting to defeat the assessment or
collection of a tax. I.R.C. § 7206 (West 2002).
95 Formally, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) provides that the intent requirement for (c),
discussed above, is satisfied if a person acts "with the knowledge that the transaction is
designed in whole or part to disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of
the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity."
96 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) (2000). See, e.g., United States v. Nunez-Hemandez,
221 F.3d 1349, 1351 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding defendants faced liability because they
sought to hide the fact that proceeds of the sale of illegal drugs were used to buy a house in
which additional drug crime-related activity occurred); United States v. Thayer, 204 F.3d
1352, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding defendant violated § 1956 because of the intent to
conceal the source of illegally derived funds by transferring them through a number of straw
business accounts). But see United States v. Olaniyi-Oke, 199 F.3d 767, 770 (5th Cir. 1999)
(fraudulent use of another person's name and credit card not enough to establish that a
person intended to avoid some reporting requirement).
" See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D) (2000).
98 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (U.S.A. Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107- 56, §
315, 115 Stat. 272, 308-09 (2001). Terrorism offenses are included among the specified
unlawful activities through amendments to RICO to include terrorism offenses as predicates,
since the list of specified unlawful activities already encompasses all RICO offenses. The
amendments also create predicates involving offenses under multilateral treaties for which
defendants can be extradited. Most of those offenses involve conduct that would be
described as terrorism colloquially, including hostage taking and aircraft hijacking.
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argument has been vanquished by September 11 and the resulting
USAPA changes.
The activity requirement necessary to establish an offense under
§ 1956(a)(1) is the existence of a "financial transaction," or at least
an attempt to engage in one.99 Perhaps in large measure with an eye
to making life easier for prosecutors and investigators, the statute
defines "financial transaction" quite broadly, including in that
umbrella the purchase, loan, sale, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery or
other disposition of property between parties. 00 When a financial
institution is involved, a financial transaction includes the usual array
of things that a bank can do for a customer, including a deposit,
withdrawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, loan,
extension of credit, use of a safe deposit box, or just about any other
payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial
institution. °1
The statute does more than just criminalize financial transactions
that conceal or promote specified unlawful activities. It also provides
for a separate crime involving the activity of international movement,
or the transnational transportation, transmission, or transfer
("transportation") of money connected to some crimes.0 2
99 See United States v. McLamb, 985 F.2d 1284, 1292 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting § 1956
bars both financial transactions and attempts at financial transactions). But cf United States
v. Fuller, 974 F.2d 1474, 1478-80 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding that substantial steps toward
completing the transaction must take place, and that mere preparation for criminal activity is
not enough to constitute a transaction).
'00 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3) (2000). Meanwhile, § 1956(c)(4) defines financial transaction
as:
(A) a transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce (i) involving
the movement of funds by wire or other means, or (ii) involving one or more monetary
instruments, or (iii) involving the transfer of title to any real property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft,
or (B) a transaction involving the use of a financial institution which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree.
The resulting definition is even broader when one considers the definition of "transaction" in
§ 1956(c)(3).
101 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4).
102 Formally, § 1956(a)(2) provides that the activity requirement for "international
transportation, transmission, or transfer" money laundering is triggered when a person:
transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit, or transfer a monetary
instrument or funds from a place in the United States to or through a place outside the United
States or to a place in the United States from or through a place outside the United States ....
The remainder of the subsection of the statute describes the relevant intent requirements that
trigger liability. The statute defines a monetary instrument as:
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Specifically, § 1956(a)(2) establishes three separate offenses: (a)
intending to promote the carrying on of a specified unlawful activity
through the transnational transportation; (b) the transnational
transportation of money representing the proceeds of some form of
unlawful activity, with the intent to conceal or disguise the link
between the money and the unlawful activity; and (c) the
transnational transportation of specified unlawful activity proceeds
with the intent to avoid a state or federal transaction reporting
requirement) °3 Offenses meant to promote the carrying out of some
specified unlawful activity need not involve the proceeds of specified
unlawful activity in order to trigger criminal liability. Thus, if a
person uses perfectly clean money gleaned from capital gains on
equity investments and uses it to support illegal drug agriculture in
Bolivia, she is violating § 1956(a)(2)(A).
Of course, the fact that someone can be prosecuted for making
transactions linked to the promotion or concealment of specified
unlawful activity does not mean it is easy to detect such transactions.
On the contrary: if the concern that gave rise to the anti-money
laundering statutes is correct, then the existence of underworld
professionals specializing in money laundering might make these
transactions particularly difficult to detect.10 4  Prosecutors use the
"sting" provision contained in § 1956 to help allay this problem.
Section 1956(a)(3) makes it a crime to conduct (or attempt to
conduct) a financial transaction with property that a law enforcement
officer represents °5 as the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity
with one of three types of intent that are probably familiar by now:
(a) promoting some specified unlawful activity,"0 6 (b) concealing or
(i) coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers' checks, personal
checks, bank checks, and money orders, or (ii) investment securities or negotiable instruments, in
bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery[.]
18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(5).
'0' See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(2)(A), 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), and 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii), respectively.
104 The legislative history emphasizes the concern that money laundering professionals
would prove particularly effective at evading detection. See infra Part II.B.
105 The statute allows for criminal liability even when the representation is made not by a
law enforcement officer but by some other person-such as a confidential informant-"at
the direction of, or with the approval of, a Federal official authorized to investigate or
prosecute violations of this section." 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3).
106 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(A); see, e.g., United States v. Shorter, 54 F.3d 1248, 1257
(7th Cir. 1995) (money laundering conviction sustained where co-conspirator gave proceeds
of illegal drug sale to a defendant using wire transfers, and co-conspirator testified that the
same defendant supplied him with illegal drugs).
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disguising unlawful activity proceeds," 7 or (c) avoiding reporting
requirements. 108
Most of the time prosecutors use § 1956 in connection with
criminal prosecutions. But the statute also includes a civil penalty
provision that lowers the standard of proof necessary to levy some
sort of penalty under the statute. This gives prosecutors an added
tool that can increase their bargaining power against individuals or
financial institutions suspected of engaging in certain transactions to
promote a crime or conceal it by hiding the money."0 9
If § 1956 opens the door for law enforcement to punish someone
who did not commit a crime but supports it indirectly by hiding the
money or plowing more of it into the criminal activity, § 1957 swings
that door wide open-making it even easier to convict a third-party
launderer who had nothing directly to do with the underlying offense.
The offense is titled "engaging in monetary transactions in property
derived from specified unlawful activity."''1 The statute essentially
prohibits the knowing disbursement or receipt of more than $10,000
of criminally derived proceeds if a financial institution is used at
some point.'" Unlike with § 1956, a person commits an offense
under this section even if the funds are not used for any additional
criminal purpose or the defendant lacks any specific intent. Thus, if a
107 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B); see, e.g., United States v. Wydermyer, 51 F.3d 319, 325
(2d Cir. 1995) (upholding money laundering conviction of defendant who consented to
laundering money that police informant claimed were the proceeds of illegal arms sales).
'0' 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(C); see, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 66 F.3d 1036, 1040-45
(9th Cir. 1995) (where defendant believed that undercover officer was a drug dealer and
defendant sought to avoid reporting requirement, money laundering conviction under §
1956(a)(3)(C) was warranted).
'09 Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b) contains a provision for imposing civil penalties of
not more than the greater of the value of the property, funds, or monetary instruments
involved in the transaction, or $10,000, for anyone who conducts or attempts to conduct a
transaction described in §§ 1956(a)(1) or (a)(3), or alternatively, a transportation,
transmission, or transfer described in § 1956(a)(2). Some courts have even decided that a
prosecutor can use the civil penalty provision against a person found guilty of some sort of
money laundering-related criminal violation encompassing some of the same conduct. See
United States v. Haywood, 864 F. Supp. 502 (W.D.N.C. 1994) (civil complaint filed under §
1956(b) did not put an attorney in double jeopardy where the attorney had earlier pled to an
information setting forth a one-count violation of 26 U.S.C. § 60501 for the same
transaction).
10 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2001).
111 Formally, it is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 ifa person (I) engages or attempts to
engage; (2) in a monetary transaction (interpreted to mean the use of a financial institution);
(3) in criminally derived property; (4) where the value of that property is more than $10,000;
(4) the property comes from specified unlawful activity (defined just as it is under § 1956);
and (5) the person knows that the property is criminally derived. 18 U.S.C. § 1957.
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car dealer takes more than $10,000 that he knows to be derived from
criminal activity, he violates § 1957. Because criminal liability under
the statute requires the transaction in question to be more than
$10,000 but the transaction is so vaguely defined, a major issue in
interpreting § 1957 is the exact meaning of the monetary amount
threshold. Courts seem dismissive of the importance of tracing in the
context of § 1956 prosecutions. Not so for § 1957, where it is well-
settled that a conviction under that statute requires that at least
$10,000 be traced back to some specified unlawful activity."2 If
courts let prosecutors dispense with proving tracing altogether, it
would be hard to argue that the $10,000 threshold in § 1957 makes
any difference at all in any case where the defendant happened to
have access to an account with more than $10,000, because then all
of that money could be assumed to be illegal. But just what "tracing"
means in the context of § 1957 is not entirely clear, even if the trend
suggests some sort of pragmatic balancing requiring the government
to do more tracing as the ratio of tainted to clean funds increases.113
At least one circuit has concluded that the government must trace the
commingled funds to a specified unlawful activity or prove that the
entire source of funds in an account derived from specified unlawful
activity. 4 Meanwhile, as a result of the USAPA, prosecutors can
also charge someone with a civil violation of § 1957.15
Distinctions in the details of §§ 1956 and 1957 should not
obscure the prevailing pattern in the way courts parse the statutes'
abstruse terms: with just occasional exceptions, over time the
statutes' interpretation has tended to favor prosecutors. Court
interpretation of the knowledge requirement under the two core anti-
money laundering statutes illustrates the trend favoring prosecutors.
Courts follow the language in the statutes to require knowledge that
the funds in question were derived from some illegal activity, and not
from a specified unlawful activity.1 6 Beyond this, courts seem to
112 See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 74 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 1996).
113 Compare United States v. Sokolow, 81 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 1996) (where $20,000 in
dirty money was commingled, the government was not required to engage in extensive
tracing to prove that all the money involved was dirty) with United States v. Mills, 116 WL
634207 (D. Ga. 1996) (concluding that the government could not presume that a transaction
involves $10,000 in funds from specified unlawful activity, even if more than $10,000 was
deposited into the account, when the ratio of clean to dirty money was about 800:1).
1H4 United States v. Rutgard, 108 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1997).
115 Supra note 98, at § 317, 115 Stat. 310 (2001).
116 Section 1956(c)(1) defines knowledge to mean "that the person knew the property
involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form ... of activity that
20031
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accept the premise that the legislature created the statutes in large
measure to target third parties who facilitate money laundering
without necessarily being involved in the underlying crime.1 7 This
seems to lead courts to the conclusion that, although the statutes
require "actual knowledge," willful blindness can amount to such
knowledge, at least (1) when the defendant claims to lack such
knowledge, (2) the facts suggest deliberate ignorance, and (3) jurors
would not misunderstand the instruction as mandating an inference of
willful blindness.118 In some ways the ascribed similarity between
actual knowledge and willful blindness is hardly surprising. Suppose
a private banker who normally gleans some knowledge of the origin
of his clients' funds is introduced to a potential client reputed to be a
criminal. Suppose the private banker, having been placed on alert
that his new customer might be a criminal, then changes his practices
to avoid learning anything about the new client's funds. It seems
plausible that the private banker should face the risk of liability at
least under § 1957, which does not require specific intent to promote
an unlawful offense. Indeed, the private banker's willful blindness
almost amounts to actual knowledge, because it was triggered by the
knowledge of the new client's reputation. The problem is that a
potential defendant does not always know ahead of time that a new
client is suspected to be a criminal. Because of this, courts applying
the willful blindness doctrine have had to explain what it is about
people, their behavior, or their money, that gives rise to such
compelling suspicion that the rejection of that suspicion amounts to
willful blindness. For example, in United States v. Campbell, a real
estate agent was involved in a transaction with a person who drove a
red Porsche, possessed a cellphone (certainly more unusual in 1992
than ten years later), and once brought a briefcase filled with $20,000
in cash to demonstrate his ability to pay for the property.1 9 By
concluding that the real estate agent engaged in "willful blindness,"
the court here endorsed the use of a sort of criminal profile that, if
constitutes a felony under state, federal, or foreign law... " 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(1) (2000).
Similarly, § 1957(c) indicates the "Government is not required to prove the defendant knew
that the offense from which the criminally derived property was derived was specified
unlawful activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1957(c) (2000); see, e.g., United States v. Bomfield, 145
F.3d 1123, 1132 (10th Cir. 1998) (for conviction under § 1957, the defendant only needs to
know that the property is "criminally derived").
17 See, e.g., United States v. Gamez, I F. Supp. 2d 176, 181 (E.D.N.Y 1998).
118 See, e.g., United States v. St. Michael's Credit Union, 880 F.2d 579, 584 (1st Cir.
1989) (explaining three-part test for the application of willful blindness theory).
"' 977 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1992).
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observed, should lead to the inference that the money or property in
question is "criminally derived." If you drive a flashy car and have a
briefcase with $20,000 cash but are saddled with bad credit, then
people who ignore the possibility that you are a criminal when they
take your money might be seen to be willfully blind.
120
As with the willful blindness doctrine, courts have also
broadened the scope of the term "financial transaction" in § 1956 to a
striking degree, even when considering the open-ended language in
the relevant portions of the statute. 12 A financial transaction must
have a link to interstate commerce in order to trigger liability under §
1956-but this element is satisfied with minimal effects on interstate
commerce, such as investment in construction of a shopping mall or
deposits in a federally insured financial institution.1 22  More
importantly, courts have decided that "financial transaction" means,
among other things, selling a car or transferring title to a truck.123 It
also means transferring cashiers' checks,124 depositing money into a
bank account, l2 5 wiring funds, 26 posting a bail bond,1 27 writing
120 To be sure, in Campbell and a number of other willful blindness cases, the defendant
also does something to try to hide the transaction that allegedly involved willful blindness.
Even if that action, such as failing to include a payment in a real estate closing statement,
falls far short of avoiding statutory reporting requirements, the action is taken by courts to be
an indication of a defendant's guilty mind. See id. But the courts' legalistic reasoning about
willful blindness hardly seems to require such an effort at concealment, and the elements of
§ 1957 certainly do not require it.
121 The term "monetary transaction" used in § 1957 has also been subject to expansion,
though courts have found it difficult to eviscerate the ineluctable textual requirement that the
transaction retain some link to a financial institution. See United States v. Richard, 234 F.3d
763, 767 (1st Cir. 2000) (defining "monetary transaction," consistent with other circuits, to
include giving fraudulent checks to a co-conspirator who then deposits them in a financial
institution).
122 See United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210, 1219 (8th Cir. 1991) (construction
activities affect interstate commerce); United States v. Ladum, 141 F.3d 1328, 1339 (9th Cir.
1998) (interstate commerce nexus established if a transaction "employs a utility" of interstate
commerce, such as FDIC-insured institution). But see United States v. Edwards, Ill F.
Supp. 2d 1057, 1062-63 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (in-state currency payment does not satisfy
requirement of interstate commerce nexus absent additional facts).
123 See, e.g., United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1990)
(transferring title to a pickup truck amounts to a financial transaction because it was
allegedly "purported to be a sale," and the statute should be interpreted fairly broadly).
124 See, e.g., United States v. Arditti, 955 F.2d 331, 338 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that since
cashiers' checks count as property and "funds," their transfer amounts to a financial
transaction).
125 See, e.g., United States v. Jolivet, 224 F.3d 902, 909 (8th Cir. 2000) (invoking
congressional intent as well as the plain language of § 1956 to conclude that merely
depositing money in a bank account is a financial transaction).
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checks, 128 or cashing embezzled checks at a bank. 129 This last sort of
financial transaction highlights the related issue of when an act of
money laundering "merges" with the underlying offense in situations
where, as with the cashing of the embezzled check, the financial
transaction might be viewed as part of the underlying offense. The
prevailing view is that as long as the money laundering violation
involves at least one separate transaction from the underlying crime,
it counts as a separate offense. 3 ' Even when courts say that an
underlying offense, by itself, does not amount to a money laundering
violation, prosecutors can often cure the defect by charging someone
for conduct that comes only slightly later in the process of
committing a criminal offense. What makes this easier is the
pliability of the definition of financial transaction-as more and more
conduct involving money gained from crime is viewed as amounting
to a financial transaction, it becomes easier for prosecutors to make a
money laundering case against an underlying offender for doing
almost anything at all with the proceeds from a specified unlawful
activity.
One might think that even if "financial transaction" ends up
meaning almost anything under the sun, there would still be some
126 See, e.g, United States v. King, 169 F.3d 1035, 1039 (6th Cir. 1999) (conviction
affirmed when virtually all the financial transactions involved in offenses under § 1956 were
wire transfers).
127 See, e.g., United States v. France, 164 F.3d 203, 208 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that
"posting of bond constitutes a sufficient financial transaction for money laundering
purposes").
128 See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 841 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasizing
the breadth of the term "transaction," and concluding that writing a check-along with
almost anything else with some nexus to interstate commerce-amounts to a financial
transaction).
129 See, e.g., United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1216-17 (3d Cir. 1993)
(concluding that a financial transaction occurred for the purposes of liability under § 1956
where defendant cashed embezzled checks).
130 In most cases, courts resolving these issues invoke congressional intent and suggest
that Congress intended to punish money laundering separately from the underlying offense.
Whether or not this is true is difficult to discern because Congress is a "they," not an "it."
But even if it were true, it begs the question of whether a single financial transaction-or a
set of closely related transactions-should count as separate offenses.
131 For example, in United States v. Holmes, 44 F.3d 1150 (2d Cir. 1995), the court
considered the appeal of a local union president accused of embezzling the union's money.
Prosecutors charged him with embezzling the money and then laundering it. Holmes
claimed he should not be punished for both activities, since the embezzlement is what
generated the funds that were laundered. The Second Circuit rejected Holmes' argument,
because the purpose of the money laundering statutes was to "provide a punishment in
addition to other punishment[s]." Id. at 1154 (citation omitted).
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limits because offenses under § 1956(a) still require an intent to
promote or conceal a specified unlawful activity. But while "intent to
promote" still seems to have some content to it, 32 "intent to conceal"
has proven more pliable.'33 In fact, whenever prosecutors have
trouble tracing the money involved in a financial transaction back to
the specified unlawful activity they might try to argue that obviously
the transaction in question is meant to conceal the specified unlawful
activity, because otherwise it would be easy to trace the proceeds
back to the crime.'34 The predictable result is that prosecutors can
almost always slap on a money laundering charge to financial crime
offenses involving financial transactions, generating far more severe
potential penalties and enhancing their bargaining position against
defendants. "'
The swelling reach of the concept of "financial transaction"
under § 1956 stands despite a legislative history suggesting that
Congress-to the extent it intended anything-sought to craft a
definition of financial transaction that would not expand to include
everything under the sun. 136  Moreover, because § 1956 has no
explicit Sixth Amendment protection built in to prevent the
government from using money laundering prosecutions or associated
forfeitures to interfere with criminal defense funding, the widening
scope of the statute also raises the question of when government
interference with the funding of criminal representation violates the
132 See United States v. Savage, 67 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1995).
133 United States v. Villarini, 238 F.3d 530 (4th Cir. 2001), nicely illustrates the point. A
bank employee embezzled $83,000 from the bank where she worked. She deposited the
money in small transactions of less than $3,000 at two-to-four week intervals. The court
concluded that the defendant's deposits could give rise to a reasonable inference that she was
trying to give the appearance of a legitimate income stream. Prosecutors needed to prove
nothing more about the defendant's intent to conceal the underlying crime.
134 Prosecutors could make the argument that difficulty of tracing implies "intent to
conceal" in § 1956(a) prosecutions because of the implication that if transactions with intent
to conceal had not taken place, then tracing money to the crime would be simple.
131 See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the implications of this power. But see United
States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1474 (10th Cir. 1994) (insisting that money
laundering statutes are not "money spending" statutes).
136 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 99-855, at 13 (1986) (listing a number of specific types of
activities that the report's authors believed should be considered "financial transactions").
Of course, a reference to legislative history should not be taken as an assertion that Congress
possesses a collective will on this issue or any issue. See infra note 309 and accompanying
text, for a discussion of the uses and limitations of legislative history in discussing the goals
of anti-money laundering legislation.
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Constitution." 7 The continuing trend toward widening what is meant
by financial transaction gives prosecutors ever more leeway in
deciding when to use § 1956, because the occurrence of some kind of
financial transaction is what triggers liability under the statute. In
short, the pattern is that interpretations have become more draconian
over time. Part of this is because the statutes are written to favor
expansive interpretations that lower the costs of prosecuting the
offense, as demonstrated by the expansive definition of financial
transactions. But there may be other reasons why courts might tend
to resolve so many of the ambiguities in §§ 1956 and 1957 in favor of
prosecutors, a subject to which I turn below.'38
The reason why §§ 1956 and 1957 are so useful to prosecutors is
not only that it is relatively easy to prove the necessary elements for a
conviction, but also that the penalties available for those convictions
are tremendously severe under the federal sentencing guidelines.'39
In some cases, money laundering penalties are more severe than for
the underlying predicate offenses. 4 ' Although the guidelines
applicable to money laundering offenses have recently been revised
to make a better case that the punishments have some relationship to
the severity of the offense committed, the resulting guidelines still
punish money laundering activity severely.'4' Even if the applicable
guidelines for money laundering are not always more severe than
those for predicate offenses, the sentences are certainly severe
137 See generally D. Randall Johnson, The Criminally Derived Property Statute:
Constitutional and Interpretive Issues Raised by 18 U.S.C. § 1957, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1291 (1993).
138 Ironically, even though the statutes' text and interpretation favors prosecutors, the
anti-money laundering laws are still better at addressing some kinds of money laundering
and worse at addressing other kinds. For example, the text of §§ 1956 and 1957 still requires
that most violations have some link to specified unlawful activity. This made it quite hard
for prosecutors to make a case against some of the potential defendants in the case involving
the suspected transfer of $7 billion in funds from Russia through the Republic Bank of New
York. See infra note 447.
139 Note that the usefulness of the statutes may be understated by the number of federal
money laundering prosecutions; even the possibility of a money laundering charge with a
severe penalty might lead defendants to strike different types of bargains with prosecutors.
The federal government does not appear to keep data on the number of cases that could have
given rise to a money laundering charge but were not so charged.
140 See supra Part IIf.A.
14 The new guidelines combine the previously separate provisions applicable to §§ 1956
and 1957, and aim to fulfill the Sentencing Commission's long-running objective of
bringing the penalties for laundering more in line with the penalties for underlying offenses.
The major impact is to reduce the applicable guideline range for money laundering involving
fraud predicate offenses. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1.1 (2001).
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enough that prosecutors and investigators could use money
laundering charges as substitutes for underlying predicate offense
charges that might be more difficult to prove against particular
defendants. After all, §§ 1956 and 1957 generally only require that
the money in question be traced to the specified unlawful activity, not
that the defendant possess any particular link to the commission of
the specified unlawful activity.
Although prosecutions under the core anti-money laundering
statutes might be especially attractive given these draconian
sentencing guidelines, they are not the only statutory tools
prosecutors can use to undermine money laundering. Even before
anyone had ever heard of federal anti-money laundering laws,
prosecutors were using federal conspiracy statutes to attack forms of
money laundering tied to drug trafficking offenses. For example, in
United States v. Barnes, the Second Circuit noted:
[I]mporters, wholesalers, purchasers of "cutting" materials, and persons who "wash"
money are all as necessary to the success of a drug venture as the trafficker. They can
all be held to agree with one another in what has been called a "chain" conspiracy.
Such a theory of criminal liability is still available, though it is
likely to be less attractive because it requires that prosecutors
establish a link to the underlying criminal activity (i.e., drug
trafficking) and does not expose the defendant to punishment for
violating multiple statutes.
Still other tools available to prosecutors seeking to disrupt the
sorts of activities encompassed by criminal finance include federal
forfeiture provisions, criminal penalties for structuring and other
reporting violations such as breaking up deposits to avoid reporting
currency transactions, and state money laundering and forfeiture
laws. Though forfeiture laws are controversial, it is at least plausible
to view them as tools that might help the government attack money
laundering through confiscation of criminal proceeds and
accessories.'43 Federal law provides for the in personam criminal
142 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979).
113 The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114, Stat. 202 (2000),
was the first civil asset forfeiture law to be passed by Congress since the initial forfeiture
statutes were enacted in 1789. The law radically affected civil forfeiture. Among other
things, it placed new burdens and time limits on the government, created a uniform
"innocent owner" defense, allowed claimants to recover interest and attorneys fees, resolved
ambiguities that had split the courts, and provided the government with new procedural tools
that could enhance its ability to use forfeiture to address crime. For a discussion, see
generally Stefan D. Cassella, The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Expanded
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forfeiture of any property traceable to (or involved in) a money
laundering offense.'44 Civil forfeiture is also available against
property connected to money laundering, as are civil and criminal
forfeiture for the proceeds of any offense defined as specified
unlawful activity.'45 Forfeiture seems to attract enthusiastic attention
from law enforcement authorities, who have also held out the
prospect of sharing forfeited assets with informants and foreign
governments to galvanize their cooperation. In 1994 alone, the
Department of Justice reported that the government achieved
forfeiture of approximately $550 million. 4 Meanwhile, criminal
penalties for currency-related reporting violations include, for
example, the prohibition against the operation of an illegal money
transmitting business,'47 prohibitions on breaking down deposits (or
"structuring" them) to evade reporting requirements,'48 and penalties
for financial institutions' failure to file reports--discussed below-
required under the Bank Secrecy Act and other legal provisions.'49
Moreover, a financial institution violating criminal anti-money
laundering laws may even face the regulatory equivalent of the
"death penalty" by being forced to forfeit its charter and terminate its
federal deposit insurance. 50  State anti-money laundering laws have
Government Forfeiture Authority and Strict Deadlines Imposed on All Parties, 27 J. LEGIS.
92 (2001).
'14 18 U.S.C. § 982 (2000). The statute even permits for the forfeiture of substitute
assets in appropriate circumstances. Courts have pervasively concluded that forfeiture under
this section requires tracing. See, e.g., United States v. Voight, 89 F.3d 1050, 1087 (3d Cir.
1996). But cf United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding the
warrantless seizure of wire transfers on the basis that such a seizure does not violate the
Fourth Amendment when the Attorney General has probable cause to believe that property is
subject to forfeiture).
' 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2000).
146 OTA REP., supra note 29, at 38 n.l 1 (1995) (citing information provided by the
Executive Office of Asset Forfeiture, Department of Justice, Jan. 13, 1995).
147 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (1994). Because of Title IIl of USAPA, operating an illegal money
transmitting business is a general intent, rather than specific intent, crime. See USA Patriot
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 373, 115 Stat. 339 (2001).
148 31 U.S.C. § 5321 etseq. (2000).
149 Id. Convictions under this section carry penalties of up to five years for a single
violation and up to ten years for "a pattern of any illegal activity involving more than
$100,000 a year." 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c) (2000). See also United States v. Bank of New
England N.A, 821 F.2d 854 (1st Cir. 1987) (developing doctrine of criminal liability where
financial institutions and their officers exhibit "flagrant indifference" to Bank Secrecy Act
requirements).
15o See Annunzio-Wylie Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550 §§ 1502, 1503, and 1507, 106 Stat.
3672 at 4044-45, 4048-49, 4055-56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
See also 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2000) (providing for termination of deposit insurance,
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also proliferated, giving local prosecutors and investigators a chance
to engage in some of the same charging patterns that their federal
counterparts practice. 5' By the same token, state authorities might
face similar problems in detecting money laundering activity when it
is not obvious from large aggregations of currency or from an
investigation incident to an underlying offense that has already been
detected.'
In short, depending on the details of her conduct, a money
launderer might face liability under § 1956 for promoting or
concealing specified unlawful activity through a financial transaction,
such as selling currency derived from some criminal activity to a
money exchange business. The transaction might also give rise to
criminal liability under § 1957 for the operator of the money
exchange business if he knows the currency represented criminal
proceeds. Both individuals might face the prospect of civil and
criminal forfeiture of the instrumentalities of the laundering (i.e., the
building housing the money transmitting business), as well as what
the laundered money buys. The two persons might also face liability
for criminal violations of regulatory-type provisions arising from
conduct such as structuring cash deposits to evade reporting
requirements. Finally, both might be punished under state anti-
money laundering laws (by state prosecutors), or under a conspiracy
theory (i.e., conspiracy to important narcotics) used to go after money
laundering even before specific statutes against the practice were on
the books. But even if individual launderers end up honeycombed
with criminal liability, their opportunity to launder might depend
substantially on the conduct of financial institutions, whose
incentives might be driven at least as much by regulations and civil
penalties (discussed below) as by criminal sanctions on individuals.
subsequent to a hearing); 12 U.S.C. § 93(d) (allowing for revocation of bank charter of
offending bank).
"'t See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 6-1242 (2003); CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.9 (West 2003);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §28-28-408 (West 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-289 (West
2003); 9 GUAM. CODE ANN. § 67.410 (2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-15-1 (West 2003);
N.J. STAT.ANN. § 2C:21-25 (West 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-901 (West 2003).
152 As far as I can tell from reported cases, state money laundering charges and
convictions are not extremely common relative to federal ones. Aside from the lower
incidence of charges and convictions, I am not aware of any evidence that state law
enforcement agencies pursue any fundamentally different strategy when compared to federal
authorities targeting money laundering.
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2. Rules Administered by Regulators
Parallel to the system of criminal statutes and pretrial procedures
administered by prosecutors is a framework of regulations and civil
penalty actions overseen by regulators. This system of rules is aimed
primarily at financial institutions, and has two obvious and
interrelated purposes: to give financial institutions an incentive to
cooperate in fighting against money laundering, and to force those
institutions to generate information that can help investigators
working with prosecutors to detect money laundering activity.'53
What follows is a discussion of the major regulatory requirements
imposed on financial institutions and others, and a summary of the
major changes to these requirements following the passage of Title
III of USAPA, which represents the most dramatic change in
regulatory authority designed to disrupt criminal finance since the
entire system was created in 1970.
Not surprisingly, the bulk of the requirements involve
accounting for transactions involving physical currency. Before
1970, banks could take large currency deposits-even from people
whose circumstances and behavior hinted that the money's origin
was probably illegal activity-without filing any sort of report. For
the most part, banks lacked economic incentives to have any
compunctions about taking such money.'54  The Currency and
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, commonly known as the Bank
Secrecy Act of 1970, has been the basis of a decades-long effort to
shape the behavior of financial institutions, create an audit trail
allowing law enforcement to track large currency transactions, and
thereby deter tax evasion and money laundering.' The "secrecy" in
the Act's title is misleading, since its main purpose is to limit, rather
153 The legislative history of the Bank Secrecy Act highlights the two major purposes of
the regulatory scheme: (1) generating information, and (2) driving a wedge between
financial institutions and customers trying to launder money. See generally Foreign Bank
Secrecy and Bank Records: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts., Supervision, and
Deposit Ins., Comm. on Banking, Fin. Servs. & Urban Affairs, U.S. HR., 91st Cong. 2nd
Session (1970). See also Foreign Bank Secrecy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fin.
Insts., Comm. on Banking & Currency, U.S. S., 91 st Cong. 2d Sess. (1970).
154 It is plausible that some banks might have harbored an interest in protecting their
reputation by refusing deposits, but this assumes that such deposits would be detected.
Given the quantity of money probably laundered each year (tens of billions of dollars) and
the tiny amount detected or investigated, this assumption is hardly warranted.
155 P.L. 91-508, Titles I and II, as amended, codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951-59
(2000), and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5330 (2000). Regulations implementing Title II of the Bank
Secrecy Act (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5330) appear at 31 C.F.R. § 103 (2002).
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than boost, the secrecy of some financial transactions. Although the
law's main purpose was not to outlaw money laundering directly, but
to create a regulatory structure to obtain information about currency
transactions, it also provides for criminal penalties for reporting
violations.'56 The theory behind the law was in part that banks would
be forced to become vigilant in identifying suspect customers and
transactions.157
The Bank Secrecy Act gives the Treasury Department a
substantial degree of discretion to define what counts as a "financial
institution," which current regulations have defined to include
depository institutions such as state and federally chartered
commercial banks, money services businesses such as check cashers,
currency exchangers, and money transmitters, post offices, casinos,
and securities firms.'58 Under the regulations, financial institutions
must file a Currency Transaction Report (CTR) to report any single
currency transaction over $10,000, and multiple transactions that total
over $10,000 conducted on the same business day if the institution
knows the transaction was conducted on behalf of the same person.' 59
Businesses and trades that receive more than $10,000 for a single
transaction-including lawyers-have to file reports of the
transaction."6  So must licensed casinos,"' except if they are in
156 A willful violation of the Bank Secrecy Act is punishable by a criminal fine of up to
$500,000 or ten years imprisonment, or both. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a), (b).
117 Cf infra note 306.
158 See Secretary of the Treasury, Report to Congress in Accordance with Section 357 of
the USA PATRIOT Act 6 (2002), available at www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/357.pdf.
According to the report, Treasury's current definition of financial institution covers about
24,000 depository institutions, about 160,000 money services businesses (including, among
others, check cashers, currency dealers or exchangers, issuers, sellers, and redeemers of
traveler's checks, money orders and stored value cards, and money transmitters such as
Western Union); 40,000 Post Offices (where people can purchase money orders); about 600
casinos and gaming organizations located in thirty states, territories, and tribal lands; and
5000 or so securities firms. An undetermined number of entities (including, for example,
insurance companies) may also be covered under the functional definition of financial
institution established by Treasury under authority from 31 U.S.C. § 5312 and under Section
352 of USAPA.
"9 See 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (2000) (establishing CTR requirement); 31 C.F.R. §
103.22(b)(1) (2002) (implementing CTR requirement, fulfilled by filing Form 4789).
160 Regulations require the filing of IRS Form 8300 for currency payments in excess of
$10,000 for a single transaction. See 26 U.S.C. § 60501(f) (2000). Indeed, the example
explaining the IRS regulation explicitly refers to a lawyer's receipt of cash for services
rendered. Although reporting of Form 8300 historically was governed by the Internal
Revenue Code, the requirement is now within the Bank Secrecy Act.
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Nevada (where cash payouts over $10,000 need not be identified), a
quirky exception that highlights the extent to which the details of
regulatory requirements and enforcement might be driven by
politics.162 On the theory that launderers might physically carry
money out of the country instead of taking their chances structuring
deposits in the United States, the regulations also impose a
requirement on individuals to report the transportation of $10,000 or
more in currency or monetary instruments into or out of the
country.'63 Individuals must also disclose the existence of foreign
bank accounts over which they have signature authority or control
with balances of more than $10,000 during the calendar year.'6 4
Because these requirements are likely to be tremendously overbroad,
the Bank Secrecy Act requires Treasury to exempt some transactions
and gives it the discretion to exempt even more.
165
Some of the Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements might
seem invasive, but the Supreme Court has found those requirements
constitutional. Shortly after its inception, bank customers whose
activities were being reported challenged the constitutionality of the
Bank Secrecy Act and the regulations it spawned. In California
Bankers Ass' v. Shultz, the Supreme Court held the recordkeeping
requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act constitutional on their face, but
161 See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(2)(i) (2002) (requiring CTRs for cash transactions over
$10,000 at certain casinos with annual gaming revenues over $1 million, fulfilled by filing
Form 8362).
162 Since the mid-I 980s, Nevada casinos have avoided reporting requirements in part
because of an aggressive lobbying effort. Nevada casinos must file suspicious activity
reports, though. See Charles Blau, Money Laundering and Currency Violations in Gaming
Enforcement, ABA CTR. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. NAT. INST. B-41 (Apr. 16-17,
1998).
63 See 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (2000) (establishing CMIR requirement, fulfilled by filing Form
4790).
164 See 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (2002) (establishing responsibility of individuals to disclose
foreign bank accounts, fulfilled by filing FBAR (Form 90-22.1)).
165 Treasury must exempt a depository institution from the requirement to report
currency transactions concerning those between the depository institution and the following
entities: (1) another such institution; (2) an agency of the U.S. government, any state, or any
state political subdivision; (3) any entity established by the U.S. government or states; and
(4) any business or category of business the reports on which have little or no value for law
enforcement purposes. See 31 U.S.C. § 5313(d) (2000). Treasury may exempt the filing of
CTRs for transactions involving "qualified business customers," which meet the criteria set
by Treasury. For example, a customer who is withdrawing currency (1) solely for payroll
purposes; (2) has been a bank customer for at least 12 months; (3) operates a firm that
regularly withdraws more than $10,000 to pay its U.S. employees, and (4) is a U.S. resident
is currently entitled to a discretionary exemption. See 31 U.S.C. § 5313(e) (2000).
[Vol. 93
TENUOUS RELATIONSHIP
determined that access to such records should not be arbitrary.166
Instead, access to the records was controlled by "existing legal
process." '167 In finding that the recordkeeping requirements were
constitutional, the Court noted that Congress had virtually plenary
power to regulate cross-border movements, which should logically
be taken to include the movement of currency across borders
(reported through CMIRs) and the existence of bank accounts abroad
controlled by U.S. nationals (reported through FBARs) 6 s Moreover,
the Court believed the recordkeeping requirements to be reasonable
because Congress had reason to believe currency aggregations were
inherently suspicious, and had considered extensive testimony to this
effect. 169
When the Supreme Court again returned to pass on the Bank
Secrecy Act, in United States v. Miller, it was asked to decide
whether an alleged illegal whiskey distiller whose Bank Secrecy Act
records had been obtained by allegedly defective subpoenas had a
Fourth Amendment interest in his bank records.17 The Supreme
Court rejected the argument. This forced it to figure out a way of
distinguishing Boyd v. United States, a holding that is now riddled
with exceptions but has never been explicitly overturned by the
Court. 7  Under Boyd, individuals have a property interest in
documents subject to the government's subpoena power. In Miller,
the Court reasoned that Boyd did not apply to currency and bank
records since the customer had no property interest in the records.
Neither did the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches or seizures affect the government's access to
the records, since its application depends on the individual's
legitimate expectation of privacy and there was none in this case. 72
The customer had no legitimate expectation of privacy, the Court
concluded, since he had consented to disclosure of the information in
question to a third-party (i.e., the bank). It is easy to criticize the
Court's argument that third-party disclosures obviate any reasonable
expectation of privacy when hardly anyone would bank with an
166 416 U.S. 21, 51 (1974).
167 Id. at 52.
168 Id. at 61 (making analogy to cross-border movements, invoking Congress' plenary
power to regulate).
169 Congress, the court concluded, has a justifiable interest in the reporting of activity
that could be fairly considered inherently suspicious.
170 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
171 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
172 Schultz, 416 U.S. at 21.
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institution that promised to make all its customers' records
completely available to the public on the Internet. Nonetheless, the
Court might have been reluctant to completely eviscerate the
government's ability to force third parties to keep records, which
would have been the potential consequence of accepting Miller's
argument.'73 Had the Supreme Court decided otherwise, it is difficult
to see how any of the recordkeeping framework of the Bank Secrecy
Act or its subsequent changes (particularly those changes requiring
the reporting of suspicious activities) could have been salvaged.
Partly in response to these developments, legislators supported the
Right to Financial Privacy Act, which regulated some of the federal
government's access to financial information.'74 The Privacy Act
does stop banks' extreme practices such as turning over entire
customer files without telling customers, and instead creates a system
where, save for some exceptions, investigators must request non-
Bank Secrecy Act records in writing and banks must notify customers
whose records are provided to investigators.'75 The Bank Secrecy
Act therefore allows law enforcement to see records without the
formalities associated with obtaining records through the Privacy Act
or through a regular subpoena.' 6
While the Supreme Court recognized the value of having
reporting requirements for currency transactions, those requirements
are not set in stone. Obviously they can be changed through statutory
173 In principle, the Court might have still left room for recordkeeping requirements even
if it had accepted Miller's argument, by developing a privacy test grounded in the inherent
nature of something rather than in the individual's expectation of privacy. Thus, the Court
might have found Miller's financial records to be inherently private because of something
about the nature of financial records. This would allow one to distinguish, for example,
records of fertilizer purchases that might be useful for ex ante enforcement against the use of
fertilizer to make bombs. The problem with this approach is that it is completely at odds
with the direction in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence since Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 350 (1967), where individual expectations of privacy are central. If it were the nature
of the information rather than the expectation of its privacy that determined whether some
information were protected by the Fourth Amendment, then it would be hard to argue that
such privacy protections should not extend to some kinds of incriminating information, such
as the presence of illegal drugs in someone's back yard. In short, functional concerns help
explain why the Court accepted the government's argument in Miller and found customers to
have no privacy interest in records given to third parties.
174 The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641, 3697-
710 (1978) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§3401-3422); see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-
1383, at 34 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9306.
175 Id.
176 Grand jury subpoenas as example of alternatives available to federal law enforcement
agents investigating possible money laundering offenses.
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amendments and changes in regulations. In addition, the structure of
the regulatory system itself allows Treasury to make some
modifications in the details of the regulatory program without the
need for public comment. For example, Treasury can approve
"Geographic Targeting Orders" (GTOs) that lower the threshold
amount of money that triggers a currency reporting requirement for
particular geographic sectors that are considered to face severe
money laundering problems.'77 In August 1996, Treasury responded
to reports from federal agents describing the flow of money from
New York City to Colombia by issuing a GTO. The order required
twelve money remitters in New York (along with their 1600 agents)
to file reports on all cash remittances involving $750 or more to
Colombia.1 7' A Treasury official described the apparent impact of
the use of GTOs as follows:
The Colombian GTOs had a significant impact on the flow of drug proceeds through
the targeted remitters. Several of the remitters targeted under the GTOs stopped
sending funds to Colombia altogether, while many others sent significantly lower
amounts. Thirteen individuals and two corporations have been indicted or have pled
guilty to structuring transactions to avoid the GTOs. Several others are under
investigation. The GTOs also force the traffickers to resort to other, more difficult
tactics to move their profits back to Colombia. In the first six months after the
Colombian GTOs went into effect, Customs' currency seizures at East Coast Ports of
entry [i.e., airports] increased a roximately four hundred percent as traffickers were
forced to move money in bulk.
1
The GTO was renewed on several occasions, extended to cover
certain New York City remittances to the Dominican Republic, and
eventually expired in October 1997. Despite this assertion of
optimism about GTOs, one would have to assume that launderers are
relatively incompetent to accept that a temporary reporting change
such as a GTO would have anything more than a temporary effect on
money laundering practices. More plausible is a scenario where
launderers make dynamic changes in response to anti-money
laundering strategies that may have a longer-term effect depending
(among other things) on the cost of the substitute strategy.'8 ° Just as
' See 31 C.F.R. § 103.26 (2002). The statutory basis for the GTO regulation is 31
U.S.C. § 5326(a).
178 See Kelly statement, supra note 72.
179 Id. at 6.
180 This is not to say that the GTO targeting remissions to Colombia is useless unless
remittances of illegal money to Colombia are permanently halted. For example, some
money transmitters facing a massive drop off in business because of the GTO might become
unprofitable, forcing them to close or scale back. If the use of targeted enforcement such as
GTOs were substantial enough, it might induce money transmitters to avoid becoming
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the $10,000 reporting threshold leads to the breaking up of deposits
into smaller chunks, launderers seeking to repatriate drug proceeds to
Colombia might shift away from New York City money transmitters
and instead use transmitters in Philadelphia or currency couriers
leaving from JFK Airport. The long-term impact of targeted
regulatory measures such as the GTO depends on the expense and
permanency of the shifts in laundering strategy among traffickers.
Legislators and law enforcement officials have not been entirely
blind to the possibility that laundering strategies are flexible and
therefore require more nuanced responses in addition to the
mechanistic currency reporting requirements. This was a major
justification behind the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering
Act of 1992, which introduced suspicious activity reporting
requirements along with a host of other technical changes in the
system.' Although the suspicious activity reporting system
introduced in 1992 allowed Treasury to require such reports from the
full range of financial institutions, the Federal Reserve Board and the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency had already been requiring
financial institutions to report suspicious transactions to regulatory
authorities since 1985. 82 Existing suspicious activity reporting
regulations require financial institutions to report suspicious activity
in a number of circumstances.183 For example, financial institutions
must report any known or suspected abuse by insiders, a suspected
crime or attempted crime through the financial institution involving
$5,000 or more (when the suspect can be identified), a crime through
a financial institution when more than $25,000 is involved (even if
the suspect cannot be identified), a transaction of $5,000 or more
when the institution suspects money laundering, or a transaction that
seems designed to avoid Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements. ,84
,.n theory, financial institutions are also supposed to report a
transaction that "serves no business or apparent lawful purpose,"
dependent on business that could dry up as the result of temporarily imposed reporting
requirements. To accept this scenario, though, we must make a host of assumptions about
the money transmitting business, and the proportion of business generated by transfers to
Colombia chilled by the GTO.
181 Pub. L. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4044 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles
12, 18, and 3 1) (Title XV of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992).
182 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ANN. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY 85
n.21 (2000).





where the financial institution "knows of no reasonable explanation
for the transaction after examining the available facts, including the
background and possible purpose of the transaction.""' Deciding
what transactions fall into the categories created by the regulation is
obviously left to bank employees, given the frequent use of
subjective terms such as "apparent" and "suspected" in the
regulations above.'86 This foreshadows an important point developed
below about the limitations of regulatory enforcement.
Among other things, the Annunzio-Wylie law also addressed a
somewhat surprising omission in previous anti-money laundering
efforts-ensuring that financial institutions kept records of wire
transfers that could be used as evidence in a criminal proceeding or
that otherwise might be useful to law enforcement.' 87 Financial
institutions are now required to keep records of wire transfers for at
least a number of years, and that record must include at least minimal
information about the sender and recipient of the transfer.'88
Nonetheless, during the notice and comment phase of the regulations'
development, financial institutions aggressively resisted Treasury's
initial efforts to provide detailed specifications for the format and
content of the wire transfer records.189 Banks insisted that the more
extensive recordkeeping requirements proposed by Treasury would
cost hundreds of millions of dollars to implement, though it is unclear
how they arrived at this figure. 9' The result was that the wire
transfer regulations which once aimed at creating standardized
records accessible to law enforcement in short order instead produced
rules that merely required banks to keep wire transfer data in some
185 id.
186 The regulations seem to duck the question of how exactly Treasury would figure out
whether suspicious activity reports are being under-filed. With respect to banks, for
example, 31 C.F.R. § 103.18(f) (2002) says only the following:
Compliance with this section shall be audited by the Department of the Treasury, through
FinCEN or its delegees under the terms of the Bank Secrecy Act. Failure to satisfy the
requirements of this section may be a violation of the reporting rules of the Bank Secrecy Act
and of this part. Such failure may also violate provisions of Title 12 of the Code of Federal
Regulations.
187 Before the Annunzio-Wylie Act, the meager responsibilities banks and money
services businesses had to keep track of wire transfer information arose from decisions of
functional banking supervisors and state regulators.
"' See 31 C.F.R. § 103.33 (2002).
189 Financial institutions' aggressive opposition to the more extensive wire transfer
recordkeeping proposals. See generally Baldwin, supra note 11, at 413.
190 Banks insisted that Treasury's recordkeeping requirements would cost approximately
$250 million a year to implement and maintain.
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form, even if that form did not make the data immediately
retrievable.'91
As with virtually any regulatory system, the regulators can slap
penalties on individuals and financial institutions that ignore the
regulations.' 92 Penalty enforcement includes civil penalties against
institutions and individuals, criminal penalties against both, and
supervisory enforcement activity from functional regulators,
including the Federal Reserve, the Office of Comptroller of the
Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision.
In addition to placing requirements on financial institutions,
regulatory enforcement can also target the accounts of individuals
and organizations. Even before September 11, some tools designed
to provide executive branch authority to respond to national security
threats had already been adapted for use against money laundering
and terrorist financing. When officials in the federal government
sought to block assets of people or entities thought to be engaging in
substantial drug money laundering, they found authority in the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)."93 Since
transactions with terrorists are prohibited, Treasury also works to
identify and block their assets, at least in principle. The President can
use IEEPA by executing a presidential decision directive naming the
targets of the blocking authority.'94 Once the President decides to
191 The original wire transfer regulations proposed in 1993 required wire transfer
information to be available "readily." Following pressure from the banking industry, the
term was dropped from the final regulation. See 60 Fed. Reg. 220, 225 (1995). The records
need only be available for five years. 31 C.F.R. part 103.33 (1994). Moreover, the resulting
scheme merely requires that information be "accessible within a reasonable period of time,
taking into consideration the nature of the record, and the amount of time expired since the
record was made." 31 C.F.R. part 103.38(d) (1994); 60 Fed. Reg. 220, 225 (1995). Under
the changes to the Bank Secrecy Act made by USAPA, Treasury is directed to take
"reasonable steps" to ensure that banks in other jurisdictions involved in sending wire
transfers to the U.S. require the originator's name, and that such information remain with the
wire transfer from the time of origination until disbursement. See USA Patriot Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, § 328, 115 Stat. 319 (2001).
192 Flagrant violations of provisions in the Bank Secrecy Act as amended by the
Annunzio-Wylie Act are also subject to criminal penalties, discussed supra Part I.B. 1.
'9' See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Under the IEEPA, the
President's authority "may be exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat,
which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national
emergency with respect to such threat." Id. § 1701(a).
.94 See BUREAU OF INT'L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REP'T 548-49 (1998) (describing Presidential Decision
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trigger IEEPA sanctions or to designate people or organizations as
terrorists, Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control identifies the
organization or individual targeted, along with address and known
aliases and tells banks to freeze the assets in question. Banks not
complying face criminal sanctions.195 Largely because IEEPA is
framed as a statute involving foreign policy and national security
concerns, the use of IEEPA is subject to little judicial review, and the
authority was further expanded by USAPA.'96
In fact, none of the preceding regulatory authority was
extinguished by USAPA. Instead, USAPA has substantially
expanded regulatory authority in the name of the allegedly
intertwined goals of fighting money laundering and disrupting
terrorist financing.'97  The Act creates changes in the federal
government's regulatory powers to disrupt criminal finance on the
basic theory that regulators should get more authority to gather
information and to close loopholes that still make it relatively easy
for people to make transactions from U.S. bank branches through
correspondent accounts, even while their accounts are based in
offshore financial centers that protect bank secrecy. 9 ' Accordingly,
under USAPA all financial institutions must create anti-money
laundering programs.'99 Treasury is required to replace vague "know
Directive 42, which froze assets of persons and organizations suspected of being connected
with the Cali Cartel).
195 See generally Hale E. Sheppard, U.S. Actions to Freeze Assets of Terrorism: Manifest
and Latent Implications for Latin America, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 625 (2002); see also
Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development v. Ashcroft, 219 F.Supp. 2d 57, 63 (D.
D.C. 2002) (discussing how Executive Order 13,334, issued by President George W. Bush
pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) following the September 11 terrorist attacks, authorizes the
Secretary of the Treasury to use substantial discretion to designate additional organizations
and individual whose property or interests in property should be blocked because they act on
behalf of terrorist organizations).
196 See, e.g., USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 323, 115 Stat. 316 (2001),
(allowing the government to use a restraining order to freeze assets in the U.S.).
197 See, e.g., Testimony of Jimmy Gurul6, Under Secretary of the Treasury for
Enforcement, Before the Senate Appropriations Comm., Subcomm. on Treasury and Gen.
Gov't, 107th Cong. (Apr. 17, 2002) ("Our war against terrorist financing extends to financial
intermediaries and facilitators who infuse terrorist organizations with money, material, and
support. We have come to clearly appreciate and understand that terrorism has been
nourished by ample funding channeled from a plethora of sources, including banks, charities,
Hawalas, narcotics traffickers, and money launderers.").
'98 Title Ill of USAPA is entitled the "International Money Laundering Abatement and
Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001." USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. at
296-342.
'99 See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2000) (as amended).
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your customer" standards with explicit regulations establishing
minimum standards."' 0 U.S. banks face new prohibitions in their
ability to offer correspondent accounts to foreign "shell" banks from
offshore jurisdictions whose customers seek the convenience of
transacting in the United States. 0 ' Even where offshore banks do not
use U.S. correspondent accounts, Treasury has new regulatory
authority to impose information-gathering measures on entire
jurisdictions (or business sectors) that do not comply with minimum
anti-money laundering standards imposed by regulators.02  In
addition, Treasury has authority (to be used in consultation with other
agencies) to contemplate the use of extraterritorial pressure against
foreign jurisdictions to force them to adopt minimum measures to
combat money laundering, and to facilitate the sharing of suspicious
activity reports (SARs) with the intelligence community.20 3 The Act
makes a panoply of other technical changes that will probably have
less pronounced effects on efforts to disrupt criminal finance.20 4
The correspondent account limitations and the special
recordkeeping measures illustrate the scope of the new regulatory
powers. Both are steps toward the creation of a more dynamic
system that allows the executive branch, at least in principle, to
respond to the policies of foreign jurisdictions that allow individuals
to purchase financial anonymity. Shell banks operating with no
physical presence offer their customers precisely such anonymity but
have a harder time offering the convenience that a full-scale bank in
200 See USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 326, 115 Stat. 317 (2001). The minimum
standards include making "reasonable and practical" efforts at verification of new customers;
maintaining records of the information used to verify identification; and consulting lists of
known terrorists.
201 See USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 312, 115 Stat. 305 (2001). The definition
of financial institution applicable to this Part is narrower, including only insured banks,
commercial banks or trust companies, private bankers, an agency or branch of a foreign bank
in the United States, an insured institution, a thrift institution, or a broker or dealer registered
with the SEC.
202 See supra note 98, at § 311; 115 Stat. 298-304 (2001).
203 See supra note 98, at § 358; 115 Stat. 326 (2001). The statute also allows federal
agents to obtain credit information without notification of the target. See id.
204 Title III of USAPA wrought substantial changes in the fight against money
laundering, including among others: additional parties are subject to CTR and SAR filing
requirements; authority of U.S. Executive Directors to international financial institutions can
be used to combat money laundering and terrorist financing; and changes made to the Right
to Financial Privacy Act. See generally John J. Byrne, Key Sections of the International
Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001 (Title III of the USA
Patriot Act of 2001), 1289 PRACTICING L. INST.: CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES 97 (2002).
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the United States would provide. °5 Correspondent accounts help
solve this problem for shell banks and any other foreign banks that
want to offer convenience to customers in the United States without
opening a branch °.2 6  Through a correspondent relationship, a U.S.
bank harbors an account for a foreign bank and allows its customers
to engage in transactions. Under USAPA, most banks are prohibited
from offering correspondent relationships to foreign shell banks that
are technically based offshore but lack a physical presence
anywhere. 27  Although correspondent accounts are still permitted
when foreign banks are subject to banking supervision in another
country or affiliated with U.S. financial institutions, banks must
engage in due diligence to ensure that correspondent accounts are not
being used by a foreign bank to provide services to a shell bank.0 8 If
foreign jurisdictions or financial institutions fail to observe these
limits or otherwise give Treasury reason to believe that they are a
sector of "primary money laundering concern," then transactions
from those jurisdictions or financial institutions may be subject to
requirements to file records or reports, to retain information about the
ownership of accounts, or to limit the power to open payable-through
accounts or correspondent accounts on behalf of any foreign
jurisdiction.2 9
Between the Bank Secrecy Act, the Annunzio-Wylie
amendments, and the new changes made by USAPA, Treasury is
vested with substantial means to generate information and to punish
financial institutions that flagrantly reject the stylized due diligence
requirements imposed by the regulatory component of the fight
against laundering. But the presence of all this regulatory power does
205 Under the terms of the statute, a shell bank is one with no physical presence, not even
in an offshore financial center. See supra note 98, at § 313.
206 A "correspondent account" allows one bank to serve certain needs of its customers
(including the need to make deposits, effectuate transfers, and receive disbursements) at
another bank. This allows banks (i.e., based in offshore financial centers) who want to cater
to customers in a certain jurisdiction (i.e., the United States) to do so without opening a
branch. See William F. Bruton, Money Laundering: Is it Now a Corporate Problem?, 17
DICK. J. INT'L L. 437,442 (1999).
207 See supra note 98, at § 313; 115 Stat. 306 (2001).
208 See supra note 98, at § 312; 115 Stat. 304 (2001).
209 See supra note 98, at § 311; 115 Stat. 298 (2001). For a concise description of the
differences between correspondent banks, shell banks, offshore banks, and just plain high-
risk accounts, see I Role of U.S. Correspondent Banking in International Money
Laundering: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on




not answer a few critical questions affecting the efficacy of the
system to fight money laundering. In particular, the presence of
regulatory authority does not imply that it will be used to promulgate
regulations, and even if regulations are promulgated, it does not mean
that they will be enforced.21° Additionally, it is not clear how the data
generated by all the regulations is actually used by investigators to
detect money laundering activities, a subject to which we turn next. 21
3. Detection Systems (Primarily) Run by Investigators
Lawyers naturally tend to focus on judicial doctrine when trying
to figure out how a public organization functions. There is something
to this since courts' decisions about doctrine help drive the decisions
of prosecutors, and those, in turn, help drive the decisions of
investigators. Yet the focus on doctrine misses the larger universe of
things that might drive investigators' decisions. Moreover, the whole
reason why investigators matter is because it would be profoundly
difficult for prosecutors to figure out whom they could charge
without investigators. After all, prosecutors cannot punish people
whose violations they have not detected. The same applies, to a
somewhat more limited degree, to regulators trying to punish
violations of rules designed to disrupt criminal finance, such as
currency reporting requirements. In both cases, the point is that the
output of an enforcement system is driven substantially by the
detection tools that are available to law enforcement (and regulatory
authorities).
So consider the problems faced by federal investigators,
inspectors, and local police in detecting criminal money laundering.
At least some of what police do involves pervasive patrolling or
responses to calls for maintaining "order," allowing them to detect
potentially criminal activity through direct observation.2 2 When a
210 In a hearing before the Senate, Citibank described how even when policies are
designed to stop questionable offshore relationships with shell banks, they do not always
succeed. Correspondent Banking Hearing, supra note 209, at 79.
21 1 Despite these regulations, banks still do not have to share much information during
criminal investigations and do not even have to testify in administrative proceedings.
DENNIS CAMPBELL, INTERNATIONAL BANK SECRECY 677 (1992). Given the information
available to banks, it is striking how few investigations are instigated by these institutions.
Remarks of a Citibank official to the Senate serve to reinforce this point: the official offered
testimony that a suspicious bank transfer would not necessarily trigger further bank
investigation. Correspondent Banking Hearing, supra note 209, at 825.
212 For a discussion of how "community policing" strategies reflect some of the efforts of
police organizations to solve the detection problem, see Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community
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police officer responds to a request for help and walks past the
doorway to a building and someone inside screams, the officer might
infer that some improper activity may be afoot inside .21  The world
becomes more complicated when we imagine the challenge of
detecting consensual activities that trigger criminal liability.2 14 Other
things being equal, two people involved in a drug transaction are not
going to want it to attract police attention (assuming neither is an
informant). Assuming police want to detect drug transactions, they
might decide to concentrate surveillance activities in neighborhoods
where those transactions happen with sufficient frequency that some
of them could be readily observed.1 5 Police can rarely find people
who are engaged in money laundering or other types of criminal
financial activity just by walking through a neighborhood and
observing the act,216 but the example of the cop looking for drug deals
in a neighborhood known for them does point out two ways that
agents can try to detect laundering. One approach is to look for the
crimes that can be more easily spotted (ranging from drug
transactions to fraud schemes with obvious victims), and then to
develop cases against those people that may include sanctions for
engaging in money laundering or some other chargeable criminal
financial activity. Police can also rely on informants and undercover
agents to detect people engaging in a range of criminal activities,
including money laundering. The second approach is to focus on the
most obvious problem of many launderers: getting rid of cash.
Inspectors and investigators might look for bulky agglomerations of
currency at airports and border crossing points and draw on the
currency reports that the government gathers. Leaving these
strategies aside, though, it becomes far more difficult for
Policing, and the Social Norms Approach to Crime Control: Should One Make Us More
Comfortable with the Others?, 34 GA. L. REv. 1253 (2000).
213 See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 37-38 (1989).
214 These activities are often referred to as "victimless" crimes, but it is an ill-fitting term
since some such activities (like drug use) arguably produce sufficient negative externalities
to make the term "victimless" inappropriate, and other activities such as terrorist financing
may involve a consensual transaction (i.e., between the terrorist financier and the terrorist),
but obviously have victims.
215 See William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. Rev. 1795 (1999).
216 The difficulty in observing laundering through ordinary police patrol activity comes
in part from the intent and knowledge elements built into statutes such as 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956,
1957, and similar provisions. Thus, accepting an $18,000 cashier's check is no crime, but
doing so with knowledge that the funds come from some illegal activity is a crime. See 18




investigators to detect criminal financial activity and, therefore, for
prosecutors to build cases.
Much of the investigative activity that helps authorities build
money laundering cases begins with looking for large aggregations of
physical currency." 7 These methods, which I call "look for the
currency" strategies, involve looking for large aggregations of
physical currency that often (though not always) suggest some link to
criminal activity. Even if large currency aggregations do not involve
some obvious link to a serious underlying criminal offense, the
bundle of cash raises the possibility that someone might be illegally
"structuring," or breaking up, large currency deposits to evade
reporting requirements. Large bundles of cash might also indicate
the violation of reporting requirements that apply to many casinos,
money services businesses, and cross-border movements of cash.
To look for currency, law enforcement authorities tend to use
two kinds of methods: police patrol and investigative. Police patrol
methods involve hovering around airports, asking people questions at
border crossing locations, and searching for currency when the law
entitles the government to commit a search. Like the cops who
concentrate their work policing drug transactions in certain
neighborhoods, investigators and inspectors physically patrolling for
currency concentrate their work in locations where they are more
likely to find large aggregations of currency. Financial institutions
are supposed to be filing CTRs reporting on large currency
transactions, which leaves investigators free to patrol other areas.
Even if financial institutions were systematically disregarding their
obligation to file CTRs, investigators view this as a problem for
regulators, and in any case the major law enforcement entities
investigating money laundering lack the agents necessary to provide
coverage at even a fraction of the bank branches (let alone money
services businesses) in areas considered to involve high
concentrations of money laundering activity.218 Instead, agents and
217 Supra note 81; Interview with Customs Agent #3, in Stanford, CA (Oct. 19, 2001)
(notes on file with author).
218 Agencies involved in anti-money laundering law enforcement activities have scarce
resources. Even if agencies had such resources, patrolling financial institutions would be
difficult without developing an organizational framework to integrate agents into the
activities of processing financial transactions. Moreover, law enforcement bureaucracies
would likely view the assignment of agents to individual bank branches as a waste of
valuable resources of special agents better suited to more complex investigative tasks. All of
this changes, though, when agents are working on a specific case targeting an individual
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inspectors involved in physical searches and patrols for large
aggregations of currency tend to congregate at airports and (to a
lesser extent) at the land border. People carrying more than $10,000
in cash across a border are required to file a CMIR.219  Customs
inspectors roam airport international departure lounges, stand next to
aircraft gates, or observe people about to cross the land border with
Mexico.22° Customs also occasionally inspects packages sent by
express mail couriers or the U.S. postal service. Obviously Customs
lacks the resources or mandate to inspect every single person,
vehicle, or package crossing the border, so it must engage in some
kind of targeting to decide whom to inspect. Although such targeting
sometimes involves the use of advance information and the results of
formal analysis using information technology, it appears that most
such profiling involved in outbound currency involves subjective
judgments made by inspectors, informed by profiles of suspicious
activity generated by Customs headquarters. Customs also uses
trained currency sniffing dogs, whose ability to sniff currency is
comparable to or even better than their ability to detect drugs.22" ' In
the late 1990s, Customs used these methods to achieve seizures in the
range of $60 million a year, which is by almost every account a tiny
fraction of the money that is likely being physically smuggled out of
the country.222
Investigative methods involve the use of tips and investigative
leads developed either by people or by the use of currency transaction
reports, primarily analyzed through the use of information
known to be a financial institution's customer (or the financial institution itself), at which
point deploying agents to a financial institution becomes more defensible.
219 See 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (2000).
220 Interview with Customs Agent #1, in Washington D.C. (June 10, 1998) (notes on file
with author).
221 See "Detector Dogs" Sniff Out Smugglers for U.S. Customs, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC
NEWS (July 12, 2002), available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/
2002/07/0712_020712_drugdogs.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2002) (noting that "In Fiscal
Year 2001, for example, dogs discovered over... 21.6 million dollars in cash.").
222 See Statement of Bonni G. Tischler, Assistant Comm 'r, Office of Investigations, U.S.
Customs Serv., Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Gen. Oversight, U.S. H.R. (Apr. 15,
1999) available at http://financialservices.house.gov/banking/41599tis.htm (last visited May
8, 2003) ("[In FY '97] the number of cash seizures increased to 876 with a total value of
over 55 million dollars. In fiscal year 1998, the amount of seizures grew to over 1200 and
the total amount of cash seized increased to 68.3 million dollars."). These seized amounts
must be a tiny fraction of smuggled currency, unless one believes that domestic placement is
exceedingly simple (which runs counter to the view that reporting requirements interfere
with such placement) or that estimates of money spent on drugs are off by a factor of 100 or
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technology. The authorities use people in the form of informants,
confederates, and agents engaged in undercover sting operations, all
explicitly authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 1956.23 Obviously, the use of
informants or undercover agents still requires law enforcement
bureaucracies to select among a range of possible targets. Law
enforcement bureaucracies are not eager to release the details of how
they allocate undercover or informant resources to target large
aggregations of currency, but cases suggest certain patterns.224 A few
informants involved in either money laundering or predicate offenses
such as drug trafficking contact law enforcement organizations on
their own.22 Others are caught through police-patrol currency
enforcement or separate investigations of underlying crimes and
agree to cooperate with authorities in infiltrating primarily drug
organizations .226
At least some of the leads that result in law enforcement use of
informants, undercover agents, and other traditional investigative
tactics result from the analysis of Bank Secrecy Act reports, which
brings us to the use of information technology.227 With financial
institutions and individuals filing about twelve million currency
transaction reports a year, it becomes virtually impossible to consign
a cadre of analysts to the mind-numbing purgatory of reading the
223 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3) (2000). According to Customs, agents working in "long-
term" undercover investigations of money laundering activity have assisted in the seizure of
over $1 billion in currency between 1988 and 2000. See Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. On Criminal Justice, Drugs, Policy and Human Res., 106th Cong. (2000)
(statement of John C. Varrone, Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner, U.S. Customs
Service).
224 Supra note 81. See infra Part II.B.1. See also GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE
SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 37-43 (1988); Interview with Customs Agent #2, in Washington,
D.C. (Aug. 14, 1998) (notes on file with author).
225 Interview with Customs Agent #2, supra note 224.
226 The focus on using informants for infiltrating drug organizations is probably driven in
part by law enforcement bureaucracies' organizational priorities, which might be path
dependent in the following sense. If the use of investigative "follow the currency" methods
depends in part on the existence of informants who can be threatened with criminal sanctions
as a result of previous drug investigations, then it will be easier for law enforcement
bureaucracies to engage in more drug-related investigations. For a discussion of path
dependence, see generally Vernon W. Ruttan, Induced Innovation, Evolutionary Theory and
Path Dependence.- Sources of Technical Change, 107 ECON. J. 1520,1520-23 (1997).
227 While banks produce massive amounts of paperwork to comply with the law, note
that in almost all cases it is the government, rather than banks, attempting to detect violators.
In a hearing before the Senate, a Citibank official, admitted that in most cases for the bank,
"monitoring" comes down to relying on the government. Correspondent Banking Hearing,
supra note 209, at 77.
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reports and making sense of whether they amount to a smoking gun
of illegal activity. Since the mid-1990s, Treasury's FinCEN has used
a combination of expert systems and link analysis to investigate the
millions of currency-related reports filed by financial institutions and
individuals under the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act.228
Among other things, the system analyzes the currency reports for
links among each other, and also for links to publicly available
information. Wire transfer information is not included in the
analysis, because none of it is systematically collected by the federal
government. 2 9  FinCEN also collects all the suspicious activity
reports (SARs) filed by financial institution employees. Although
such reports cover more than just money laundering, the lion's share
focuses on violations of currency reporting requirements. 2" Despite
the approximately twelve million reports a year and FinCEN's
analysis of them, the reporting requirements probably only result in a
small number of proactive investigations a year.3
228 See OTA REP., supra note 29, at 44 (discussing the architecture of FinCGEN's FAIS
program).
229 Since wire transfer information is not reported, it cannot be analyzed until agents
know that they should ask for it.
230 According to FinCEN statistics from a recent SAR report, 46% of all SARs filed
between 1996 and April 2001 involved suspected violations of Bank Secrecy Act reporting
requirements, or other activities connected to money laundering. See U.S. Dep't of
Treasury, BANK SECRECY ACT ADVISORY GROUP, SAR ACTIVITY REV.: TRENDS, TIPS, AND
ISSUES, ISSUE 3, at 10 (2001) available at http://www.fincen.gov/sarreviewissue3.pdf.
[hereinafter 2001 SAR ACTIVITY REV.].
231 See Michael Allen, U.S. to Cut Bank Reports on Cash Deals, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21,
1998, at A3 (noting that the filing of approximately 35 million CTRs in a recent three-year
period "swamped" authorities and resulted in fewer than 1,000 investigations started
exclusively from the reports). Of course, this does not necessarily mean the system is
ineffective in terms of raising the cost of crime, for at least two reasons. First, case studies
suggest criminals structure deposits to avoid reporting requirements. See Part II.A. If they
did not, it is possible (though it is not clear how possible) that the reporting requirements
would give rise to more investigations because criminals would be easier to detect in the
absence of strategic activity. Second, even if virtually no criminals were detected
exclusively because of reporting requirements, it seems plausible that the reporting
requirements discourage some criminals from the most obvious or egregious uses of banks to
place or transfer currency linked to criminal activity Oust imagine the counterfactual world
where criminals faced zero risk of detection regardless of their financial conduct).
Nonetheless, it is hard to determine exactly how much of a deterrent effect is created by the
currency reporting requirements. For example, while banks try to look good by citing the
number of reports they file (see, e.g., Correspondent Banking Hearing, supra note 209, at
144), the number of reports, which represent large movements of cash, are likely to be highly
correlated with laundering activity.
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An observer might wonder why the police patrol and
investigative methods would not be suited for disrupting criminal
finance in situations that had nothing to do with currency-focused
laundering. In principle, any method-whether involving
information technology or undercover agents-could be adapted to
advance almost any law enforcement agenda. But in practice, the use
of investigative and police patrol strategies depends on information
(i.e., about who is doing what, or where people are likely to do it). In
most cases, the information to which law enforcement bureaucracies
have access is about currency movements. Inspectors engaged in
police patrol have trained canines that can smell currency rather than
checks. Most of the reporting requirements that cross-border
travelers violate with respect to money involve the movement of
currency. And while neither informants nor undercover agents are
limited to looking for currency, the currency-focused pattern is
strengthened by the sources from which law enforcement
bureaucracies obtain information. Much of the information that
authorities use to decide about sting operations involves either drugs
or currency.232 Because of the likely path-dependent focus on drug
investigations, many of the investigations are drug focused and
therefore involve currency. Finally, computers may be perfectly
capable of analyzing non-currency financial information (a subject
discussed in Part IV), but that capability means little if the
government does not have access to this data (for example, on
international wire transfers). 3
This leaves the "follow the crime" strategy, which involves the
detection of a possible money laundering violation by detecting an
underlying crime and then slapping on the money laundering charge
subsequently. What is striking about the "follow the crime" approach
to detecting money laundering and other types of criminal finance is
how much it depends on the detection of predicate offenses. In fact,
even the currency reports that are supposed to assist authorities in
232 During the 1980s, for example, the priorities of both federal as well as state/local law
enforcement bureaucracies were increasingly driven largely by the "war on drugs." See
Robert Reinhold, Police, Hard Pressed in Drug War, Are Turning to Preventive Efforts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1989, at Al (between 1968 and 1988, drug arrests more than
quintupled). Accordingly, one would expect that a substantial amount of information that
agents and prosecutors would accumulate and find useful in developing undercover
investigations would reflect such priorities.
233 Even when investigators identify a target, access to information can be difficult to
obtain. For example, courts have disallowed the use of nonspecific subpoenas targeting
international transfers in some instances. See OTA REP., supra note 29, at 103.
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detecting laundering schemes end up being used primarily for
"follow the crime" enforcement once a predicate offender has been
detected.234  Aside from the suspicious activity reporting system,
which allows financial institution employees to report suspected
financial crime activity, the "follow the crime" method involves
targeting and detecting predicate offenses rather than criminal
finance. One way that investigators engage in the fight against
money laundering is by following a suspected crime through the use
of SAR review teams. For example, in New Jersey, a team of
prosecutors, federal investigators engaged in anti-money laundering
and related investigations, and local law enforcement officials review
virtually every SAR from their jurisdiction.2 ' The value of such
review teams is that they can convert SAR reports into something
more than just another way of detecting currency reporting violations
(which are the most frequently-filed kinds of SARs). Through SAR
review teams such as the one in New Jersey, SARs can be reviewed
by a team of investigators and prosecutors with access to a range of
case files that may shed light on whether to further probe matters
relating to a SAR that would not appear to warrant further
investigation when viewed without the benefit of the team's case
files. The use of SAR review teams is useful as a means of giving
SARs a bare minimum of necessary attention, since it is not clear that
every SAR is actually read and analyzed by investigators.236 Yet
full-fledged review teams are quite rare,237 and even SAR review
teams might not be able to place individual SARs in their full context
without access to wire transfer data not currently available. 23 ' Agents
and prosecutors also frequently use CTR reports to assist in
234 See Money Laundering: The Volume of Currency Transaction Reports Filed Can and
Should be Reduced, Testimony Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, reprinted in The Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1993-S.1664: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 43 (1994) (statement of
Henry R. Wray, Admin. of Justice Issues, General Accounting Office) ("[B]y far the biggest
use of [CTR] data is in a 'reactive' manner, where a name or other form of identification of a
suspect is known and search of the data is made .... ).
235 Between 1996 and 2000, New Jersey state authorities started eighty-eight
investigations from SARs, giving New Jersey the highest ratio of SAR filings to state
investigations reported of any state. See 2001 SAR ACTIVITY REv., supra note 230.
236 Supra note 224; Interview with IRS Agent #1, supra note 81; Interview with FinCEN
Official #1, in Washington, DC (June 18, 1998) (notes on file with author).
237 In addition to the New Jersey SAR Review Team, the Southern District of California
formed an interagency SAR Review Committee in 1998. See Mary Lee Warren Testimony,
supra note 10.
238 See generally Baldwin, supra note 11.
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investigations against individuals already suspected of committing
some offense.239
Agents trying to detect a money laundering related crime can
also use undercover agents and informants to detect predicate
crimes.24 The reason law enforcement bureaucracies are likely to
view this approach as bountiful is that it does not require authorities
to do much of anything different from what they would ordinarily do
to investigate predicate crimes.24' On the contrary, if predicate
crimes are detected and specific violators suspected, the anti-money
laundering statutes simply leave prosecutors with more options
regarding whom to charge and with what charge. After all, the core
money laundering statutes themselves make virtually any disposition
of money that can be traced to a predicate crime into a transaction
that can trigger criminal liability.242 The same is true for victims
reporting a crime, such as fraud. The limitations with these
approaches is that not all underlying predicate offenses are
effectively detected with direct observation, undercover agents,
informants, or victim reports. Although drug trafficking and
distribution are notorious targets of undercover and informant-
supported investigations, a substantial number of them are not
detectable through such methods.243 Moreover, some fraud or cyber-
crime activity might not be fully or accurately reported, even by the
239 Indeed, it appears the disproportionate use of the currency transaction reports is to
develop cases against people already known to be suspicious, not to detect offenses against
unknown offenders. See Allen, supra note 231; David Overlock Steward & Marc E. Sorini,
Suspicious Activity Reporting for Casinos.- The Next Wave in Currency Reporting, reprinted
in ABA CENTER FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION NAT'L INST., GAMING ENFORCEMENT If:
CRIM. JUST., Apr. 16-17, 1998, at D-31 (noting the frequent ex post use of CTR filings).
While investigators may use the presence of SARs and CTRs to "follow the crime," this does
not necessarily trigger substantial response from financial institutions. For example, in a
letter submitted in Senate hearing, Citibank's lawyers admit that even if it knows of
particular "follow the crime" strategy, this does not allways trigger a substantial bank
regulatory response. Correspondent Bank Hearing, supra note 209, at 72 I.
240 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM. REP'T, supra note 15, (indicating that almost 10%
of money laundering cases in sample involved an undercover "sting" operation).
24 Here is one indication: the Justice Department's Organized Crime and Drug
Enforcement Task Forces nationwide were conducting 875 ongoing investigations in 1992,
and 75% of them allegedly "addressed" money laundering-even though agents working
through OCDETF are not specialized in or otherwise particularly well-suited to engaging in
money laundering investigations. See 1993 Hearings on Money Laundering, supra note 20,
at 419-20.
242 See discussion on money laundering criminal statutes in Part I.A. 1, supra.
243 See Stuntz, supra note 215.
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victims. 244 This means that detecting money laundering (and, more
generally, criminal finance) using "follow the crime" methods aimed
at predicate crimes makes the detection of criminal finance
contingent on the political economy of criminal investigation.
Whatever drives criminal investigation will drive the sort of criminal
finance detected in relation to the underlying offenses and eventually
charged by prosecutors. If drug crimes are more likely to be
investigated than environmental offenses (which are, by the way, also
predicates under §§ 1956 and 1957), then drug money laundering will
be punished more severely. At the end of the day, if people can be
caught for some criminal violation, they can be charged. Because of
the loose interpretation of the core criminal statutes involved (§§
1956 and 1957), there is little factual investigation necessary to
charge someone with laundering if they are caught for underlying
criminal activity and they handled money in some way.
Finally, the new USAPA legislation changes many of the legal
restrictions in sharing information between U.S. intelligence and law
enforcement agencies, making it easier for them to exchange
knowledge. This allows for "follow the crime" type methods to be
used where intelligence information gives rise to suspicion that some
violation occurred. 45  For example, if the federal government
possesses intelligence information indicating that a U.S. not-for-
profit organization is providing money raised in the United States to a
terrorist organization, that information can more easily be shared with
law enforcement agencies that can investigate the not-for-profit
organization's activities and help build a case against it for financing
terrorism. Unfortunately, the federal government lacks a system that
would make it possible for the opposite to happen; it would be
difficult to ascertain whether an organization that is not considered
suspicious should be investigated simply because of the patterns of
transactions in which it engages. Even if the government wanted to
investigate all the sources of funding of a particular known terrorist
organization (or a drug kingpin abroad), it would face the challenge
244 Not all fraud and cyber-security breaches are quickly detected by the victims. See,
e.g., Marc Goodman, Why the Police Don't Care About Computer Crime, 10 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 465 (1997).
245 Even before USAPA, law enforcement agencies sometimes relied on foreign
intelligence to develop cases. Indeed, it was a report from British intelligence that appears to
have alerted U.S. law enforcement authorities to the now-infamous scheme to launder
billions of dollars through the Republic Bank of New York. See Bombshell Expose of




of obtaining records from governments abroad.246 Thus, the U.S.
government's efforts to block the assets of alleged terrorist
organizations does not evince a means of detecting terrorist financial
activity from patterns of transactions, but instead appears to represent
the use of regulatory and related criminal justice authority on the
basis of intelligence information.
The point of this discussion is not to show that the "look for the
currency" and "follow the crime" methods of detection are a waste of
time, but that they result in a detection system with acute sensibility
for some things and blind spots for others. The system has fairly
pronounced sensitivity to currency movements (though even here
there are some blind spots, as with land border outbound enforcement
involving vehicles). The system has extreme sensitivity to possible
money laundering charges that could be brought against someone
detected for a predicate crime (i.e., fraud, drug trafficking), because
prosecutors have an incentive to consider possible charges and the
doctrine makes it easy to fulfill elements of the money laundering
statutes without intensive fact-specific investigation. Yet the system
is far less able to detect money laundering (or virtually any kind of
criminal financial activity, including terrorist financing) when the
"look for the currency" and "follow the crime" methods begin to
falter. In other words, if a person whose identity does not arouse
suspicion is engaged in money laundering or the financing of crime,
it becomes exceedingly difficult for the government to detect this
activity. The task becomes even more difficult if the person is smart
enough to minimize (or avoid altogether) the use of currency in
carrying out the activity.
C. THE SYSTEM'S GLOBAL DIFFUSION
Laundering's international element is virtually undeniable. 47
Through a combination of diplomatic peer pressure, explicit
organized entities such as the OECD-sponsored Financial Action
Task Force,248 international treaties such as the Vienna Convention on
246 See, e.g., C. Todd Jones, Compulsion Over Comity, The United States' Assault on
Foreign Bank Secrecy, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 454 (1992).
247 HrNTERSEER, supra note 11, at 38 ("Money laundering is a global problem, and as
such resolving the problems it creates will require an integrated solution .... "). For the U.S.
government's version of this argument, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL
STRATEGY REP. 20 (1995) (noting that money laundering "is occurring with varying degrees
of regularity in more than 125 [countries]").
248 The Financial Action Task Force is an organization created under the auspices of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Members include the countries
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Narcotics, 249 and incentives in other countries, the global fight against
money laundering is taking shape along the lines of what the U.S. has
done-and is likely to suffer similar shortcomings. In some ways
the insistent push from U.S. government officials and representatives
of other developed economies for international anti-money
laundering efforts is hardly surprising. The major elements of the
U.S. enforcement system reflect the preoccupation with cross-border
financial flows tied to crime. In terms of criminal statutes, § 1956
contains an explicit prohibition on many international transactions
and applies extraterritorially. Regulations are designed to give
government access to information about many (though not all) cross-
border movements of money. Even the strategies of investigators
reflect the international preoccupation, as Customs agents and
inspectors swarm through airports looking for outbound movements
of currency. Despite all this, authorities correctly recognize that
criminals' financial activity, like that of non-criminals, spills across
borders. Moreover, financial systems are interconnected. The laws
and regulations in other jurisdictions might affect the ease with which
money derived from crimes committed in the United States can be
laundered. This at least explains the overt reasons why U.S. officials
and their international allies among developed economies have
sought to create a system that increasingly forces other
jurisdictions-particularly secrecy havens making it difficult for
investigators to get account information-to adopt laws and policies
to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.5
of the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council, as well as 26 governments
(mostly OECD members), including Hong Kong and Switzerland, considered major
financial (or money laundering) centers. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY
LAUNDERING, ANNUAL REP. 1998-1999 (July 2, 1999) (last visited Jan. 25, 2002), available
at http://www.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/99ar-en.pdf [hereinafter FATF ANNUAL REP.].
249 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, UN Doc. E/Conf.82/15 (1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989)
[hereinafter Vienna Convention on Narcotics].
250 For an insightful discussion of the similarities, see Diane Marie Amann, Spotting
Money Launderers: A Better Way to Fight Organized Crime?, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
COM. 199, 216 (2000). Professor Amann described the similarity between the Financial
Action Task Force's major anti-money laundering recommendations and the U.S. approach
thus:
[The Forty Recommendations] posit a two-pronged attack similar to the U.S. statutory scheme.
Reflecting the Money Laundering Control Act, the Forty Recommendations call for stronger
criminal laws against money laundering. Reflecting the Bank Secrecy Act, they call for an end
to financial confidentiality and for imposition of reporting duties on banks.
251 See, e.g., Treasury, Justice Unveil New Strategy to Combat Money Laundering
Schemes, 68 U.S Law Week 2182, 2184 (Oct. 5, 1999) (Treasury and Justice Department
2003]
MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUELLAR
The FATF recommendations tend to focus on the criminal and
regulatory enforcement priorities emblematic of the U.S. approach to
combating money laundering and disrupting criminal finance.252
Countries are urged to pass statutes criminalizing money laundering.
Laws and regulations should provide an audit trail for large currency
transactions. Financial institutions should be forced to adhere to
these requirements and to file suspicious activity reports when
something subjectively arouses suspicion, and failure to comply with
any of these requirements should subject an institution (as well as its
officers) to civil or criminal penalties. 53 The organization promotes
adoption of these laws and policies through mutual evaluations for its
members and through the designation of non-member jurisdictions
that flagrantly disregard any effort to fight money laundering or
terrorist financing.254 The result has increasingly homogenized the
strategies used to fight money laundering and terrorist financing in
developed economies that have membership in the organization. All
of them have laws providing for separate criminal penalties for
money laundering, which authorities can use alongside other laws
such as criminal tax evasion statutes to target money laundering.
Most FATF members now have currency reporting and suspicious
activity reporting requirements, although some FATF members use
suspicious activity standards even more subjective than the U.S.
ones.' Since before September 11, FATF communiqu6s echoed the
assertions of some U.S. government officials regarding the
connection between anti-money laundering enforcement and terrorist
anti-money laundering strategy "calls for government officials to work to improve
international cooperation and to intensify pressure on lax jurisdictions to implement strict
money laundering controls.").
252 The U.S. Department of the Treasury views the Forty Recommendations as being
important enough to domestic anti-money laundering efforts to merit inclusion in the
appendix to the 2002 ANNUAL STRATEGY. See 2002 ANNUAL STRATEGY, supra note 8, at A-
22-A-27. See also id. at A-28-A-33 (describing progress in combating laundering by
countries on a FATF "blacklist," primarily in terms of whether such countries passed statutes
or established regulatory programs).
253 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, THE FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, WITH INTERPRETATIVE
NOTES, 35 I.L.M. 1291 (1996) (arguing for basic features of the U.S. and Western European
model).
254 See FATF ANNUAL REP., supra note 248 (describing FATF mutual evaluation
process, as well as the legal basis for and consequences of designation of non-members who
disregard anti-money laundering or terrorist financing objectives).
255 See Noble & Golumbic, supra note 10.
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financing.256 Both concerns have led FATF members to adopt some
version of "know-your-customer" standards that, among other
things, press financial institutions to confirm their customers' identity
at the time an account is opened. 7 What is not covered under this
framework is in large measure what seems conspicuously left out of
the American system: a formalized means of detecting criminal
financial activity beyond what emerges from currency reporting or
from the use of traditional law enforcement methods that detect
underlying predicate crimes.
The most striking development in international cooperation has
been the development of a FATF "blacklist" of bank secrecy havens
and other jurisdictions of particular money laundering concern. Since
the jurisdictions that are candidates for blacklisting tend to have some
incentives to create bank secrecy regimes and otherwise avoid
cooperating,258 FATF members have threatened restrictions on
financial transactions with blacklisted jurisdictions that do not make
amends.259 Although some have made the argument that FATF's
actions interfere with international law, this argument is a stretch
because the measures threatened by FATF members involve domestic
law changes.26° Ironically, although the basis for the FATF is not a
binding international treaty but an agreement, it has provided the
basis for an embryonic system to police the behavior of countries,
including both members and non-members.261  In contrast, the
256 See Cordia Scott, Treasury Secretary Urges FATF to Set World Standard for
Combating Terrorist Financing, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Oct. 30, 2001, available at
LEXIS, 2001 WTD 210-1.
257 See FATF ANNUAL REP., supra note 248.
258 See Part III.A.4., infra, discussing the incentives of offshore financial centers and
other bank secrecy havens.
259 See Todd Doyle, Cleaning Up Anti-Money Laundering Strategies: Current FATF
Tactics Needlessly Violate International Law, 24 Hous. J. INT'L L. 279 (2002).
260 Even if the General Agreement on Trade in Services applied to all the parties, it
includes an exception for policies vital to the national security interests of signatories. If
Japan has justified its subsidies to rice farmers on national security grounds in the context of
the WTO agreement, then it seems difficult to imagine a restrictive enough definition of
national security that would exclude the decisions by the U.S. government to impose some
sort of restriction on nation-states that did not cooperate with anti-laundering measures.
Admittedly, Japan's invocation of the national security exception as the basis for subsidies to
rice farmers is the exception rather than the rule. The more common practice is for nation-
states to stick to a narrow interpretation of "national security," which is itself an interesting
puzzle. See James R. More, Unlocking the Japanese Rice Market: How Far Will It Be
Opened? 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 273, 276 (1996).
261 International Monetary Fund and World Bank, Enhancing Contributions to
Combating Money Laundering, POLICY PAPER I I (Apr. 26, 2001) (discussing how the FATF
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Vienna Convention is a binding treaty, establishing formal legal
obligations against the signatories. Yet unlike the FATF system, the
Vienna Convention does not establish an enforcement system that
generates useful information about signatories' compliance, because
the Convention's provisions regarding the detection of criminal
financial activity are tremendously vague.262 Neither does the
Convention have anything to say about the behavior of non-
signatories, who obviously do not have legal obligations under the
treaty.
The increasing convergence of the global recipe to fight money
laundering should not obscure some important differences in the
system. For years FATF members have not agreed on whether tax
evasion should count as a predicate offense for money laundering,
and therefore whether members should be encouraged to include tax
evasion in the list of money laundering predicate offenses. French
criminal statutes against money laundering include tax evasion as a
predicate, for example, while U.S. statutes do not. In part the debate
probably reflects the politics of tax enforcement and concern over
slippery slopes in different countries, but the dispute has not had
regime is forcing members and non-members to show some measure of adoption of core
anti-money laundering policies). The paper notes:
[Tlhe FATF has produced a set of 25 Criteria Defining Non-Cooperative Countries or
Territories (NCCTs), based on, but not identical to the FATF 40 [recommendations] which it has
used to evaluate 29 non-FATF members. The evaluations identified weaknesses and grouped
countries based on their degree of compliance, and a list of NCCTs has been published.
Id.
262 The Vienna Convention on Narcotics includes, for example, some of the following
provisions, none of which specify the extent to which signatories must fund a regulatory
system to detect offenses, or even a criminal justice system to prosecute them:
Art lII.l(b)(i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from
any offence or offences [covered under the treaty]... or from an act of participation in such
offence or offences, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property
or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an offence or offences to
evade the legal consequences of his actions.
Vienna Convention on Narcotics, Art. 111.1(b) et seq., supra note 249. Despite the ambiguity
of the Convention (beyond simply the requirement that signatories criminalize the offense),
the creation of a criminal offense at least addressed a persistent problem in extradition-that
most extradition arrangements require "double criminality," meaning that, in order to be
extradited, an offender must have committed conduct that amounts to an offense in the
requesting and the requested country. If signatories followed their responsibility under the
treaty, then someone could be extradited for money laundering without creating a "double
criminality" problem. The focus on issues like "double criminality" is obviously connected
with ex post enforcement (it isn't much good if you don't know whom you want to
extradite), and is consistent with the notion that the treaty is meant in part to serve the
interests of prosecutors and investigators.
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21important practical consequences. 63 Some observers insist that
Western European FATF members as a whole historically tended to
rely more on subjective reporting than does the U.S. system.264
Although the United States does provide for some exemptions from
currency transaction reporting requirements, Western European
approaches rely more on information exchange between financial
institutions and government regulators or investigators-an approach
that makes authorities even more reliant on financial institutions to
uncover suspicious activity.265  Moreover, not every system appears
to be designed around the specifications of the United States and
Western European approach. The Australian government's anti-
money laundering system, for instance, provides wire transfer and
currency reporting information to the Australian government's
financial intelligence unit (Austrac), almost in real time.266 Instead of
relying almost entirely on subjective suspicious activity reporting,
Austrac uses expert systems and link analysis to analyze all currency
transaction reports and international wire transfers.267 Yet the
majority of systems appear to reflect the basic elements of the U.S.
and Western European approaches.
The debates about the policies of FATF members and about the
fate of the blacklisted jurisdictions might suggest that the
recommended measures are costly and require dramatic changes for
jurisdictions that adopt them. Yet in many ways, the FATF
recommendations and associated minimum standards for blacklisted
countries leave substantial flexibility to the jurisdictions. Everyone is
able to get away with something, because the recommendations leave
263 For a discussion of the normative and practical issues raised by making tax evasion a
money laundering predicate, see Peter Alldridge, Are Tax Evasion Offenses Predicate
Offenses for Money Laundering? 4 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 6 (2001).
264 See Noble & Golumbic, supra note 10 (discussing differences between the objective
approach, emphasizing mandatory currency reporting requirements, that predominates in the
U.S., and the subjective model prevalent in Western Europe, which relies more heavily on
suspicious activity reporting). Nonetheless, the two approaches are increasingly converging.
See id.; Amann, supra note 250, at 216 ("the [FATF] forty recommendations... posit a two-
pronged attack similar to the U.S. statutory scheme").
265 See Noble & Golumbic, supra note 10, at 144 ("A system obliging financial
institutions to ... report anomalous transactions enhances the capacity to detect money
laundering by placing ... experts on the front lines"). See also Amann, supra note 250, at
217 ("abolition of bank secrecy is, in fact, a common aspect of transnational efforts against
money laundering").
266 See OTA REP., supra note 29, at 47-48.
267 See supra note 228 and accompanying text for an example of how the U.S. regulatory
system can deploy expert systems and link analysis.
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open critical questions about prosecutors' discretion to charge people
using the recommended criminal statutes, investigators'
responsibility to detect activity, and regulators' use of their authority.
This flexibility makes it politically easier for the increasingly
standard menu of anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing
prescriptions to grow in importance because it can be imposed in so
many ways. The FATF requirements and treaties are one approach.
But after USAPA, U.S. regulators have new authority to unilaterally
punish jurisdictions that do not take steps in the direction of
complying. As with domestic regulatory authority, the issue of when
other countries' investigative and regulatory authority is actually
used, and whether that use can fairly be called effective, are separate
questions.
II. JUSTIFYING THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING AS AN ATTACK
ON CRIMINAL FINANCE
Laws often fall short of their goals, so it is worth reviewing the
specific goals of the fight against money laundering. Specifically,
what sort of laundering is the system meant to fight? Is the goal
simply to interfere with the movement of profit from crimes or to
develop a whole system capable of preventing, detecting, and
punishing crime? In short, is the fight against money laundering
largely a convenient means of letting prosecutors make easier cases
against criminals-especially drug traffickers-or is it meant to be
something more than this? Leaving aside the evaluation of any
specific law enforcement system for now, this section poses the
question of why in principle society might be concerned about
financial activity related to crime (i.e., what the system detects as
well as what it does not detect). The more cause for concern about
such financial activity, the larger the existing system's limitations
would loom.
A. THE CAUTIOUS CASE FOR DISRUPTING CRIMINAL FINANCE
If legislators just wanted to change the risks or costs associated
with perpetrating crime, they could have simply made sanctions even
more draconian. The focus on laundering suggests something else.
Some of that is almost certainly symbolic politics. Legislators want
to take political credit for passing criminal statutes but they begin to
run out of things to criminalize, so they look for new tropes that seem
to make intuitive sense (i.e., fight the link between money and crime)
and generate credit. But beyond the game of symbolic politics, is
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there anything to the notion that we ought to target this process of
turning dirty money into clean money, or (more generally) this
process of the intersection between money and crime?268
1. Disruption of the Financial Activities of (and the Supply ofSservices to)
Criminals, Especially Leaders of Organized Criminal Networks
The most obvious argument for targeting criminal finance is that
financial transactions connected to crime are complements for
underlying criminal activity. Admittedly, this whole reason is only
valid to the extent that it makes sense to punish the underlying
crime-but leave this aside for a moment.269 Begin with the premise
that many criminals that are in it for money should be expected to
respond to the possible financial rewards of crime as well as the
costs, which include among others, the probability of being
detected.27° Financial transactions complement crime by making it
marginally easier to directly enjoy the gains from criminal activity, to
undertake legitimate economic investments, to plow money back into
268 That intersection, or "criminal finance" includes any financial activities or
transactions related in some way to crime, including the money laundering activities detected
and punished by the existing system. Besides the sort of laundering that could be discovered
through "look for the currency," or "follow the crime" enforcement, criminal finance surely
includes other forms of money laundering that are harder for the existing system to detect, as
mentioned above. These include, among others, large scale non-currency related corruption
activity, higher-level drug-related laundering that may have started with placement of cash
but extends to layering or re-integration activities, and laundering connected with fraud and
similar offenses, where the offender (and perhaps even the existence of the offense) is not
yet known. Criminal finance also encompasses the financing of crimes such as terrorism.
Other things being equal, the political leadership of a jurisdiction would almost always
prefer to exert some control over criminal finance rather than no control. Governments have
long exhibited an interest in controlling the movement of value (in the form of currency or
valuable assets). See Stuart Corbridge & Nigel Thrift, Money, Power, and Space:
Introduction and Overview, in MONEY, POWER, AND SPACE I (Stuart Corbridge et. al., eds.
1994) (discussing the history of, and inherent mobility of, money as a source of private and
national power). The question is whether this interest is justified, and whether the failure of
strategies to control criminal finance require some fix.
269 Thus, if someone profits from selling computers illegally in China to dissident
organizations and one believes that such distribution of information technology is
normatively valuable, then it does not matter whether financial activity makes the "crime"
easier because the underlying activity does not elicit derision.
270 There is obviously some basis to expect that criminals-like non-criminals-behave
this way even if they are not engaged in crime exclusively for the money. See Erling Eide,
Economics of Criminal Behavior, in V ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICs 345, 355-64
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000) (providing a survey of empirical studies
making this case).
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criminal activity, or to avoid detection. In theory, it is possible that
financial activity linked to crime is the equivalent of a proverbial
smoking gun, making it marginally easier for authorities
(investigating tax, drug, or any sort of offense involving money) to
detect crimes from the distinctive signature left by financial
transactions. Most criminals dealing with more money than what
they can comfortably put under a mattress or spend on goods and
services that can be easily purchased with cash will find it extremely
valuable to use the financial system because of the benefits that come
from using it. For example, through banks and other financial
institutions launderers can access investment opportunities such as
equity markets that would be unavailable if they dealt only in cash.
All of this increases the possibility of obtaining rewards from crime.
To the extent that authorities recognize this and make any effort to
investigate suspicious financial activity (whether currency, non-
currency, or whatever), then easy laundering reduces the probability
that a criminal will be caught. 273 Easy and cheap laundering therefore
should be expected to let a criminal use a greater proportion of the
financial return from crime, without having to fritter a significant
fraction simply converting the money into some useful form.274
Criminal financial activity can make the perpetration of crime
cheaper and more efficient (from the criminal's point of view)
271 See Part ILA, supra.
272 For example, the more criminals try to evade cash reporting requirements by
structuring deposits to place them in different accounts, the more we might expect that
multiple accounts receiving cash deposits under the threshold will eventually show wire
transfer activity centralizing the money into a single account. Obviously, if criminals knew
this would give them away (and currently it almost certainly does not, because of the
system's incapacity to examine wire transfer activity for detection purposes), they might use
another layer of accounts before centralizing the balances. If detection were not a problem,
then perhaps even this could be ferreted out. Even if detection were a problem at that point,
it would be hard to argue that criminals would be entirely neutral between the first and the
second scenario, as the second one entails at least a few additional costs (i.e., opening the
account, finding someone to be the account's owner, and managing transactions from that
account).
273 This assumes that enforcement is effective enough to create a substantial risk of
detection and punishment.
274 Anecdotal evidence reports that the cost of laundering has increased over time,
perhaps as a result of the fight against money laundering. See, e.g., OTA REP., supra note
29, at 14 n.39 (quoting Interview with Greg Meacham, Chief of the Government Fraud Unit,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mar. 14, 1994) ("Colombian cocaine cartels are said
currently to pay contractors a 20% fee for money laundering; the contractors give the cartel a




because it means criminals get to use the bureaucratized world of
modem finance. Just as RICO was a response to the perceived threat
of criminals operating as an enterprise or seizing control of a legal
one, laws targeting laundering could be understood as a means of
denying criminals access to a tool that might greatly increase their
financial efficiency. As capital has become more mobile and private
markets have expanded, financial institutions have grown in scope
and size.27 For example, larger markets mean transactions have the
potential to be arm's-length in the sense that the parties have no
previous relationship. Financial institutions have developed rules and
procedures, often spurred by legal rules, to make otherwise
anonymous financial transactions not only possible but relatively
secure and reliable. 76 The bureaucratization of finance allows people
engaged in crime-for-profit (or, to some extent, in financing crime)
to solve a host of practical problems. Banks, for example, preserve
the security of criminals' financial resources. Individuals and
organizations involved in illegal activity can easily consolidate their
resources, divide them, and easily allocate them between (legal and
illegal) investment opportunities. Criminals also gain the power to
move money around the globe almost instantly.277 At the same time,
though, financial institutions work through records of balances and
transactions, replacing most physical movement of valuable assets
with the movement of information that is settled through payment
systems like CHIPS, Fedwire, and SWIFT.27 The existence of a
global financial system with bureaucratic financial institutions thus
presents criminals with both an opportunity and a risk: the
opportunity to better move and exploit money-thereby reducing
costs and the possibility of detection-and the risk that the records
left behind as money moves will lead investigators to the criminal.
So if authorities develop a capacity to disrupt the least detectable
kinds of criminal financial transactions (i.e., cash transfers or
financial activity where a corrupt banker shreds all the documents),
they might get criminals to shift to financial activity that is more
costly, more detectable, or both. This can yield law enforcement
275 See Susan Strange, From Bretton Woods to the Casino Economy, in MONEY, POWER,
AND SPACE, supra note 268 (discussing banks, history).
276 See id.
277 In contrast, consider the cumbersome means of engaging in credit transactions
without financial institutions. Some organized criminals engage in loan sharking, but other
opportunities to participate in credit markets are scarce if money stays in cash form.
278 See OTA REP., supra note 29, at 20-32
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benefits. For example, exogenous factors might make crime for
profit (or criminal activity requiring some non-trivial amount of
financing) spike, raising the amount of criminal financial activity that
could be detected, disrupted, and deterred in the right circumstances.
If a crime increase is both elastic to changes in returns and
overwhelms traditional law enforcement, it is then perhaps an
effective means of detecting and punishing criminal finance that can
help fill the gap. Of course, the fact that we are dealing primarily
with an illicit, underground economy makes it difficult to estimate all
the details with quantitative precision.279 But even in the absence of
quantitative estimates, two things should be clear. Not all increases
in the price of laundering money will result in decreases in crime, and
some increases in crime that overwhelm law enforcement can be
affected by disrupting criminal finance, assuming that such disruption
can detect crimes at least as well as traditional law enforcement
strategies and criminals' cost of evading controls is high enough."'
The result is that strategies capable of detecting criminal financial
activity (assuming this is possible) could raise the probability of
detecting despised predicate crimes.
Consider, for example, the now-familiar dilemma of a drug
trafficker trying to place a large amount of cash in the financial
system without detection. As more of it accumulates, its marginal
utility probably declines.281 Although the marginal utility of cash
probably never reaches zero, it could decline to the point that it is
cost-effective for a criminal to engage in strategies that yield money
with higher marginal utility, such as bank balances-even if one
279 Even finding proxy variables is difficult. For example, an IMF study of the
macroeconomic impact of money laundering uses crime as a proxy variable-yet not all
crime requires financing or generates money, nor do we even have completely reliable
measures of actual (as opposed to reported or investigated) crime. Tanzi, supra note 30, at 5.
280 As discussed in Part 11, these assumptions may be heroic-but are still sensitive to
policy and legal changes that can render the system more effective.
28 1 There are at least three reasons to expect that cash would have declining marginal
utility. First, cash that is not placed in the financial system (i.e., at a bank) is much harder to
use to make a range of legitimate investments, such as those in equity or futures markets, at
least not without a report (either at the bank or, since passage of USAPA, at a securities
firm) that increases the likelihood of the crime's detection. Second, not all goods and
services can be easily purchased with cash-and anything costing $10,000 or more will
trigger the requirement that a report be filed. Third, large concentrations of cash are
unwieldy and must be guarded from threats, including among others marauding pilferers and
even physical degradation. As one example, see Frantz, supra note 55 (noting that during
the 1980s, Pablo Escobar's Colombian drug trafficking network appears to have abandoned




factors in the additional cost of placing the cash and risk of detection
from an unusual transaction.282 Thus, even adjusting bank balance
money for the extra cost of getting into that form, it is still more
useful. The upshot is that given a plausible set of assumptions,
higher costs of laundering result in lower returns from crime. So an
effective enforcement strategy against money laundering presumably
has the potential to make it more costly to undertake an offense, and
(in principle) provides an additional means of detecting the predicate
offense.283
Of course, affecting the financial return from perpetrating crime
is more than an aesthetic goal; the point is to interfere with the
commission of crimes. Most arguments about the value of making
the perpetration of crime more costly tend to imply that making crime
more costly reduces crime, which would be true if criminals are in it
for the money, and the rise in cost is enough to push at least some of
them under the threshold where crime's risk-adjusted return makes it
worth doing.284  One might also assume (as legislators did)285 that
282 The cost could include either increased risk of detection or increased financing cost of
laundering if the risk of detection is outsourced or if a professional is used to lower the risk
of detection, at a price.
283 Note that raising the marginal cost of perpetrating criminal activity can itself
conceivably have counterintuitive effects, at least in theory. To the extent that criminals
engaged in crimes for profit are acting rationally, then raising the cost of crime can
discourage smaller operations and clear the market allowing more sophisticated criminal
organizations to innovate and take more control from less organized criminals. But it seems
unlikely this would happen, because small-time criminals are less likely to be rational in the
first place. What is more, in order for the rise in the cost of crime to have the
counterintuitive effect of worsening the impact of crime, the benefits of organization and
having the market cleared of smaller competitors would have to overwhelm the higher price
of committing crime. If anything, larger organizations are more likely to be price sensitive.
284 Analyzing criminals' behavior from this perspective does not preclude the view that
criminals do not respond exclusively to financial incentives, or that they do not respond to
such incentives in the same way that non-criminals would. One might imagine that the
marginal value of cash could decrease more slowly for some criminals than for non-
criminals, because a large wad of greenbacks conveys a social meaning that would be
irrelevant or even counterproductive to the non-criminal while it enhances the status of the
criminal. Cf Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943
(1995). Instead of claiming that money is either the exclusive or even the primary incentive
for criminal activity, a principled defender of the fight against laundering need only establish
that criminals respond to incentives, including those that affect the financial return to
perpetrating crime. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 121 (rev. ed.
1983) ("People are governed in their daily lives by rewards and penalties of every sort. ...
To assert that 'deterrence doesn't work' is tantamount to either denying the plainest facts of
everyday life or claiming that would-be criminals are utterly different from the rest of us.").
285 See infra notes 306-309 (discussing legislators' perception that major sources of
funding for criminal activity would come from criminal profits).
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much of the money that would finance further crime-whether drug
trafficking or terrorism-would come from criminal profits. 86  It is
worth noting that even if one accepts this logic, the legitimacy of
money laundering enforcement depends on the predicate crime that is
being made more costly. Thus, China might be interested in using
money laundering enforcement to catch people selling
communications technology to dissident groups-a goal that would
find much less sympathy among Americans." 7 But assuming one has
no qualms about the underlying predicate crimes in question, then the
disruption of criminal finance seems like an attractive way of cutting
into the return people can make from criminal activity, and therefore
into the amount of criminal activity.
Because the process of laundering is thought to affect the return
from perpetrating a crime, cheaper laundering opportunities that
allow criminals to obtain the greatest benefit from their money can
thus lead to micro-level distortions in social and economic activity
for at least two reasons. First, other things being equal, as the
perpetration of illegal activity becomes less costly (either because the
risk of detection is lower, the expected return is higher, or both) then
the choice to forego it becomes more expensive. Not all people
making a choice between legal and illegal activity make what could
be defined as a "rational" choice28 to engage in illegal activity, but
those who tend to make such decisions are attracted to crimes for
profit in part because of the benefit. Indeed, even individuals whose
desire to engage in terrorist activity could hardly be termed "rational"
might still make reasoned judgments meant to maximize the success
286 This position implies that it is easier for people already engaged in criminal activity to
fund it rather than for new entrants to do so. It would be hard to deny the possibility that
money would come from other sources, but at least some indications of the behavior of
organized crime suggest that criminal networks might both (1) reinvest their profits in some
of their existing activities (to pay for corruption, raw materials, human capital, and
equipment) and (2) expand the scope of their illegal activities. See LEVITT & VENKATESH,
supra note 81.
287 Note that whether an offense is consensual or not does not necessarily give us an
adequate means of assessing its legitimacy. For example, some people might view the
consensual nature of most drug transactions as evidence that it should be condoned, but even
libertarians should be uncomfortable about a consensual transaction to deliver nuclear fissile
material to a terrorist group.
288 Unfortunately, just exactly what is "rational" is not inherently clear. See Eyal Zamir,
The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLuM. L. REV.
1710, 1793 (1997) ("The term rationality is susceptible of different definitions, varying as to
their abstractness and the elements they contain.").
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of their activity and lower the risk of detection. 89 In any case, for
some people, legal and illegal activity can substitute for each other-
as a means of making a living, making a profit, winning friends and
influence, or just spending time. The greater the perceived benefit
from illegal activity, the less attractive legal activity is by
comparison.29 0  This means at least some subset the population is
more likely to engage in socially harmful activities. Second,
laundered illegal money can subsidize anti-competitive and
predatory practices by legitimate businesses infused with dirty
cash.29' Although this is hard to show empirically because of the
difficulty in detecting money laundering, the scenario is easy to
envision. Suppose two money exchange houses on the Texas side of
the U.S.-Mexico border (A and B) compete, and one of them (B)
receives dirty money on the side. As a result B can offer more
favorable exchange rates; given the right market conditions (i.e., no
unduly increasing marginal costs, acceptable tax consequences, and
customers are highly price sensitive), then B might use its ability to
offer slightly lower rates to steal much of A's business. In a
competitive market A will have to lose business or look for its own
source of dirty money.92
289 The indictment against Zacaraias Moussaui highlights the government's theory that
the hijackers were goal-driven and made reasoned choices to maximize the probability of
the success of their scheme. See Moussaui Indictment, supra note 24.
290 See Eide, supra note 270, at 345-355 (reviewing empirical research on the
determinants of criminals' behavior, including substitution between different kinds of illegal
activity, and between legal and illegal activity).
291 Id.
292 In technical terms, one might say that B's willingness to undercut A depends on
whether gains from extra customers' business outweigh the extra margin that could be
obtained from the higher price that was foregone, adjusted for B's extra costs and the
corresponding tax consequences. See supra note 69. Research from the IMF also makes a
related argument that criminal finance, in principle, can lead to economic distortions and
even macroeconomic instability, but the argument is not entirely convincing. See PETER
QUIRK, MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF MONEY LAUNDERING 24 (Int'l Monetary Fund,
Working Paper No. 96/66, 1996). See also TANZI, supra note 30. In a nutshell the argument
is this: criminals with lots of dirty money will not behave like rational, profit-maximizing
investors looking for the most rewarding rate of return. Instead, they will (1) look for
secrecy, distorting the incentives of jurisdictions and encouraging them to provide secrecy;
and (2) develop the potential to move massive balances from one economy to another,
destabilizing it. Although these papers persuasively suggest the possibility of an
independent destabilizing macroeconomic effect arising from laundered money, there are a
few problems with the argument: (a) it is not clear why criminals would use the movement
of money to explicitly or implicitly undermine an economy's stability, especially since that
could undermine the disposition of their assets or the security of their longer-term (possibly
2003]
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The upshot: other things being equal, there is some law
enforcement value in trying to disrupt criminals' access to the
convenience of the modem financial system. The more financial
resources a criminal controls, the more valuable it will be to the
criminal to be able to transform the financial resources obtained from
criminal activity into a convenient form (i.e., bank or financial
institution balances without an obvious trail to people, places, or
accounts connected to criminal activity)-either directly or by hiring
someone to do it. Balances at a financial institution can easily be
turned into consumable goods and services, reinvested in criminal
activity, or diversified across a range of legal and illegal investments.
The disruption of criminals' financial activity forces the high-level
criminal and his underlings into an uncomfortable choice: pay more
(i.e., in commissions to expert launderers) to get the money into its
most usable, high-return usable form, or accept constraints in the
extent to which money connected to crime can be moved,
transformed, and used.
2. Aid to Detection of Predicate Offenses
One constraint on criminal financial activity may come from
efforts to detect predicate offenses by monitoring financial
transactions. Financial transactions leave records-and even those
that do not leave as many records (such as cash transactions) can be
made to leave behind a paper trail. All of which can aid investigators
in the ex ante detection of predicate offenses linked to particular
kinds of transactions (such as large currency deposits or wire
transfers to accounts considered suspicious) or even in the ex post
detection of factual information that can be helpful in building a legal
case against a defendant.
In principle, using criminals' financial transaction patterns to
detect their involvement in predicate crime may be more than just an
efficient strategy. A strategy of using financial activity to trace the
responsibility of higher-level criminals may also reflect a basic
concern with fairness. One plausible story might be that the more
difficult it is to trace money linked to criminal activity, the more law
enforcement investigative strategies are confined to targeting the
most visible wrongdoer. The most visible wrongdoer is not
necessarily the most guilty, if by guilt one means someone who,
legal) investments; and (b) individual countries (especially offshore financial centers) might
see their hard currency positions strengthened by the presence of criminal financial activity.
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compared to others, either benefits more from an offense, had a more
substantial role in spurring it, or both. Moreover, it is not morally
controversial that someone financing a crime should be identified as
responsible.29
3
3. Cleansing the Financial System of Benefits Derived from Crime
Now consider another potential sort of harm arising from
criminal financial activity, quite apart from the impact of that activity
on the criminal's return from perpetrating crime. Suppose one
believed that money linked to crime-that is, either derived from
crime or on its way to pay for criminal activity-should be kept apart
from the financial system. There are two possible versions of this
claim. One focuses on the potential harm to which financial
institutions might be subjected when money that is linked to crime
courses through their accounts. Another version could make more of
a normative claim that it is undesirable for the financial system to
spread the gains from criminal activity to the larger universe of
people who are not lawbreakers.
The former argument is fairly straightforward, even though it
depends on empirical presuppositions that are seldom defended.
Balances obtained from criminal activity, goes the argument, can
give banks and other financial institutions a stake in criminal
activity.294  The latter argument is perhaps more far-fetched. The
idea is that money from crime can obviously contribute to legitimate
economic activity, thereby serving as a sort of macro-economic
stimulus, generating jobs and economic activity. Although some of
this activity might help offset the micro-economic distortions and
criminal subsidy problems discussed above, there might be reason to
fear that the money would act as a sort of tempting "bribe" offered to
particular groups or geographic regions if they merely look the other
way and let the predicate crime occur. Under this view, a crime's
reach extends not only to the people who are obviously involved but
293 See supra note 142 and accompanying text, discussing the extent to which financing
an offense gives rise to criminal liability for it. Even under international law it is entirely
possible to argue that someone who finances a terrorist act (whether the money is clean or
not) becomes liable for its effects.
294 For an example of the sort of rhetoric associated with this argument, see 2000
ANNUAL STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 7 ("Money laundering taints our financial institutions,
and, if left unchecked, can undermine public trust in their integrity.... In an age of rapidly
advancing technology and globalization, the uncontrolled laundering of large sums can
disturb financial stability."). See also supra note 292.
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also to the people who enjoy benefits from the profits of crime.295
This latter theory makes more sense as another version of the "willful
blindness" argument (i.e., akin to the situation where bankers put
their talents at the service of an arms dealer), rather than as the
expression of an abstract moral principle, since it is hard to accept a
view where physical currency becomes possessed of some kind of
moral agency that is somehow irredeemably soiled after the dollar is
spent on some illegal deed. After all, forfeited dollars from drug
sales or fraud end up being given to law enforcement. Cops then
spend the money with no compunction, because it is the erstwhile
295 There may be less than meets the eye to this argument. If money were not spent on
illegal activity, presumably it would be eventually spent either on something else that is
illegal, or on something legal. Either way, there is no good reason to think that the money
spent on drugs, alien smuggling, or gun running would not eventually end up flowing
through the economy. The Anglo-American legal tradition of in rem proceedings against
property may foster the illusion that it is the money itself that is "guilty" and must be
stopped from flowing through the economy-indeed, this is part of the legal reasoning that
allows the government to seize and convert a lot of allegedly dirty money through forfeiture.
But in the end, money doesn't buy things by itself, nor does it have a conscience. The idea
that the dirty money itself is tainted and that anyone who touches it is also tainted means that
we would just have to assume that handling the dirty money automatically taints someone
(even if they have little knowledge of this). That does not seem especially satisfying either
as a moral principle, or as a practical approach to deterring crime.
There is an alternative line of reasoning to save the "cleansing the financial system"
argument, but one needs to make additional assumptions. Suppose our objective is to limit
the extent of predicate crimes and encourage legitimate economic activity. Suppose further
that the residents of the City of Guadalajara can invest either in new maquila plants or a drug
money laundering infrastructure of loosely regulated banks and real estate markets. The
maquila plants may pay off but will face greater competition than the drug smuggling
activities. The drug activities will also produce more money, some of which (assume) will
cycle through Guadalajara's economy, the proverbial tide that lifts all boats in the city. In
this situation, we might say that laundering activities conducted through Guadalajara-and
leaving it money-could make large chunks of the city derive a benefit from the illegal
activity. This would be true not in the sense that the city's population were formally
complicit, but in the more subtle sense that they would derive a benefit from the activity and
would adopt even slight changes in behavior that would continue making the city a
competitive center for laundering. We might imagine additional assumptions that the
average Guadalajara citizen, knowing that his city's economy and tax case is swelling with
drug money, becomes more corrupt-more willing to engage in illegal activity-given
cognitive dissonance. The common folk in Guadalajara may not all be facilitating wire
transfers of dirty money, but they may be subtly encouraging the illicit enterprise and its
financial side. The more one pushes this line of argument, the more it starts to sound like the
consequentialist case for catching lawyers, bankers, and other third-party launderers
engaging in "willful blindness" when they use their talents to help predicate offenders. The
problem is not that the money itself taints the financial system, but that the laundering
process can give Guadalajarans an incentive to further the underlying, ostensibly harmful
criminal activity in order to soak up riches that would otherwise be spent on something else.
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criminal who used the money, and not the currency itself, that is
worthy of blame.
4. Assessing the Justifications and the Goals They Imply
It is virtually beyond dispute that disrupting criminal finance is
costly, though it is not clear that the financial costs are as high as
banks and financial institutions contend.296 Since any attempted
disruption of criminal finance has financial as well as non-financial
costs, policymakers should consider these costs in deciding whether
to pursue efforts to disrupt criminal finance. Disrupting criminal
finance may require the development of a framework for gathering
financial data that would leave the government with more power than
what "society" prefers (i.e., according to some defensible scheme for
considering the consequences of government power). If anything,
though, this is an argument for caution in institutional design-and
not for abandoning the objective of disrupting criminal finance. Yet
on balance, the assumptions of the skeptical arguments seem less
plausible than the assumptions of the affirmative arguments, for two
major reasons. A substantial amount of people engaged either in
crime for profit or the financing of offenses such as terrorism are
likely to be rational in the sense that they want to achieve an
objective (i.e., get money, remain in control of a criminal
organization, fund a crime that is effectively carried out). Therefore,
if criminals have to accept some risk of detection when using the
infrastructure of the global financial system, they may choose not to
do so and will be forced to shoulder the cost of transacting outside
that system.
In short, the project of disrupting criminal finance can hardly be
evaluated comprehensively without further empirical assessments of
the arguments for and against targeting criminal finance. In the
meantime, though, it is at least possible to understand why legislators
could conceivably have thought that building an elaborate
enforcement system was worth doing as a means of targeting criminal
finance.297 The case that can be made is a cautious one, but someone
who accepts all the skeptical arguments excessively trivializes the
extent to which criminal activity is influenced by the presence of
money and by efforts to obtain more of it. Going through the reasons
296 Their interests in the matter are self-explanatory. See Part IV, infra.
297 This is not to suggest that the development of the fight against money laundering was
a logical response to concern over crime and drugs. Legislators are politicians and respond
to lawmaking opportunities as such. See Part IV.A, infra.
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for skepticism is useful for two reasons. First, it shows that the
precise impact of the alleged deleterious effects of criminal finance
requires at least some more empirical testing. It might be true, for
example, that cheap laundering lowers the cost of perpetrating crime
and maximally enjoying the profits, but whether this means less
crime depends on assumptions. But second, the most plausible
assumptions are ones that suggest there are social costs that arise
from criminal financial transactions: in principle, the cost of
perpetrating particular kinds of crime often impacts the amount of
criminal activity. In theory, financial surveillance can sometimes aid
in crime detection, and penalties for laundering can make the world
harsher for third-party launderers and others who help criminals
profit from crime and reinvest that money, perhaps even in more
illegal activity, of which terrorism is the example of the day.
The cautious arguments in favor of targeting criminal finance do
not necessarily justify any sort of money laundering policy under the
sun. Obviously the claim that a great many criminal activities have a
financial component could be taken to mean that one can see
laundering in every crime. But unless there is a special means of
detecting crime through its financial component, then finding some
sort of "laundering" component in every crime collapses into an
effort to detect every ordinary substantive crime and to punish it
more severely. 98 If special reasons exist to target laundering, then
presumably these reasons should translate into some priorities for
targeting particular offenses or conduct. One might advance the
agenda of disrupting criminal finance, for example, by punishing
financial activity undertaken by those who benefit most from the
income produced by crime, such as the leaders of organized criminal
networks (i.e., the proverbial drug "kingpins," among others).
Another specific objective that would seem to follow from the
acceptance that criminal financial activity produces a special harm is
the targeting of individuals (or, if one prefers, organizations) with
accumulated knowledge, expertise, and willingness to make
298 Consider why this is the case. In a world where every case has a "laundering"
component, then the presence or absence of laundering is as irrelevant to the choice of what
offenses to target as the absence or presence "harm" in a world where every crime can be
plausibly described as causing some kind of "harm." Cf Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse
of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999). In the abstract, most
every crime might be said to have a "laundering" or "criminal finance" component. A more
targeted effort to disrupt criminal finance requires a more specific focus, such as attention to
the importance of the criminal being targeted or the potential marginal impact of a
prosecution on the finances of an organized criminal network.
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laundering easier. Call these "third-party" launderers, because they
may have no interest in getting involved in the substantive criminal
offense. If the goal is to target laundering because of its distinctive
harms or particular importance in crime, then it makes sense to target
these launderers disproportionately since they are (presumably) in a
position to facilitate a host of substantive criminal offenses (not just
one). Finally, one might imagine that if criminal financial activity
leaves a sort of smoking gun that can lead authorities to substantive
crimes, then the government would be justified in developing an
infrastructure to take advantage of such traces of information (and
increase them). Moreover, the better the detection system (in
principle), the easier it could be for authorities to detect the most
damaging or large-scale criminal financial activity-thereby
allowing them to fulfill the other objectives of focusing attention on
organized criminal networks and third-party launderers.
Consider the deterrent impact of these three interrelated
objectives: detection strategies raise the probability of detecting both
predicate crimes and laundering, which means that criminals have to
pay higher risk premiums solve the problems associated with
managing their money (or bear the risk themselves). Targeting the
leaders of organized criminal networks focuses resources on the
individuals and bank accounts that can presumably do more harm (on
average), in part because they harbor greater resources that could be
reinvested in crime. And targeting third-party laundering disrupts
both criminal financial activity and the underlying predicates. By
increasing the risk to third-party launderers, the authorities could
(again, in principle) increase laundering costs which are passed onto
substantive offenders-thereby lowering the return from the
perpetration of crime, and perhaps forcing some to substitute less
expensive and less efficient methods of laundering that might make it
easier for the authorities to detect the underlying predicate offense.299
299 For example, assume that drug traffickers have the choice between using a third-party
launderer that would take care of depositing cash in American bank accounts and turning it
into balances in Colombia that were not linked to drugs, or instead making bulk shipments of
cash out of the United States. If the authorities target the third-party launderer and increase
her risk, the providers of laundering services would tend to respond by raising the price of
laundering services. The drug traffickers would then have to pay the higher prices for
laundering, or substitute the costly strategy of making the bulk cash shipment themselves,
making them easier to detect at airports and border checkpoints because of the cash-focused
nature of most existing detection strategies there.
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B. THE "OFFICIAL" STORY: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND EXECUTIVE
JUSTIFICATION
Now turn from theory to history. At least some parts of the
official justification for the fight against money laundering seems to
match the cautious theoretical case. First, although the testimony and
discussions during the legislative history lack analytical nuance,
policymakers seemed to cling to the basic "cost of perpetrating
crime" idea as the main justification. Two other justifications surface
that are also consistent with the preceding analysis: the notion that
targeting criminal finance helps in detecting crime, and that targeting
criminal finance prevents "reinvestment" in crime. The logical
implication of these arguments is that the focus of the whole
enforcement apparatus against criminal finance-which became what
I call the fight against money laundering-should be on third-party
launderers and high-level criminal organizers. Those are indeed the
figures upon which legislators focused. The focus on these sorts of
villains probably served another purpose: it played into the symbolic
value of the statutes, since it was (and is) easy to hate the underworld
drug lord soaking up dirty money to buy a yacht and fast car, as well
as the corrupt lawyer, accountant, or banker who (in theory) helps the
kingpin pull this off the magical task of turning literally soiled
crumpled currency into accounts at a bank secrecy haven. In short,
the fight against money laundering is supposed to be about disrupting
criminal finance."'
A cynic might disagree, insisting that the system's entire purpose
is to increase the power of prosecutors and investigators to make it
easier to target criminals. This is obviously true at some level, since
changes expanding the scope of criminal law enhance the power of
300 For what it's worth (and maybe not much), the legislative history seems to square
with the cautious case that could be made for targeting criminal finance. See supra notes
290-296. This includes two important caveats, though. First, the legislative history should
hardly be expected to serve as a picture of the full panoply of interests and dynamics that
shape legislation. Part IV, infra, provides a discussion of the incentives of legislators, the
pressure they might face from financial institutions, and the parallel interests of investigators
and prosecutors. Second, even if we focus on the legislative history, it quickly turns out that
a lot more (and perhaps less) is going on than just having Congress. The justification for the
fight against money laundering was going on at a time of dramatically rising crime rates and
(for the criminal penalties) a growing national obsession with drugs. So, in addition to
whatever underlying purpose could have been served by the fight against money laundering
in principle, the anti-drug and anti-crime hysteria is almost certainly part of what led




prosecutors and investigators.3 °1 When criminal law covers more
behavior, it is easier for prosecutors to make cases because it is easier
to gather evidence of some criminal violation, even if that violation
seems technical or unrelated to the reasons why someone initially
aroused suspicion.31 2 For example, during the 1970s, public concern
over drug consumption was growing and law enforcement attention
to drug offenses was increasing. Police faced increasing pressure to
investigate drug-related offenses even as judicial regulation of
criminal procedure was thought to get in the way of investigations.
Enter the spoon laws: prohibitions against drug paraphernalia,
including spoons when intended for use preparing drugs. 3 3  These
laws then allowed prosecutors to build cases against people even in
the absence of evidence of the underlying offense that probably
generated concern against someone (i.e., drug trafficking or even
possession). Not surprisingly, the action requirement to trigger
liability under a spoon law-namely, possession of a spoon-
becomes virtually meaningless: a spoon can be used to eat soup or to
heat a drug-laced solution to make it easier to inject. It is the
intended use of the spoon that triggers the criminal offense.3"4
Proving intent might not always be easy for the prosecutor, but may
still be simpler than building a case against someone for a more
substantive violation involving something like possession of drugs
with intent to distribute. Like the prohibitions on drug paraphernalia
that criminalized the possession of a spoon with the intent to use it
for the preparation or consumption of drugs, anti-money laundering
laws turn some innocent conduct into guilty conduct, allowing
prosecutors to have more tools with which to secure convictions. In
this account, part of what drives the money laundering laws might be
a simplistic concern over despised offenses that are difficult to detect
and to prosecute.
All of this could make sense as a partial explanation for the
politics of the definition of money laundering offenses (a topic
30 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv.
505 (2001).
302 See Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the
Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 259, 273 (2000).
303 See Annotation, Validity Under Fed. Const. of So-called "Head Shop" Ordinances or
Statutes Prohibiting Manufacture and Sale of Drug Use and Related Paraphernalia , 69
A.L.R. FED. 15 (defining as "drug paraphernalia" to include "(8) Blenders, bowls, containers,





addressed below), but does not necessarily shed light on the
justifications used to sell the fight against money laundering. In fact,
neither the legislative histories of the relevant laws nor statements
from public officials since passage of the legislation brazenly say that
the entire enterprise of fighting money laundering is simply cover for
letting prosecutors boost their ratio of work to convictions. Nor does
the simplistic prosecution-focused rationale explain legislators'
interest in creating a regulatory framework of civil penalties and
information gathering to complement the use of the statutes. If we
assume that laws expanding the scope of criminal and civil liability
increase the power of law enforcement authorities, the question is
how such power has been justified by the officials who designed and
administer the system.
The legislative history reveals primarily three concerns: (1) a
recurring preoccupation with the nexus linking high-level figures in
drug trafficking and organized crime to money laundering; (2) a
conclusion that money laundering involved a range of financial
activity, including complex financial schemes, that-if detected-
could point to the presence of predicate crimes (and, more recently,
to the presence of terrorism); and (3) and a concern with people
thought to be specialists in money laundering, navigating the criminal
underworld and helping people engage in illicit transactions."' The
following passage from the Senate Report on the legislation creating
the money laundering criminal statutes, quoting a previous Reagan
Administration report, illustrates all three concerns:
Ultimately, the degree of sophistication and complexity in a laundering scheme is
virtually infinite, and is limited only by the creative imagination and expertise of the
criminal entrepreneurs who devise such schemes .... [I]n recent years ... [criminals]
have mastered the details of modem technology, international finance, and foreign
305 For some of the Bank Secrecy Act's legislative history illustrating these concerns, see
H.R. 15073, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 16,955-56 (1970). For similar concerns
animating discussion of substantive criminal statutes, see infra note 306. Although the
disruption of terrorist financing might seem analytically distinct, the reflexive reaction from
policymakers post September II is to identify fighting money laundering with fighting
terrorist financing. See supra note 8. For analogous arguments about terrorist financing
showing little sensitivity to subtle distinctions between that activity and ordinary laundering,
see U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE DEP'T OF THE TREASURY TO THE
FINANCIAL WAR ON TERRORISM 4 (Sept. 2002) (highlighting the disruption of terrorist
financial strategies as a major objective of anti-money laundering detection strategies).
Note that any efforts to combat terrorist financing would still find logical coherence with the
three major objectives described above. Indeed, without some version of these objectives,
the fight against terrorist financing would devolve into a simple effort to target whomever is
detected for, or suspected of, being a terrorist.
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secrecy laws to create a select fraternity of money laundering professionals. As a
result, organized crime today uses banks and other financial institutions as routinely,
if not as frequently, as legitimate business.
306
The image of the "select fraternity of money laundering
professionals" recurs now and again in the legislative history." 7 So
too does the notion that laundering prosecutions and regulations
could be tools to detect and punish people higher up in criminal
organizations-who were presumably more likely to be engaged in
criminal activity for financial gain.3"8
Of course, the preceding discussion of legislative history does
not imply that such history should occupy the most privileged
position in making sense of the law. Congress is a "they," not an
"it. '"309 But legislative history shows how a statute is marketed to the
public, and to courts that ultimately serve as arbiters of their meaning
and their constitutionality. So even if one accepts the view of
legislative history as politically self-serving or at least unreliable,"'
306 S. Rep. No. 99-433, at 2 (1986).
307 See, e.g., WALTER, supra note I, at 151 (quoting Current Problem of Money
Laundering: Hearing of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong. (1st Sess.
1985):
[Money laundering] is an extremely lucrative criminal enterprise in its own right. Treasury's
investigations uncovered members of an emerging criminal class-professional money
launderers who aid and abet other criminals through financial activities. These individuals
hardly fit the stereotype of an underworld criminal. They are accountants, attorneys, money
brokers, and members of other legitimate professions. They need not become involved with the
underlying criminal activity except to conceal and transfer the proceeds that result from it. They
are drawn to their illicit activity for the same reason to that drug trafficking attracts new
criminals to replace those who are convicted and imprisoned-greed. Money laundering, for
them, is an easy route to almost limitless wealth.
Press accounts also emphasize the existence of "white-collar" laundering professionals. See,
e.g., Timothy L. O'Brien, Cash-Flow Woes: Law Firm's Downfall Exposes New Methods of
Money Laundering, WALL ST. J., May 26, 1995, at Al (describing an alleged international
network of "white-collar" professionals used by the Colombian Cali drug trafficking cartel
to launder profits).
308 The legislative history of the laws forming the bedrock of the fight against money
laundering is replete with statements like this one, from Representative George Wortley:
[M]oney is the reason people get into the drug trade. If we take away the lure of easy money, if
we increase the costs associated with making that money, we will be much closer to greatly
reducing, if not totally eliminating, the drug trade. To do this we have to get at the financial
backers, which means we have to stop money laundering.
131 CONG. REC. H5382-01 (daily ed. July 10, 1985) (statement of Rep. George Wortley).
309 See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress as a "They, " Not an "It": Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 244 (1992).
310 id.
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its content reveals the arguments that many policymakers believed to
be important in justifying the fight against money laundering.
Statements of executive branch officials accentuate the
impression created by the legislative history. Since the statutes
passed, officials from the Treasury, Justice, and State Departments
have frequently insisted that the fight against money laundering is
meant to disrupt criminal financial activity, particularly activity
involving high-level leaders of criminal organizations and
professional third-party launderers.3 1 This implies that the statutes
and regulations are not simply a means of enhancing the punishment
faced by people who have already been detected for committing
crimes. Sometimes the corrosive nature of money laundering is
asserted repeatedly, even without a detailed analytical justification of
its impacts. The larger message is that money laundering is the "life
blood" of crime and the fight against money laundering is about
shattering the link between money and crime.312  The message
coming from executive branch officials therefore shows remarkable
consistency with the legislative history justifying the major anti-
money laundering statutes.
Concerns over terrorist financing have only raised the volume
and extent of claims that the fight against money laundering could
fight criminal finance, including the financing of terrorism. Although
some policymakers recognized a distinction between fighting money
laundering and terrorist financing, the most frequently-heard claims
are that fighting one helps disrupt the other. The claim tends to be
made in two ways. Some people insist that terrorists raise funds
through illegal activities, the profits of which become useful for
311 See, e.g., Fed. Gov.'s Response to Money Laundering: Hearings Before the
Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 200-01 (1st Sess. 1993)
(statement of Ronald K. Noble, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury); see also id. at 453 (statement of Federick B. Verinder, Deputy Assistant Director,
FBI):
The use of the money laundering statutes reduces the profitability [of crime] through seizure and
attacks the underpinning of the enterprise by attacking the organizational infrastructure which
facilitates the money laundering function.... [allowing the] target[ing] [of] members of the
enterprise for whom the money is being laundered.
312 The reference to money laundering as the "life blood" of crime may be little more
than a rhetorical flourish on the part of some policymakers, but some of the issues raised by
the metaphor may be consistent with more analytically sophisticated discussions of why




terrorism only if they can be laundered.313 There is probably some
support for this, although just how much is difficult to tell.314 Indeed,
one example of how at least the relationship between drug money and
terrorism is not monotonic may come from the Taliban, whose
support for Al-Qaeda tends to be widely acknowledged. 3" Less
acknowledged after September 11 is the Taliban's apparent interest in
undermining drug production in Afghanistan. 316  The other claim is
that, even when terrorist financing is not directly related to money
gleaned from illegal activity, the task of detecting terrorist financing
cannot be separated from that of detecting money laundering.317 This
argument is plausible. In principle, the detection of money
laundering involves figuring out if money comes from illegal activity.
313 A host of present and former executive branch officials imply that terrorist financing
is at least partly grafted onto the process of money laundering. One former Deputy Treasury
Secretary described the relationship thus:
Terrorists must have money, to pay for weapons, travel, training, and even benefits for the family
members of suicide bombers. The September 11 terrorists pent tends, if not hundreds, of
thousands of dollars on U.S. flight training, and their U.S. living expenses were likely even
higher.
Hearing on the Admin. 's Nat '1 Money Laundering Strategy of 2001, Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Sept. 26, 2001) (Testimony of Stuart E. Eizenstat,
Former. Deputy Sec'y of the Treasury), available at http://banking.senate.gov/0 I _09hrg/
092601/eiznstat.htm (last visited May 10, 2003). See also Remarks by Julie Meyers, Deputy
Assistant Sec'y for Money Laundering & Fin. Crimes, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Before
the Int'l Regulators Meeting (Mar. 15, 2002), available at http://wwww.ustreas.gov/press/
releases/po2003.htm, (last visited Mar. 26, 2002) ("To say that September I 1th refocused
our attention on the problem of money laundering and the related threat of terrorist financing
hardly seems to capture the import of that day, but was certainly one of its many effects.").
314 There is anecdotal evidence that some of money from the Pakistani heroin trade
(which feeds more than half of the heroin consumption in the U.S. market) was used to
support Al-Qaeda.
315 The Taliban are widely alleged to have supported Osama Bin Laden and AI-Qaeda.
Although the most conspicuous example of this support involves the Taliban's apparent
grant of permission to use Afghani territory for training camps, the precise extent of the
depth of the Taliban's support for AI-Qaeda has not been documented publicly.
316 One might speculate that ideological and religious extremist groups may loathe the
impurity of American society as well as the growth and marketing of narcotics. Yet, as with
so many enforcement efforts, politics might play a role here at least as much as ideology. In
Afghanistan, for example, drug revenues might have been viewed as helping local warlords
raise resources to resist centralized Taliban control, thereby making the Taliban erstwhile
allies in the international campaign to control narcotics.
317 Policymakers frequently make the argument that there is a seamless connection
between fighting money laundering and disrupting terrorist financing. See, e.g., Tamara
Loomis, Sept. 11 Attacks Created New Urgency for Legislation, N.Y. L. J. 5 (col. 2) (Oct. 18,
2001) (quoting James. E. Johnson, former Under Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement,
discussing "the threats posed by people who launder money to facilitate other crimes").
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This means investigators might trace the origin of funds to determine
if they can establish a link between the funds and illegal activity (as
required to establish a violation of § 1957 or to activate forfeiture
provisions). Investigators might also determine that someone is
likely to be involved in illegal activity, in which case the funds
received by that person might be suspected of some link to crime.
Although the detection of terrorist financing is different in principle
(since there needn't be a link to illegal activity to generate the funds
involved), it is similar in that it also involves figuring out where
money came from and where it is going. Accordingly, the fight
against money laundering encompasses regulatory authority and
investigative tools-including suspicious activity reporting,
informants, undercover investigations, asset freezes, and airport
enforcement-that could help authorities investigate where money
goes or comes from and therefore, how terrorism is financed. It
therefore makes sense to think that one goal of the fight against
money laundering is to make transactions traceable enough to enable
investigators and regulators to detect and disrupt terrorist
financing.31 None of this suggests that the fight against money
laundering is the only way or even the best way of disrupting terrorist
financing. What should be clear instead is that policymakers view
the fight against money laundering as a vehicle to achieve larger
objectives involving the disruption of criminal finance, including
terrorist financing. One consequence of the argument that the fight
against money laundering disrupts terrorist financing has been that
the aftermath of September 11 opened the door for laws further
expanding prosecutors' power to combat money laundering,
including, for example, creation of a new criminal offense of bulk
cash smuggling319 and further expansion of specified unlawful
318 See, e.g., Money Laundering Investigations, Hearing Before H-ouse Committee on
Banking and Financial Services (June It, 1998) (testimony of Raymond W. Kelly),
available at 1998 WL 12761116 (requesting change in anti-money laundering criminal
penalties to include terrorism among list of specified unlawful activities). Whether the fight
against money laundering is actually able to deliver on this goal is, of course, another
question. We might properly have skepticism over this issue given the limitations in
investigative methods used to detect money laundering. See Part II.B, infra.
319 USAPA Section 371 now prohibits the knowing concealment of more than $10,000 in
currency or monetary instruments for the purpose of evading a currency reporting
requirement when transporting or attempting to transport the currency into or out of the U.S.
This crime is punishable by up to 5 years imprisonment, and the property involved in or
traceable to the offense must be forfeited. See generally USAPA Title III (containing
statutory changes premised on the connection between efforts to combat money laundering
and the imperative of disrupting, terrorist financing).
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activities for §§ 1956 and 1957,320 regardless of whether these
changes plausibly enhance the prospects for disruption of terrorist
financing.
Perhaps an even more telling indication of the anti-money
laundering system's grand ambitions is found in the nature of the
laws and regulations that make up that system-which are not just
focused on drugs, on cash, or simple penalty enhancement. Specified
unlawful activities in the core anti-money laundering federal statutes
range from sale of counterfeit aircraft parts to fraud to (recently) a
full bevy of racketeering activities and crimes extraditable under
multilateral conventions."' Specified unlawful activities also include
offenses ranging from environmental crimes to murder-for-hire and
precursor chemical offenses. The international laundering offense in
§ 1956 covers not only the movement of criminally derived proceeds
out of the United States to hide them, but also the movement of
money into or out of the United States to finance specified unlawful
activities. Moreover, The Bank Secrecy Act's scope, as amended,
extends to recordkeeping on monetary instruments and wire transfers.
All of this suggests a concern with more than drugs (i.e., by covering
white-collar offenses), more than cash (i.e., by covering wire
transfers), and more than penalty enhancement (i.e., through the
creation of a regulatory system for detection and audit trails). Then
there are the laws designed to fight terrorist financing, which are not
necessarily anti-money laundering laws in the technical sense of
applying only to the disposition of criminal proceeds but are often
referred to as part of the same system.322 Suspicious activity reports
are supposed to give bank employees a vehicle to report suspected
activity linked to terrorism. These reports are analyzed (at least in
theory) by FinCEN. Orders to block terrorist assets, like those
designed to block the assets of narcotics traffickers, are implemented
by OFAC.323 Section 1956 now incorporates terrorist activity in its
list of specified unlawful activity, both because RICO now includes
terrorism as a predicate and because most of the offenses that are
extraditable because of multilateral treaties involve what is ordinarily
320 See, e.g., supra notes 147, 191, and 204 (discussing the expanded reach of USAPA).
321 See supra note 17 (noting some offenses among the long list of predicates forl8
U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957. See also supra Part I.B.2 (discussing USAPA's impact on the
regulatory structure).
322 A clear example of this asserted connection is in the history of Title III of USAPA,
which makes pervasive reference both to terrorism and to money laundering.




defined as terrorism, including threats to or violence against the civil
aviation system, bombings meant to intimidate the public, and
hostage-taking.324
Of course, the scope of all the laws and regulations designed to
fight money laundering may strengthen the claim that its purpose
must be in large measure to strengthen prosecutors' hand against
some kinds of criminal defendants (namely, those whose alleged
crimes have anything to do with money). As discussed earlier, there
is something to this since it is almost impossible to deny that the
criminal penalties and information that could be obtained through the
operation of the anti-money laundering system can help
prosecutors.3 25 But even if this is true to some extent, it is worth
noting that the system is not justified as a bald attempt to increase
prosecutors' power (even if this is part of what it achieves), but as
part of a systematic means of disrupting the financial aspects of
crime. Moreover, the design of the system seems to undermine
claims that policymakers and legislators were only concerned about
bags of drug-tainted currency. Instead, both the rhetoric about the
fight against money laundering and the statutes designed to carry out
that fight suggest an interest in disrupting a larger universe of
financial activity related to crime. That universe includes, among
other things, all the specified unlawful activities that were long part
of the core anti-money laundering criminal statutes and all the
financial activities that might involve cross-border movements of
currency (perhaps even including tax evasion).
In short, regardless of one's evaluation of what the fight against
money laundering actually achieves, it is hard to escape the
conclusion that the system was publicly justified on the basis that the
fight would affect the financial gains that could be achieved from a
broad range of crimes. To some extent, it was also designed to
achieve this in principle, providing prosecutors and regulators with
enough authority to punish a substantial range of involvement in the
financial aspect of crime. According to the record, the paradigmatic
scenario envisioned by legislative and executive branch officials at
the time the major statutes were passed was that of a money
laundering expert or facilitator with little if any involvement in the
predicate crime. By targeting such people, the logic was, the
government would have an effective tool to disrupt the possibility of
achieving financial gain from a broad range of crimes. More recently
324 See supra note 98.
325 See, e.g., supra notes 113-151 and accompanying text.
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government officials insist that the system to fight money laundering
should also be the primary vehicle to fight terrorist financing,
especially once it is supplemented with the legal authority contained
in USAPA.3 26 The fact that some people have insisted that the system
has quite ambitious objectives does not minimize the possibility that
prosecutors, investigators, and some legislators recognized that the
system's most direct result might simply be to make it easier to
punish some people who might already be caught, or who might
already be known but difficult to convict without the fight against
money laundering. But neither should we ignore that the system has
been publicly justified on the basis of the importance of disrupting
criminal finance, because that public justification affects everything
from financial institutions' compliance efforts to judicial responses in
cases questioning the constitutionality of certain aspects of the fight
against money laundering. When the Supreme Court weighed the
constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements, it
accepted the arguments Congress used to justify the fight against
money laundering.3 27 Whether this objective is achieved depends far
less on the articulation of that objective than on the likely incentives
of the players that run the system.
III. THE SYSTEM'S CONSEQUENCES
Broad grants of legal discretion are not turned into practical
enforcement strategies by accident. Predictably, the operation of the
system to fight money laundering appears to have been most directly
shaped by the incentives of players who have a role in the system.328
Legislators write and approve the substantive criminal laws that
allow prosecutors to charge people for money laundering and related
crimes.329 Judges interpret those laws and in the process shape
incentives of prosecutors and investigators whose work depends in
part on building cases against suspected violators. Investigators work
with the resources and tools at their disposal to target potential
violators. Regulators administer a system of rules and civil penalties
that often exists parallel to the criminal enforcement system, designed
to supplement the work of the criminal justice system by providing it
with information and to reduce the possibility of criminal violations
by giving private parties incentives that make it more difficult to
326 See supra note 22.
327 See supra note 169.




commit crimes. Thus, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
required federally licensed firearms dealers to conduct background
checks on most firearms sale transactions,33  and FinCEN
promulgates regulations requiring banks to file reports of large
currency transactions. 3  Beyond the government, financial
institutions have a substantial stake in the way the system works,
because they could face administrative, financial, and other burdens
depending on the way laws are written, prosecutors charge,
investigators detect, and regulators administer.
A. THE REALITY OF THE FIGHT AGAINST LAUNDERING
1. Result #1: Severe Penalties Focused on Predicate Offenders and Activity
Involving Large Aggregations of Currency
This section analyzes the allocation of criminal penalties for
laundering, particularly under the core anti-money laundering
criminal penalties, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957. Obviously the
criminal penalties and related forfeitures reach only a tiny fraction of
laundered money. So penalties and forfeiture are not reaching the
bulk of criminal finance. The question is then what is being reached,
and what that tells us about the incentives of the major players in the
system. Admittedly, the data used in this paper cannot answer every
question about money laundering charges, convictions, or the role
they play. For example, we do not know how many suspects are
arrested for conduct connected to money laundering, or when in the
plea bargaining process money laundering charges are added or
dropped. But at least we can begin to understand what exactly is
going on with money laundering charges and convictions.
a. Methods
Data were gathered from two major sources: a Bureau of Justice
Statistics (BJS) database of records relating to federal criminal
charges, and a random sample of fifty reported district court opinions
and case dispositions, obtained through the Westlaw database,
mentioning money laundering charges. (1) The Bureau of Justice
Statistics maintains a database of records relating to all federal
330 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2003). The statute provides for both civil penalties imposed through
regulatory enforcement as well as criminal penalties.




charges for a given year (i.e., fiscal year 2000). Each record
represents one offense charged against one person, so multiple
records may correspond to a single indictment.33 Data were
extracted using SPSS code on file with author. (2) To provide for
additional detail, I constructed a random sample of fifty reported
district court opinions and case dispositions from among all such
decisions available in Westlaw with dates between January 1, 1999
and May 15, 2002 mentioning "money laundering" and involving
violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957. Each case was read and
coded according to the following binary criteria: (1) whether the
defendant was charged with a substantive predicate crime in addition
to money laundering, or only with a money laundering offense;333 (2)
whether the offense involved currency; and (3) whether the offense
was detected using informants or undercover work. If the case did
not provide sufficient details to determine the answer, it was replaced
with another case from the sample. 334  The remainder of the
discussion below not focusing on the sources above involves analysis
of previously-reported data of money laundering convictions from
the U.S. Sentencing Commission, as well as doctrinal analysis of
opinions interpreting the major federal anti-money laundering
statutes (§§ 1956 and 1957), and sentencing defendants under those
statutes.
First Conclusion: Money Laundering Charges Are Grafted Onto
Charges for Substantive Offenses, and Penalties Tend to be
Severe Compared to Criminal Statutes Used in Conjunction with
Laundering
The first persistent result should be plain from the preceding
discussion of the players' incentives. Not surprisingly, law
332 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DATABASE OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS, 2000
(2001), available at http://fjsrc.urban.org/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2002).
333 For the purposes of the coding "money laundering" offense refers to the statutory
violations that the federal government classifies as "laundering" when deciding whether
funds were forfeited by defendants because of a "money laundering" investigation. See 2002
ANNUAL STRATEGY, supra note 8, at A-2. The federal statutes listed include: 18 U.S.C. §
1956 (2000) (laundering of monetary instruments); 18 U.S.C. § 1957(2000) (engaging in
transactions derived from unlawful activity); 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (operating an illegal money
transmitting business); 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (2003) (failure to file a currency transaction report);
31 U.S.C. § 5316 (violation of currency and monetary instrument reporting requirements,
and bulk cash smuggling); 31 U.S.C. § 5317 (2003) (forfeiture resulting from the failure to
file currency and monetary instrument reports); 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (2003) (structuring
financial transactions).
334 Additional methodological details on file with author.
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enforcement seizes and detects only the tiniest fraction of the total
amount of money associated with crime.335 Instead, the system tends
to make available severe penalties against individuals already
detected of committing some criminal activity, or people linked to
large aggregations of physical currency. People committing federal
offenses that can be predicates for money laundering (such as drug
trafficking), for example, can now be charged with money laundering
for doing almost anything in the world with money from specified
unlawful activity, because of the watered down interpretations of the
anti-money laundering statutes.
Criminal penalties for money laundering are severe. Sections
1956 and 1957, for example, provide for a maximum of twenty years
and ten years imprisonment, respectively, as well as steep fines.336
Moreover, until recently the relevant sentencing guidelines made
punishment for money laundering offenses more severe than for the
underlying crime. The guidelines have recently been amended to
strengthen the link between punishment for money laundering
involving a specified unlawful activity and the punishment for that
underlying criminal activity. Nonetheless, prosecutors can still
charge defendants with money laundering in addition to some other
charge-worsening the potential punishment that a defendant faces
given the facts of the case.
In fact, as Table 1 indicates, the vast majority of people charged
with a federal money laundering offense were also charged with at
least one other different kind of offense. This may not be altogether
unusual as federal criminal charging patterns go, but it does raise
threshold questions about the idea that the anti-money laundering
criminal statutes are being used to target third-party launderers
whose only (and indispensable) role in the criminal underworld is to
hide money's origin, since the more that laundering charges were
used against third-party launderers, the more we would expect
laundering charges to be used alone. Not only that, but in the
335 In 1992, the Treasury Department's Asset Forfeiture Fund (which processes most
annual forfeitures and seizures associated with federal criminal investigations) included $362
million. This pales in comparison to even the lower estimates of drug profits, and would be
an even smaller fraction of total returns from crime if one also considered organized crime
and fraud. See e.g., ONDCP REP'T, supra note 2, at 18 (estimating drug profits to be at least
$49 billion in 1993).
336 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957 (2001).
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plurality of cases where money laundering is coupled with some
other charge, money laundering carries the most severe penalties.337
Even in the minuscule number of cases charging money
laundering where that offenses involving laundering constitute the
only type of charge, the offense might still be a proxy for a predicate
crime that is more difficult to make out. After all, prosecutors and
investigators have strong incentives to use a money laundering
violation as a proxy, and judicial interpretations of the core money
laundering statues make it easy to establish a violation. Suppose, for
example, that investigators learn about a prostitution ring, and
prosecutors catch someone (call him John) spending money that can
be traced to a prostitution ring but have trouble establishing John's
position in the ring. Prosecutors may want to charge John with
money laundering instead of going through the difficult process of
establishing John's link to the prostitution ring. In such a scenario,
the hardest thing prosecutors have to do is establish a link between
the money John is spending and the prostitution ring (to satisfy the
link to specified unlawful activity). If that link can be established
and John spends more than $10,000 and uses a financial institution,
though, then even a prosecutor with the skills of a trained monkey
could make out a violation of § 1957. 338 A monetary transaction does
not mean much beyond simply using a financial institution in some
transaction connected to the criminally derived proceeds, and the
statute's knowledge requirement can still be satisfied with a willful
blindness argument.339 It is hard to tell exactly what proportion of
cases involving money laundering charges actually reflect
substitution of laundering for predicate offenses that might have been
detected but are hard to prove. The point is the ease with which a
prosecutor can use money laundering charges to substitute for
337 The BJS data on case filings show that money laundering charges are the most severe
or second most severe charges in the majority of cases where there is any money laundering
charge at all. This shows that laundering charges are not mere technical afterthoughts. The
severity of the sentencing guidelines applicable to money laundering until recently (and even
the existing guideline) underscores the potential for laundering charges to be used to levy
substantial punishments on predicate offenders. The Sentencing Commission also noted this
trend in its own study. See infra note 343.
338 Section 1957 requires the defendant to have engaged in a "monetary transaction," but
just about anything involving a financial institution counts as that.
339 See supra notes 116-119, discussing willful blindness and other doctrinal elements
relevant to § 1957.
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charges of committing some of the predicate crimes that might be
more difficult to prove.34 °
Table 1
Federal Criminal Indictments for Core Money Laundering Offenses
(2000), by Severity of Charge341
Total §§ 1956




































Total All 3,225 100.0% 520 100.0% 3,745 100.0%
The absence of many cases where defendants were charged only
with money laundering would appear to belie the idea that third-party
launderers (wherever they are) attract a major chunk of prosecutorial
attention. Most federal criminal indictments include more than one
type of count, of course, but it is still telling that prosecutors making
money laundering charges so often do so in conjunction with a
battery of other charges that suggest the alleged launderer was more
than just a third-party broker of some kind. Nonetheless, the charges
indicated above might tend to be technical violations like lying to a
340 The point is not that all or even most predicate crimes (i.e., drug trafficking, murder-
for-hire, environmental crime, or anything else) are always harder to prove than money
laundering. Depending on the facts linking the defendant to the predicate crime, sometimes
a money laundering might be easier, harder, or just as hard to prove than a predicate crime.
341 Data obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics criminal charges database (2000
figures). See supra note 332.
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criminal investigator, instead of substantive crimes like drug
trafficking. To make sure the effect was not just technical violations,
I reviewed a random sample of cases qualitatively and still found a
most pronounced pattern of money laundering being used against
predicate offenders. The result was similar.34 As the Table 2 below
illustrates, the vast majority of defendants in the cases in the sample
were charged for laundering as well as an underlying substantive
offense such as fraud or drug trafficking. Virtually none of the cases
where defendants were charged with a substantive offense in addition
to laundering involved any laundering activity more sophisticated
than depositing physical currency in a financial institution, conveying
property, or (rarely) sending a simple domestic or international wire
transfer.
Table 2
Sample of District Court Cases Involving Money Laundering Charges
Under 18 U S.C. §§ 1956or 1957 (2000-2002)
1956 D2E
Charged for laundering and substantive predicate offense 74% 81%
Laundering scheme connected to physical currency 77% 64%
Investigation involved undercover operation or informant 32% 25%
Predicate offense involved drugs 43% 27%
Finally, the one major government study bearing on this issue
involved the review of conviction files, which also showed a massive
focus on convicting predicate offenders for laundering. In 1992, the
U.S. Sentencing Commission's Money Laundering Working Group
undertook what is apparently the only government study of
sentencing practices under the money laundering guidelines (at the
time, 2S1.1 and 2S1.2, corresponding to §§ 1956 and 1957,
respectively).343 The study examined a random sample of money
laundering cases and found that defendants sentenced for money
laundering under §§ 1956 or 1957 participated in the underlying
342 See supra note 333 and accompanying text (methods) for details of how the sample
was selected and coded.
343 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM., MONEY LAUNDERING WORKING GROUP, REP'T
SUMMARY (1995), available at http://www.ussc.gov/moneylau/monisum.htm (last visited
June 2, 2002).
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criminal conduct in 93.6% of cases in the sample.3" The Working
Group also found that offenders charged under 2S1.1 tended to be
subject to higher offense levels than for the underlying criminal
activity.345  Immediately following the study, the Sentencing
Commission supported changes consolidating 2S1.1 and 2S1.2 and
bringing the offense level for money laundering more into line with
the underlying offense, but Congress passed and the President signed
a law barring the change from taking effect.146 More recent data from
the Sentencing Commission also reveal that 83% of individuals
convicted of money laundering in 2002 did not receive any sort of
enhancement for being the leader, manager, or organizer of money
laundering activity, suggesting that people convicted are not
sophisticated launderers. 47
Consider the consequences. The fight against money laundering
is consistent with-and strengthens-the trend toward more
prosecutorial discretion and power. Prosecutors can use laundering
charges to expand the scope of evidence that can be admitted at trial
344 The study highlights the extent to which prosecutors and investigators used money
laundering charges to enhance the penalties faced by defendants who could already be
convicted of the underlying crime:
The working group found that 70 of the 79 cases (88.6%) involved criminally derived funds. Of
the nine other cases, eight involved government "sting" operations... and one lacked sufficient
information to determine the source of the funds. The defendant participated in the underlying
criminal conduct in 93.6% of these 70 cases.
Id. at2.
"5 Id. at 3 ("The money laundering offense level was higher than the underlying
conduct's offense level in 52.5% of the drug cases and in 96% of the non-drug cases"). The
working group took another random sample of cases in 1995 to update the 1992 results and
found the pattern continued to hold true, noting that "[t]he inclusion of a money laundering
count raised the offense level 94.5% of the time for fraud." Moreover, "(i]n approximately
75% of the cases, the increase was at least four levels." Perhaps in reaction to this, judges
sentencing money laundering defendants made downward departures for 33% of all
defendants, in comparison with a downward departure rate of 19% for other offenses. Id.
346 Id. Legislators' interest in setting high penalties and responding to interest group
pressure from prosecutors and investigators is consistent with passage of the law blocking
the change. The money laundering guidelines were finally consolidated and adjusted in
2001 and took effect in November of that year. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2S1.1
(2002).
117 See 2002 ANNUAL STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 5. Because of the relatively draconian
penalties associated with laundering, the low rate of enhancements could reflect prosecutors'
or judges' reluctance to ask for all possible enhancements or plea bargains. But given the
frequency of charges against predicate offenders (including many who acted essentially
alone), this explanation by itself seems implausible. It seems at least as likely that, while
statutory elements offer little constraint, the enhancement provisions of the Sentencing
Guidelines do.
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or documents that can be subpoenaed during the course of an
investigation-even if the charges are eventually dropped.348 What is
more, assuming that anti-money laundering criminal laws allow
prosecutors to enhance the potential sentences, fines, and extent of
forfeiture faced by defendants when compared to the penalties faced
without such laws, then the bargains struck between defendants and
prosecutors are probably different. What drives a defendant's risk of
facing these penalties is not how culpable one defendant is compared
to another (assuming we could agree on a definition of culpability),
but how easy it is to detect the defendant's laundering. As with every
criminal offense, the penalties are not necessarily distributed evenly
among all the people committing the offense defined by the statute.
Instead, people run the risk of being prosecuted for money laundering
depending on the probability that their conduct is detected. To the
extent that people are being charged with money laundering because
they are detected for committing a predicate offense-such as drug
trafficking-then charging patterns for money laundering will reflect
any of the inequities and biases inherent in the detection of the
predicate crime. In fact, the number of laundering charges probably
understates the extent to which the availability of laundering charges
casts a shadow on the bargaining process between federal prosecutors
(or state prosecutors who routinely use state laundering charges) and
defendants, since prosecutors can brandish the prospect of a
laundering charge without actually issuing the charge.349
Second Conclusion: Characteristics of Cases in the Sample of
Recent Laundering Cases is Consistent with the Limitations in
Detection Strategies Described in Part I
Returning to Table 2, consider how the sample of cases also
reveals the use of informants and undercover agents in about a
quarter of the cases, a substantial focus on drug laundering, and a
disproportionate emphasis on cash laundering schemes. The random
sample of district court laundering cases therefore also highlights
348 Money laundering charges help in the introduction of evidence and the conduct
(especially availability of documents through subpoena) of investigations, because if a
particular document or conduct appears reasonably relevant to the laundering charge,
ordinarily it can be introduced.
349 The reason the threat to charge is credible, moreover, is because the doctrine
interpreting the core laundering statutes makes it cheap for prosecutors and investigators to
tack on money laundering charges with minimal additional facts (beyond a predicate crime
that involves money or even property in some way). See supra note 348 (discussing the ease
with which prosecutors can tack on laundering charges to substantive criminal offenses).
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trends consistent with the operation of the detection strategies
followed above. Nearly half the cases mentioning money laundering
charges involve drugs, which suggests an investigative focus on drug
laundering, and (probably) on developing laundering cases from drug
investigations. The sample also shows that a large proportion of
laundering cases involve undercover work, a proportion that probably
understates the number of cases involving undercover work because
not all district court opinions would explicitly discuss whether
undercover techniques were used in an investigation. All of this is
consistent with the view that detection systems rely heavily on
existing investigative methods (hence the connection to drugs and the
use of undercover agents) or looking for large aggregations of
physical currency. By contrast, the cases reviewed do not provide
any indication that CTRs or other reporting requirements assisted in
the detection of offenses (even if it is plausible that they assisted in
the prosecution). What few reports exist on the usefulness of
reporting requirements are consistent with the view that, if reporting
requirements help, they do so at the ex post, prosecution stage and
not in detection.
The striking degree to which laundering prosecutions appear to
focus on predicate offenders partly reflects the laundering statutes'
structure and their interpretation-making it so cheap for prosecutors
and investigators to pursue charges with minimum work once they
detect predicate offenders touching money. The upshot here is that
third-party launderers are not the subject of many laundering charges
or convictions. If they were, then there would be many more people
convicted of laundering without much (if any) involvement in
predicate crimes. Instead it is the predicate offenders who end up
being prosecuted for laundering. Some high profile exceptions like
Operation Casablanca seem to break the mold here, but in large
measure it was the government who became the third-party launderer
and the scheme largely ended up resulting in the prosecution of drug
traffickers. The preceding conclusions shed light on whether to
accept or reject the theory that money laundering investigations,
charges, and prosecutions target primarily third-party launderers and
leaders of large-scale criminal organizations. The data indicate this is
not the case: money laundering defendants are, for the most part, also
drug and fraud defendants whose main transgression is an underlying
predicate crime, not laundering or the financing of crime. Using the
criminal penalties against offenders already detected is the path of
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least resistance, reflecting limits on what prosecutors and
investigators can detect.35 Where prosecutors use laundering statutes
to charge a defendant who is also charged with a predicate offense, it
becomes exceedingly simple to prove knowledge-because if a
defendant is engaged in conspiracy to import cocaine, for example, it
would be hard for him to prevail when arguing he did not know that
certain money represented criminally-derived proceeds (or the
equivalent).35' Prosecutors prefer more, rather than less, discretion to
decide whom to charge and how to charge them.352 In contrast,
targeting the sorts of third-party launderers and higher-level
criminals that provided much of the justification for the system is
much more difficult because of limitations in detection strategies
since these are the people who amass the greatest expertise in
concealing the origin of money, and both domestic and international
bank secrecy laws get in the way of detecting people involved in
criminal finance.353
350 In principle, prosecutors could insist that investigators seek (i.e., detect) more third-
party money launderers, or some other kind of offender. But even if prosecutors did this, it
is hard to force law enforcement bureaucracies to accomplish the task, particularly when
their detection strategies are not designed to detect such offenders. In the meantime,
prosecutors have no incentive to refrain from using the anti-laundering criminal statutes
against defenders whose conduct meets the elements of the offense.
351 Even if the facts did not allow a prosecutor to use the commission of the predicate
crime directly in fulfilling the knowledge requirement, a laundering charge makes it easier
for prosecutors to build a circumstantial case and introduce relevant evidence.
352 See Stuntz, supra note 301.
353 Statutory provisions in the Bank Secrecy Act allow investigators to get records of
bank customers considered suspicious in the U.S. See Part I.B, supra. The USAPA further
expands law enforcement power to obtain records of bank customers. Id. For example, new
regulations implementing USAPA Section 314 allow FinCEN to request transaction
information about an individual it considers suspicious. But ordinarily, it is not the bank
records that would make FinCEN (or any other law enforcement agency) suspicious, but
rather the preexisting suspicion (because of an informant's report, for example) that would
lead investigators or analysts to seek the bank records. Prosecutors can also obtain records
through traditional subpoenas; in both cases, government authorities (investigators and
prosecutors) must have some independent reason to focus on the individual in question; for
example, the individual may be suspected or known as an offender who committed a
predicate crime. In contrast, when investigators know who committed a crime, they can start
tracing where the funds came from. Or they can rely on informants or undercover
operations. In short, the statutory provisions allowing law enforcement to have access to
records and the traditional subpoena methods of obtaining records are useful where law
enforcement already knows about suspicious individuals or organizations. These methods
are less useful when law enforcement does not even know that someone is suspicious in the
first instance.
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Targeting terrorist financing is probably even harder with the
existing structure-because some of the telltale signs that might be
associated with traditional drug money laundering (i.e., connection to
criminal networks that can be infiltrated by informants, or large
currency transactions) are unlikely to be present. If they were caught,
terrorist financiers would be subject to a bevy of criminal penalties,
including among others those in § 1956(a)(2)(A).354 Yet again,
though, the problem is detection. The upshot on terrorist financing is
this: when the President talks about "following the money trail" to
"starve terrorists of financing, ' 355 what he really means is we will
freeze the accounts of people whom we suspect are involved in
terrorist financing, if we are lucky enough to know their names.
The patterns described above are hard to defend or to reconcile
with the justifications initially offered for the fight against money
laundering-and highlight how statutes are used for purposes other
than how they are justified. The amendments to anti-laundering and
related terrorist financing laws wrought by USAPA's Title III only
continue this trend.3 7  Assuming the legislature has priced predicate
114 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) (2000) (as amended by USAPA) (international movement
of monetary instruments or funds with intent to promote a specified unlawful activity).
355 Indeed, this is exactly why the September II terrorists did not trip the detection
systems designed to identify patterns of criminal financial activity. See James Risen, Money
Transfers by Hijackers Did Not Set Off Alarms for Banking Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, at A]6
(July 17, 2002):
Financial safeguards also failed to detect the money trail behind the September II plot. Even
when the hijackers began to receive much larger amounts of money, their transactions did not
prompt any of the banks that they were using to file federal reports of suspicious activity. In
fact, because they received most of their money through wire transfers of funds directly into
commercial bank accounts, the hijackers were able to avoid having to make large cash deposits,
and so skirted several important bank reporting requirements, officials said.
Id.
356 The Office of Foreign Assets Control implements an executive order's mandate to
block the assets of specific individuals or organizations by instructing banks to block the
assets of individuals on the basis of their name. Sometimes, the blocking orders include
alternate names and spellings in order to raise the probability that the suspected target's
assets will be blocked-though such a practice obviously expands the possibility that
unsuspected account holders will be affected.
357 For example, the anti-money laundering and terrorist financing provisions of USAPA
were constantly justified on the basis of their importance to the war against terrorism, yet for
the most part the new regulatory and criminal investigation tools are not limited to anti-
terrorism uses (nor is terrorism defined in substantive terms that could render it useful as a
means of legally limiting the Act's scope). Indeed, in Congressional testimony during
January 2002, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division (Michael Chertoff)
simultaneously lauded the anti-terrorist financing provisions of USAPA as critical to the
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offenses anywhere near the appropriate range to deter the conduct in
question, then the addition of money laundering charges against
predicate offenders (as opposed to against third-party launderers)
should have little if any effect on disrupting criminal finance.
Moreover, it would be hard to argue that people caught handling
currency and subsequently charged with a laundering offense are
more culpable than traffickers who receive their money in bank
balances abroad. Indeed, the former kind of defendant is probably
likely to be poorer and less compensated than anyone who enjoys the
financial fruits of drug trafficking by accessing a bank account of
"clean" funds. This is true despite the evidence recognized even by
terrorism investigation and yet one of the few concrete examples of the Act's alleged
usefulness to prosecutors involved a prosecution that has no connection to terrorism:
Section 319(a) provided us with a new tool to seize and forfeit criminal assets deposited into a
foreign bank account through the foreign bank's correspondent bank account in the United
States. This section provides that assets which are subject to forfeiture in the United States, but
which are deposited abroad in a foreign bank may be deemed to be held in the foreign bank's
correspondent account in the United States. Thus, where a criminal deposits funds in a bank
account in a foreign country and that bank maintains a correspondent account in the United
States, the government may seize and forfeit an equivalent sum of money in the correspondent
account, irrespective of whether the money in the correspondent account is traceable to the
proceeds deposited in an account held by the foreign bank.
Although I was recused from the case because of a past representation, I can report that last
month we recovered almost $1.7 million in funds using Section 34419, which will be used to
compensate the victims of a fraud scheme. On January 18, 2001, a grand jury in the Southern
District of Illinois indicted James R. Gibson for various offenses, including defrauded clients of
millions of dollars by fraudulently structuring settlement agreements for numerous tort victims.
.... Following the passage of the Patriot Act, and interagency consultation, the Criminal
Division authorized the use of the Section 319(a) authority [to seize Gibson's assets].
Anti-Terrorism Money Laundering Enforcement: Hearing on The Financial War on
Terrorism and the Administration's Implementation of the Anti-Money Laundering
Provisions of the USA Patriot Act, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of the Honorable Michael
Chertoff, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division), available at 2002 WL 2010149.
Whatever else one says about the USA Patriot Act, it would be virtually impossible to argue
that the law's major articulated purpose is anything other than to combat terrorism and
address the perceived threat of terrorism arising in the wake of September 11. Indeed, the
core of USAPA appears in large measure to consist of proposals already rejected by
Congress. Of course it is possible to find oblique references to "other purposes" in the act,
and even to suggest that the larger system of criminal finance connecting drug traffickers and
fraud perpetrators to banks somehow propitiates the conditions that allow terrorist financing
to flourish. But these arguments require analytical support, which is often not forthcoming
(and which, for example Assistant Attorney General Chertoff did not provide in his January
2002 testimony). This sort of legal "mission creep" could be understood as an example of
the slippery slope discussed infra. Whether one chooses to use this metaphor or not, this sort
of bait-and-switch phenomenon is probably driven in large measure by the agency problem
arising from law enforcement authorities' dual role as experts on the threat society faces and
major beneficiaries' of legal changes.
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executive branch officials that a substantial number of financial
transactions connected to crime do not involve physical currency at
all.358
By the same token, it is not clear why people who commit an
offense for which the legislature has already set a punishment should
be subjected to still harsher punishment when the only thing they
have done in addition to the predicate crime is to handle the money
derived from it. Suppose a mid-level drug distributor accepts $5000
supplying some ounces of cocaine, and deposits the money at a local
bank branch. Although the $5000 does not trigger a mandatory CTR,
suppose (for the sake of argument) that an astute assistant supervisor
at the branch decides to file a SAR, perhaps because the drug
distributor's address information cannot be confirmed, or (for better
or worse) because the distributor has a Latino surname and dresses in
flashy clothing. Assuming (perhaps heroically) that the SAR gave
rise to an investigation, investigators and prosecutors could easily
decide to charge the distributor with distribution as well as money
laundering. All this despite the fact that one might expect someone
who commits a crime to do something with the money other than just
keep it in a cellar. So what happens when the deposit of the $5000
(or nearly any other disposition of that money) ends up giving rise to
the money laundering offense? One could argue that the distributor
is twice facing punishment for what is at some level just one
offense-distributing drugs for money-that the legislature has
already decided to punish quite severely. 59 In an age of three strikes,
it may seem like a lost cause to be arguing that drug distributors, or
others among the unpopular constituency of criminal defendants, are
facing punishments that are too severe. Regardless of whether
criminal defendants are politically popular, though, the criminal
justice system's claims of rationality and justice might be viewed as
suspect if it functions in a manner that reflects blatant intellectual
dishonesty, or a shallow understanding of the practical realities of
crime.36 The sentencing guidelines do nothing to remedy this
358 See, e.g., Mary Lee Warren testimony, supra note 10 (acknowledging problems with
non-currency money laundering, but essentially conceding defeat and giving up the fight).
359 Note that the consequences of the money laundering charge arises even if the
distributor is sentenced to serve sentences concurrently for the two offenses because if one
charge is dismissed on appeal or for other reasons the other still stands.
360 One might be able to make a similar critique of conspiracy law, where some offenses
that are almost impossible to commit (such as bank robbery) without engaging in some sort
of group activity, and therefore, without engaging in conspiracy, thereby triggering penalties
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problem, even if they have been recently amended to make
punishments for laundering more commensurate with the
punishments for the underlying offenses in question: people can still
be punished for both the predicate and money laundering when they
have done little more than committing the predicate offense and
handling the resulting money in some way.36 ' Indeed, over time
courts have interpreted the relevant sentencing guidelines in a manner
that makes it easier to sentence someone to a severe punishment for
money laundering even when that activity was quite incidental to the
underlying criminal activity.36
Admittedly, some questions cannot be answered from the present
sample. Because the analysis of recent cases selected at random
relies on dispositions or opinions (however long or brief) available in
legal research databases, the focus is on what can be discerned from
such records-not all of which describe the circumstances under
which the alleged criminal financial activity was detected. For
example, one might speculate whether the fight against money
laundering at least serves to help detect large numbers of other non-
laundering crimes given all the reporting requirements.363 This turns
out to be highly unlikely once we consider the detection strategies
for both the underlying offense and the conspiracy. A number of critiques of criminal justice
focusing on the poor fit between enforcement and normative goals.
36 1 For a cogent explanation and empirical analysis of the impact of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, see James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing
Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J. L. & ECON. 271 (1999)
(concluding that the expected difference between two typical judges in average sentence
length was about 17% in the years immediately before enactment of the Guidelines and 11%
in the years following adoption).
362 See United States v. Diaz, 245 F.3d 294 (3rd Cir. 2001).
363 If one believed this theory, one might conjecture that investigators and prosecutors
might be developing cases that involve money laundering and related charges against
predicate offenders (which are part of the present sample) that could have been detected
using anti-money laundering regulations. Virtually none of the cases in the sample provided
fact descriptions that would easily allow one to make the inference that reports required by
the Bank Secrecy Act or other regulatory requirements had assisted in detection. This is
consistent with qualitative accounts and press reports suggesting that such requirements are
little used in ex ante detection, even if they are still conceivably useful to law enforcement
for the ex post phase of criminal investigation and prosecution. What the existing sample of
cases cannot shed light on is whether cases that do not lead to laundering charges might have
still been detected through anti-laundering regulatory requirements. Nonetheless, it seems
hard to imagine that the reporting requirements and investigative methods related to financial
activity would be such a boon for detecting non-laundering activity if they have limited
potential to detect financial offenses. Moreover, if non-laundering activity were detected
using reporting requirements, the low statutory threshold for charging financial offenses
would give prosecutors an incentive to also bring such a charge. See infra note 389.
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alongside the legal doctrine interpreting the laundering statutes and
the incentives of investigators and prosecutors. Since the
interpretation of the laundering statutes makes it so easy to charge
predicate offenders with laundering (a development bome out by the
data), then we should expect prosecutors to charge predicate
offenders detected because of their financial behavior with laundering
as well as the predicate crime. For reasons discussed above, the
laundering cases that are made do not seem to involve substantial
laundering activity beyond simply the commission of the predicate
crime, nor do they seem to have been detected because of laundering.
So if we cannot view the existing trove of laundering cases as an
indication of successful detection strategies at work, then neither can
we view the large number of drug and other criminal prosecutions not
involving laundering as a testament to the fight against laundering's
effectiveness in detection.
Third Conclusion: A Statutory Scheme At War With Itself
This use of the anti-money laundering criminal statutes to
disproportionately target people who are either committing a
predicate offense or making cumbersome cash-related transactions
may be strikingly at odds with the prospective uses one might have
imagined from the legislative history.364
A major reason why prosecutors and investigators find it easy to
make laundering charges and to achieve laundering convictions is
because courts have interpreted the laundering statutes' ambiguities
in a manner that lowers the threshold of both the act and intent
requirements necessary to trigger §§ 1956 and 1957.365 There is a
hint of perversity in the resulting charging and conviction patterns
described above, which highlight how in some sense the statutes, as
interpreted, are at war with the most defensible account of their
purpose. By setting lower act and intent thresholds, the core
laundering laws eviscerate the legal distinctions between the sort of
laundering that could most significantly enhance the return from
crime and the sort of financial activity that is potentially more
cumbersome for criminals yet is referred to as "laundering" merely
because of the circular logic that it triggers criminal liability under an
anti-laundering statute.
364 See supra note 308, in Part II for a discussion of the legislative history of the anti-
money laundering statutes (emphasizing the goal of increasing criminals' cost of engaging in
efficient financial transactions).
365 See supra Part I.B. 1, describing the statutory scheme in detail.
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An illustration: in principle, anti-laundering laws are supposed
to punish people not for the underlying criminal offense (even if it is
meant to produce financial gain), but for engaging in the sort of
activity that makes it easier to enjoy that profit-which is why one
premise behind § 1956 is to punish a perpetrator's effort to conceal
money's link to crime. Yet the wide interpretation of the statute
instead tends to criminalize a range of conduct involving money
obtained from crime regardless of whether the offense involves much
concealing or elaborate financial footwork.366 So the statutory
scheme as interpreted seems to defeat its own purpose by failing to
distinguish between, for example, criminals' elaborate transactions at
financial institutions-the alleged ill to which the statute was
addressed-and bulk currency smuggling, which is the more
inefficient and costly alternative that one would hope criminals
would adopt as a substitute.367 Similarly, if one of the problems that
the anti-laundering criminal statutes targeted was the use of special
skills or knowledge to launder (either directly or by hiring someone
with substantial skills in this domain), then the statutes' low threshold
for convicting someone who has not hired a third-party launderer or
used specialized knowledge seems at cross-purposes with one of the
articulated statutory justifications.368
One might think of various responses to this critique. One is that
prosecutorial discretion actually focuses prosecutions on the more
significant launderers. The charging and conviction patters discussed
above, though, reveal exactly the opposite-where the most
discernible focus is on predicate offenders whose criminal conduct
hardly involves elaborate laundering activity. Another argument
might be that perpetrators are not sensitive to such small distinctions
366 See id.
367 Not only are a host of activities involving bulk currency smuggling arguably
criminalized under § 1956, but bulk currency smuggling is also criminalized separately
under USAPA. Consider a description of a recent money laundering case:
A New York City policeman pled guilty in March 2002 to laundering between $6 and $10
million obtained from the sale of drugs in the New York City area. Proceeds of the drug sales
were driven to Miami, Florida, and delivered to various businesses, which accepted the drug
money as payment for goods, such as video games, calculators, print cartridges, bicycle parts and
tires, which were subsequently exported to Colombia.
2002 ANNUAL STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 34. Although the policeman's behavior is
obviously reprehensible, there is something slightly odd about a conviction for laundering
when at least some of his behavior reflects precisely the sort of inefficient transacting by
criminals that the rest of the system (i.e., including the currency reporting requirements, for
example) is designed to promote.
368 See Part I.B. 1, describing the statutory scheme in detail.
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in statutory interpretation; instead they are likely either to know there
is a laundering statute and be deterred by it or to ignore it altogether.
This is possible. Yet the statutes are founded on the sort of "best
case" scenario that actors in the system behave something close to
rationally. If not, one' wonders whether any of the premises of the
system make sense, whether offered by legislators ex ante or by
executive branch officials and scholars post hoc. Virtually all the
justification offered for the fight against laundering depends on the
assumption that people whom the statute seeks to affect act
rationally, or at least rationalistically. 69 So if laundering penalties
are not providing a means of focusing punishment on the more
"harmful" criminal activity, then one might wonder why the statutes
could not (should not?) be replaced with simple, across-the-board
penalty enhancements.37 Last is the argument that maybe the
statutes (as interpreted) no longer distinguish between degrees of
laundering activity, but the Sentencing Guidelines do.3"' Although
the question of how the Guidelines are used is empirical in principle,
the discussion that follows on sentencing inconsistencies does not
bode well for this argument. It is doubtful whether the Guidelines are
used with the consistency necessary to send the message that
different kinds of laundering activity are reliably associated with
specific kinds of sanctions.
Fourth Conclusion: Judges Seem to React to Laundering
Charging and Conviction Patterns by Making Inconsistent
Departures on the Sentencing Guidelines
In fact, the stiff penalties levied on people already subjected to
substantial punishment for predicate crime not only reflects inequities
369 See supra Part MA, explaining the justifications for disrupting criminal finance (and
thus, for fighting laundering) that depend on the implicit assumption that raising the
marginal cost of perpetrating crime (or, conversely, lowering the marginal return) can reduce
criminal activity.
370 The positive (as opposed to normative) answer is, of course, almost certain to be a
function of politics. Regardless of the purposes served (or not served) by the actual
operation of the system, legislators may have an interest in calling for, supporting, and
achieving passage of criminal statutes that send a signal about their concern regarding the
offenses. Thus, even though the financing of terrorist activity is an offense that can lead to a
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, the most recent Annual Money Laundering Strategy still
calls for Congress to pass a separate offense criminalizing the financing of terrorism. See
Part IV.A, infra, for a more detailed discussion.
37 1 The argument here would be that the Sentencing Guidelines would adjust the offense




in the detection process but also drives them in the sentencing
process. Federal judges must sentence defendants in accordance with
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, but they retain some flexibility to
make some downward departures.372 The Sentencing Commission
found in its study that the rate of downward departures for money
laundering cases was particularly high. To a striking degree courts
making (or appellate courts accepting) downward departures in
money laundering cases appear to justify their departures by
critiquing the practice of using money laundering charges against
predicate offenders.373  If judges engaged in such a practice
consistently, substituting downward departures for discretion in
interpreting the elements of the offense, perhaps the application of
the laundering offenses would be less of a concern. But not all courts
accept such departures where predicate offenders are charged with
money laundering. 74 Some of the differences probably depend on
372 See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996) (holding that judges must follow
the sentencing guidelines, which mandate a range of appropriate punishment based on the
offender's criminal history and the characteristics of the offense).
373 The long list of cases includes: United States v. Smith, 186 F.3d 290, 299-300 (3d
Cir. 1999) ("The fact that the money laundering statute facially applied to the defendant's
activity was insufficient to mandate the application of U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1 because
[defendant's] conduct... was atypical."); United States v. Woods, 159 F.3d 1132, 1135 (8th
Cir. 1998) (downward departure upheld from money laundering Guidelines because money
laundering offense played "minor" role); United States v. Gamez, I F. Supp. 2d 176, 183
(E.D.N.Y 1998) (motion for downward departure granted, because no highly organized
money laundering scheme existed); United States v. Bart, 973 F. Supp. 691, 696-697 (W.D.
Tex. 1997) (departing downwards from money laundering guidelines because the case did
not involve substantial connection to organized crime or drugs).
374 See, e.g., United States v. Charles, No. 98-4010, 1998 WL 539469, at *22 (4th Cir.
Aug. 25, 1998) (affirming district court decision that it lacked the legal authority to depart
from the applicable money laundering guidelines on the basis of lack of severity in the
money laundering conduct); United States v. Adams, 74 F.3d 1093, 1103 (11 th Cir. 1996)
(deciding that the district court lacked authority to make downward departure from the
money laundering guidelines because it would have effectively nullified the jury's finding of
guilt on that charge); United States v. Pierro, 32 F.3d 611, 620 (Ist Cir. 1994) (finding that
departure from money laundering guidelines is not warranted because the defendant's
conduct fell within the language of the money laundering statute, regardless of the scheme's
complexity); United States v. Rose, 20 F.3d 367, 374-75 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a
downward departure was not appropriate on the basis of the fact that, if the prosecutor had
charged the identical conduct under another statute, it would have allowed for substantially
less severe punishment). One could write a traditional law review analysis about which of
the two trends is correct given the relative degree of ambiguity in the factors courts can use
to make downward departures and the deferential standard of review. The larger point,
though, is to highlight that the use of downward departures has probably not lowered all or
most laundering sentences levied on predicate offenders but has probably made them more
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case-specific factors, but something else seems to be at work: judges
in cases with similar fact patterns appear to have different visceral
reactions to the use of money laundering charges as penalty
enhancements, which leads them to make different conclusions about
the extent to which downward departures are possible for people
charged with money laundering as well as predicate offenses.375
An example: two cases involving defendants charged with food
stamp fraud and money laundering involve similar facts (except for
the amount of money laundered) but widely disparate sentences, with
the defendant who laundered more money receiving a substantially
lower sentence. In United States v. Caba, the defendant committed a
long-running food stamp fraud from which he laundered $11,700,000
over a two-year period.376 At sentencing, the trial court granted the
defendant's request for a downward departure, accepting the
argument that the laundering conduct fell outside the "heartland" of
money laundering offenses.377 As a result, the defendant received a
sentence of thirty to thirty-seven months imprisonment instead of the
twelve to fifteen year sentence that would have resulted if the court
had not granted the downward departure.378 Compare this with
United States v. Arnous, where the defendant was also convicted of
food stamp fraud and money laundering involving the equivalent of
$1,056,000. 37' The trial court in this case refused to grant a
inconsistent, thereby thwarting what was supposed to be a major reason for the Sentencing
Guidelines.
375 In more formal terms, the contention is that federal judges could be arrayed ordinally
in accordance with their rejection of the apparent mis-pricing of predicate offenses arising
from the use of predicate as well as money laundering charges. The higher the level of
rejection from a judge, one might imagine, the more probable that a given fact-pattern
involving such charging will lead to a downward departure. Another factor affecting the
probability of a downward departure is whether the offense involves drugs, in which case
some courts satisfy themselves that Congress intended the severe money laundering
penalties to apply (even if there is little evidence that Congress intended the penalties to
apply routinely to drug offenders who essentially only committed a predicate crime). See,
e.g., Smith, 186 F.3d at 298 (finding clear legislative mandate that the money laundering
statutes would be used against drug dealers). Courts' penchant to make much about the
distinction between drug and non-drug offenses (instead of drawing a distinction, say,
between money laundering committed by a predicate offender versus a third-party) seems
strange given the long list of specified unlawful activities including a large number of
"white-collar" offenses.
376 911 F. Supp. 630, 632-633 (D. N.Y. 1996), aff'd 104 F.3d 354 (2d Cir. 1996).
377 Id. at 642. The court cryptically noted that the type of laundering committed did not
justify a 10-year prison sentence.
378 id.
37' No. 96-6275, 1998 WL 136533, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar. 16, 1998).
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downward departure, resulting in a guideline sentence of ten years in
prison and three years in a supervised release program.38 ° Sentencing
disparities like those between Caba and Arnous make it harder still to
defend the normative legitimacy of using money laundering charges
to increase the penalties of predicate offenders.381 Although the
guidelines applicable to the core money laundering offenses have
recently been amended, the basic dynamic still applies: the watered-
down statutory elements for money laundering make defendants face
substantial sentences under the guidelines even if they have done
little more than commit the underlying predicate act, a development
to which judges are likely to continue reacting unevenly by doling or
withholding downward departures.382
A facile explanation for the sentencing disparities-and perhaps
even the draconian impact of the money laundering statutes
themselves-is to note that the problem lies with prosecutors'
"mistaken" drive to use laundering charges and the corresponding
guidelines for non-drug related offenses. 83 This view misses the
point, since §§ 1956 and 1957 include a large number of non-drug
offenses among their predicates. Perhaps a more defensible claim is
that the paradigmatic villain the statutes were designed to target was
not the person who commits a crime (whether involving drugs or
"white collar" fraud) and engages only in the minimum amount of
financial activity designed to complete the offense.384 In contrast, one
380 Id. (upholding the district court's sentencing determination). The Sixth Circuit noted
that the trial court distinguished Caba, 911 F. Supp. at 632, on the basis of the absence of
mitigating circumstances in Arnous. Yet the allegedly mitigating circumstances to which the
Sixth Circuit alludes largely consist of the absence of anything significant to distinguish the
money laundering scheme from the underlying offense. On that score, one could easily
argue that Arnous poses essentially the same situation. Arnous was not laundering money
for others, nor was he engaging in activity that allowed him to expand to other sorts of
offenses.
38 1 Neither the differences in the facts of the underlying fraud nor the differences in the
laundering process appear to provide any justification for the disparity. Compare Arnous,
1998 WL 136533, at *2, (describing Arnous' scheme as the trafficking of food stamps and
laundering of them through the use of supermarkets), with Caba, 911 F. Supp. at 632, (food
stamp laundering scheme involved the purchase of them for a fraction of the cost).
382 For an extended review of some of the disparities in money laundering cases
involving so-called "white-collar" offenses, see Jonathan H. Hecht, Comment, Airing the
Dirty Laundry: The Application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines to White Collar
Money Laundering Offenses, 49 AM. U. L. REv. 289, 319-324 (1999).
383 See id. at 319-320.
384 Thus, even a person using cumbersome means of engaging in crime-related financial
activity-presumably exactly what the statutes were supposed to encourage-faces liability
for their offense. See supra note 365 and accompanying text.
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might imagine a situation where a food stamp fraud perpetrator such
as Caba or Arnous was able to dramatically increase the scope and
consequence of the fraud scheme because of financial wizardry.
So what plausibly seems to be fueling the inconsistencies is more
subtle than just a "mistaken" use of the money laundering charge to
target non-drug offenders: that the use of the guideline for conduct
with little financial component beyond the underlying crime does not
fit the paradigmatic sort of justification offered for the statute.
Judges react differently to that disconnection, 386 and it is uncertain
whether even changed guidelines making laundering penalties more
consistent with those of the underlying predicate offense might well
entirely alleviate these differences.387
In closing, one might note that the question remains then why
there are not even more laundering cases made against predicate
offenders, since the threshold established by the statutes is so easy to
reach, and since federal laundering charges-unlike RICO charges-
do not require central approval from Main Justice.388 One answer
goes back to plea bargaining-there can be many more threats to
charge (and there are many more charges in case filings than actual
convictions) because such practices help prosecutors negotiate more
draconian pleas involving non-laundering charges. So the focus on
385 For instance, imagine a perpetrator that opens various different accounts through
which she funnels money from a small food stamp fraud operation into the accounts of other
grocery stores as bribes to entice them into the scheme. The ownership of at least one
account might be in the name of a fictitious person, to increase the difficulty of tracing the
scheme back to the fraud perpetrator. In this example, the perpetrator is more than just a
criminal committing a single offense-he becomes the leader of an (admittedly small-time)
organized criminal network of sorts.
386 Note that the disconnection described here is not between drug and non-drug
defendants, but between defendants that vary in the extent to which they appear similar to
the paradigmatic villains that figured prominently in the story of why criminal finance
should be disrupted.
387 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1.1 (2001) (harmonizing sentences
corresponding to many types of money laundering activities to a significant degree with
sentences for many kinds of predicate offenses). For example, even under the new
guidelines, judges will likely still face a host of cases where prosecutors charge both
laundering and the predicate offense, and must still decide whether they accept the
prosecution's recommendation to make those charges run concurrently or not. Moreover,
even the new guidelines require judges to decide whether to accept prosecutors' requests for
upward adjustments or departures involving the complexity of the financial scheme.
Depending on how prosecutors frame the factual description of the underlying offense, a
financial scheme can appear either incidental (and perhaps even central) to the commission
of the predicate offense, or it can appear as a separate venture to conceal and advance the
purposes of that scheme.
388 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 9-110.101 (June 1998).
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charges and convictions actually understates the extent to which
laundering affects the mass of other prosecutions. Second, the time
trend is definitely in the direction of more laundering charges and
convictions every year, suggesting that prosecutors and investigators
are increasingly deciding to make laundering cases once they detect
predicate offenders. 89
2. Result #2." Regulations ofLimited Scope
Now consider the regulatory component of the fight against
money laundering. The regulations chronicled above are extensive,
but when considered alongside each other, a striking picture emerges:
the bulk of the regulatory requirements cover only a tiny fraction of
financial activity-that involving currency. The one major exception
to this involves suspicious activity reporting and financial
institutions' limited responsibility to "know" their customers, but
even here the regulations create such subjective standards that it
becomes exceedingly difficult for the government to ever punish
someone for violating the requirements. Meanwhile, the existing
wire-transfer regulations rarely if ever require reports to authorities
(aside from what would be reported under the suspicious activity
reporting requirements), and even leave banks substantial flexibility
to determine how they keep records of wire transfers.
Besides the criminal penalties in federal law and some analogous
state laws, the single most salient feature of the fight against money
laundering is the battery of reporting requirements that apply to
physical currency.390 Between the reports required to be filed by
banks and money services businesses, the forms individuals must fill
out when moving more than $10,000 across borders, and the related
casino and retail reports, the government gets some picture of who is
making large cash transactions 39 -even if some blind spots still exist
389 The difficulty in detecting more elaborate laundering activity combines with
prosecutors' and investigators' ability to easily develop laundering charges, resulting in a
significant skew of laundering investigations and prosecutions toward predicate offenders.
Absent more substantial changes, the mere command of the federal government to focus on
"major money laundering organizations" is little more than an empty exhortation.
390 See Part IB, supra.
391 Through the use of GTOs, regulators and investigate can adjust the system to generate
more information about sectors considered particularly troublesome. The use of GTOs to
target money services businesses is conspicuous because it excludes banks. When regulators
decide to target money services businesses, it is their customers-probably more likely to be
poor and minorities-that are subjected to all the reporting requirements. This is not to
suggest that reporting requirements shouldn't follow differential crime rates. But if the
2003]
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in this area.392 Some would argue that the focus on currency makes
sense because other kinds of transactions already leave a record.393 A
credit card transaction, for example, leaves records with the credit
card company, the business where a purchase is made, and the
customer.39 4 In contrast, currency is anonymous: a cash transaction
between two people needs no record to be consummated, because
currency is a medium of exchange accepted virtually everywhere. 9
All of this might help make the case that reporting requirements for
cash are important, but they do not necessarily establish that physical
currency is the only important medium for criminal transactions.
Indeed, the focus on audit trails should not obscure the fact that CTRs
and other currency-related reports required under the Bank Secrecy
Act serve not only as a resource to help document offenses already
known, but also as a proactive means of detecting crime. That is,
FinCEN and Treasury analyze current transaction data in much the
same way that they analyze SARs: to detect patterns of potential
illegal activity that warrant further investigation.396 Presumably, if
the records of currency transactions are supposed to be useful in
detecting criminal offenses, it is not immediately clear why records
of at least some non-currency transactions should not also be subject
to analysis (i.e., if they are linked in some way to suspicions cash
activity, or for some other reason). Yet, while most non-currency
transactions are auditable in principal, they are rarely subject to some
kind of audit-either because the government lacks access to the
information without individualized suspicion or lacks the technical
capacity to analyze the information it does collect.397
reporting requirements are precisely the means through which crimes are detected, then their
differential application can lead to different rates of punishment.
392 See infra notes 8-27 and accompanying text for discussion on SARs.
393 See OTA REP., supra note 29, at 68-72 (defending to some degree FinCEN's focus on
analyzing CTRs); Mary Lee Warren testimony, supra note 10 (emphasizing the importance
of investigating large currency transactions).
394 In fact, once the customer pays off the balance, the financial transaction between the
customer and the bank issuing the credit card creates its own cluster of records.
395 This property of cash helps illustrate the importance of creating an audit trail,
discussed in Part IV, infra. Digital cash may pose particular problems because it could
include the anonymity of cash and the convenience of non-cash payment systems.
396 See OTA REP., supra note 29, at 41.
397 For example, the government does not have access to most wire transfer data without
individualized suspicion. At the same time, it appears that the government lacks the
organizational and technical capacity to centralize the analysis of all financial information it
collects in the course of developing criminal cases for prosecution.
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If the currency-focused regulations cannot be expected to cover
the full gamut of criminal financial activity, then perhaps we can
expect the suspicious activity reporting (SAR) system to make up the
difference. Employees and banks and money services businesses,
recall, must fill out SARs in accordance with a number of
requirements, all of which are essentially subjective. 98 The SAR
statistics reveal a growing concentration of filings, with 500,000
reports filed so far, and higher concentrations of filings in states with
greater populations and financial centers (especially California and
New York).399 One might plausibly conclude that subjective reports
of suspicion are not junk. The SAR system allows authorities to have
a centralized system to pick up these suspicious reports and analyze
In all likelihood, criminals and their financial partners probably face some higher costs
because of the anti-laundering regulations. The cost may come from a genuinely greater risk
that currency transaction reports or suspicious activity reports will give them away, thereby
raising the risk that the criminals face when perpetrating crimes that require (or greatly
benefit from) financial transactions. Or it may come from criminals' efforts to
simultaneously evade reporting requirements and solve organizational problems (like
policing big concentrations of cash) without recourse to the legal system. The latter
possibility is more likely, given the anti-laundering system's difficulties in detecting even a
lot of cash-focused laundering. See infra Part III.B. Even if one makes highly favorable
assumptions about what all these regulations (backed up by criminal penalties) are going to
accomplish, a principled analysis has to acknowledge that at some point their various costs
will start to outweigh the benefits. For example, the fact that launderers (or terrorists) may
use informal money transmission systems does not necessarily justify severe criminal
penalties and registration requirements on all unlicensed money transmitters. This sort of
aggressive prophylactic enforcement could make limited sense as a practical matter, even if
it is attractive politically. See infra notes 449-481 and accompanying text.
398 Banks, for example, must fill out suspicious activity reports in accordance with five
requirements: (1) insider abuse of a financial institution, involving any amount, detected by
the institution; (2) federal crimes against, or involving transactions conduct through a
financial institution that the institution detects and that involve at least $5000 if a suspect can
be identified, or at least $25,000 regardless of whether a suspect can be identified; (3)
transactions of at least $5000 that an institution knows, suspects, or has reasons to suspect
involve funds from illegal activities and banks; (4) transactions of at least $5000 that the
institution knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect are designed to evade the impact of
Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements; and (5) transactions of at least $5000 that the
institution knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect have no business or lawful purpose, or
are not the sorts of transactions that the particular customer would normally be expected to
engage in. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.18 (2001) (establishing suspicious activity reporting
requirements for banks); 31 C.F.R. § 103.20 (2001) (establishing suspicious activity
reporting requirements for money services businesses). Note that all these requirements are
essentially subjective, because they turn on whether the official with the responsibility to file
the report "knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect..." that a report should be filed.
391 See 2001 SAR ACTIVITY REV. supra note 230, at 5-12.
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(at least some of) them.4"0 The system also helps remedy some of the
problems inherent in reporting requirements with rigid amount
cutoffs. A $10,020 cash deposit requires a CTR filing but may not be
inherently suspicious when placed in the context of who is making
the deposit, what sort of business is (allegedly) involved, and how
frequently deposits are made to the account. By contrast, an $8,000
deposit does not require a CTR filing but may be profoundly
suspicious when placed in context. The SAR system (at least in
principle) builds in the flexibility to consider context. What this
means is that (again, in principle) bank officials can be trained to
seek out suspicious patterns of transactions. FinCEN's advisories on
certain laundering schemes, like the Black Market Peso Exchange,
can serve as a basis for financial institution employees to learn to
recognize suspicious patterns that can be reported through the SAR
system. Even in the absence of any special training or even the
recognition that specific laundering schemes are particularly
dangerous or prevalent, SAR review teams (such as the one in New
Jersey) run by some U.S. Attorneys' Offices focus attention on
SARs.
One indication of the limits of the usefulness of SAR reporting
comes from the relationship between the number of SARs filed and
the amount of different kinds of criminal activity, by state.
Presumably, if the number of SARs filed (adjusted by population)
can be predicted from the incidence of criminal activity in a state, one
might conclude that SAR filings are probably being driven to some
degree by the money generated from criminal activity. The results
showcase how the SAR reporting system has potential-but only up
to a point. It turns out that the SAR filings indicating possible
violations of bank secrecy reporting requirements (such as
structuring), adjusted for population, have a weak but not
insignificant association with the per capita demand for drugs in a
state. Although the analysis below does not control for all the factors
that could affect the relationship, some obvious controls (such as
number of financial institutions and overall crime) seem to have little
effect. The results are consistent with the notion that drug demand
produces currency, and more currency deposits lead to more SARs.4"'
400 In 2000, federal law enforcement agencies received 6,375 direct referrals from
financial institutions filing SARs, and state and local law enforcement agencies received
10,950 direct referrals. Id. at 13-14.
401 Data taken from 2001 SAR ACTIVITY REV., supra note 230, Appendixes. Drug
demand data taken from U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Annual Household
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By the same token, SAR reporting bears no statistically significant
relationship to a host of other factors, including fraud arrests (the
SAR system has 12 reporting categories focused on fraud), property
crimes (which also produce money), and violent crimes (which may
be connected to organized crime). This suggests that SARs are
probably not particularly effective in filling in all the gaps left
Drug Survey (2000). The data on property, violent, and vehicle theft crimes taken from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States (2001), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/01 cius.htm.
The first model tests whether the rate of per capita SAR reports alleging money
laundering violations, by state, can be predicted from the percentage of a state's population
that used drugs in the last month. The model also includes controls for the state's population
size, number of FDIC-insured financial institutions, and assets held by those institutions.
The model is statistically significant (adjusted r-squared = .365; p < .0001), and so is drug
use (t-statistic = 1.637; p < .10). As expected, more drug use per capita were associated with
more per capita SAR reports alleging money laundering. There are no obvious
multicollinearity problems. Similar models including violent crime and vehicle thefts are
also significant [adjusted r-squared = .326; p < .0001). The vehicle theft variable is also a
statistically significant predictor (even more so than drug use) of per capita SAR filings (t-
statistic = ; p < .2.109; p <.05). Violent crime is not, and neither are any property crimes
besides vehicle theft (tested in a separate model to avoid multicollinearity). A third model
analyzes whether per capita SAR reports alleging fraud, by state, can be predicted from the
limited available data on state fraud arrests reported to the U.S. Department of Justice.
Neither the fraud arrest variable nor the model itself is statistically significant. Additional
results and data on file with author.
The fact that SAR reporting on money laundering is more strongly predicted by per
capita vehicle theft than per capita drug use for the rate of SAR reporting on money
laundering hints at two important themes discussed earlier in this article: that subjective
reporting requirements are not perfect, and that criminal networks probably have different
levels of skill in managing the financial flows associated with criminal activity. One would
think that drug use would be a better predictor of SAR reporting on money laundering than
vehicle theft, since the former generates so much more money. But drug traffickers may be
more skilled at laundering than car thieves, making it easier for them to evade detection.
This means that vehicle theft might have a greater effect on SAR reports, because
transactions associated with these crimes might be easier for bank employees to notice. Like
legitimate businesses, some criminal networks could gain important skills through
experience, trial-and-error, incentives that attract and keep talented people, and outsourcing
their work to others with expertise. Indeed, part of the point of the fight against laundering
was to target skilled third-parties working with launderers.
Moreover, the ability to predict SAR filings from drug demand per capita does not
imply that banks and other financial institutions are filing enough SARs, even if we just
focus on drug crime. The federal government's analyses do not shed light on whether higher
SAR filing rates involve lower triggers of suspicion among banking officials or higher
degrees of objectively suspicious activity in the jurisdiction. Thus, the number of filings for
certain offenses might (or might not be) related to the amount of crime in a state, but
financial institution employees may still be systematically under-reporting suspicious
activity (only that, when it comes to drug demand, the degree of under-reporting is
consistent enough across states that it does not affect the relationship between SAR reports
of Bank Secrecy Act violations and drug demand).
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because the regulatory system is disproportionately currency-
focused. Bank employees may be able to pick up on at least some
activity designed to evade currency reporting requirements, but
differing standards of subjective suspicion probably lead to both over
and under-inclusive reporting of activity that would be considered
objectively suspicious if there were a reliable frame of reference.4"2
Scrupulous bank employees may even end up filing SARs as a
response to what they believe holds the greatest interest for
authorities-which is perhaps why only thirty-two SARs were filed
mentioning terrorism during the entire history of the system up to
September 11 (April 1996 to September 11, 2001), but more than
1,600 SARs mentioned allegedly terrorism-related financial activity
between September 12, 2001 and March 31, 2002.403
402 See Part IV, infra, for a discussion of how to design a system to ferret out certain
transactions in a subset (i.e., international wire transfers) that are objectively suspicious.
403 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE SAR
ACTIVITY REV. TRENDS, TIPS, AND ISSUES: ISSUE 4 25 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 SAR ACTIVITY
REV.]. This sort of feedback relationship between the authorities' investigative priorities and
the number of SAR reports filed may reflect the well-known phenomenon in social science
of questioner effects on survey respondents, where respondents may be swayed to answer
what they expect the questioner wants to hear. The resulting dramatic upsurge in the number
of SAR reports filed mentioning terrorism in their narrative portion may reflect greater
sensitivity to financial activity genuinely tied to terrorism, more of such activity or merely
greater responsiveness to factors that bankers or authorities consider more likely to be
related to terrorism. The latter alternative seems at least as plausible as any of the others,
given the relatively meager guidance that financial institutions seem to get from Treasury
about what constitutes terrorism related to financial activity. For example, Treasury's
above-referenced SAR Activity Review discusses a number of suspicious transactions
involving the Middle East in a section of the Review entitled "Aspects of Financial
Transactions That May Indicate Terrorist Funding." Id. at 17. The discussions are revealing
for two reasons. First, the decision to tie the concept of "terrorism" to the Middle East
reveals a substantive conception of what is meant by terrorism that excludes, for example,
activities such as those pursued by Timothy McVeigh. Second, the fact that financial
activity involving the Middle East is subjectively framed as being more likely to involve
terrorism probably increases the likelihood that bankers evaluating ambiguous financial
behavior will decide that it is suspicious. For instance, the post-September 11 SAR Activity
Review chronicles a series of transactions by a charitable relief organization focused on the
Middle East. The transactions described below resulted in multiple SAR filings:
One bank filed three SARs that reported the activities of a relief organization operating in the
U.S., whose stated primary purpose is the collection of donations and funds for worthwhile
causes in Middle Eastern countries. Over an approximate 15-month period, the relief
organization initiated wire transfers from its U.S. bank account totaling $685,560 through its
primary account in a former Soviet Republic to its accounts in other former Soviet Republic
countries. The relief organization's U.S. bank account also received wire transfers totaling
$724,694 from unknown senders at a European bank and wired a total of $65,740 to a U.S.
charitable organization. The filing institution deemed this activity inconsistent with the stated
purpose of the account.
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Moreover, although some bank and financial institution
employees might scrupulously try to file suspicious activity reports
when they consider it appropriate, it is worth noting that banks and
other financial institutions might have an affirmative economic
interest in not filing reports aggressively: at the organizational level,
financial institutions have little to gain in terms of avoiding penalties,
because the subjectivity in the standard makes it virtually impossible
to assess penalties for non-compliance,4"4 and the reports can anger
customers and lead to lost business.4"5 The predictable result is that
SAR reports do not pick up a great many things that might meet some
acceptable definition of suspicion, like the financial behavior of the
September 11 hijackers. Bank employees may simply not find
behavior subjectively suspicious, and the lack of any objective
enforcement standard further lowers the incentive to make new
decisions about what is suspicious.40 6
Investigators probably perceive some of the shortcomings
discussed above, a perception that probably combines with long-
standing organizational resistance to engaging in analytical work or
poring over regulatory reports to detect criminal offenses. It is
admittedly difficult to assess the degree of law enforcement concern
Id. (emphasis added).
One might tell a story suggesting that the relief organization's financial activity
merited further scrutiny, but one might also tell a story about this behavior that makes it
relatively consistent with what one might expect of a relief organization serving the needs of
Muslim populations in former Soviet Republics, except perhaps for the (deep and
intractable?) matter of where exactly the "Middle East" begins and ends. Absent more
systematic information and analysis of a host of additional variables, it is hard to tell which
story is more plausible. In any case, extensive use of information technology, algorithms,
and outside data to evaluate individual SARs in context does not appear to be commonplace
(or perhaps even possible) with SARs. See Interview with FinCEN Official #2, in
Washington, DC, (June 18, 1998) (notes on file with author).
404 Treasury appears to have assessed a penalty for non-compliance with SAR reporting
only once in the history of the program. It assessed a penalty against the Great Eastern Bank
of Florida: a bank that lends to "many Asian-American-owned companies doing
international business." Jane Bussey, Treasury Agency Levels $100,000 Fine against Great
Eastern Bank of Florida, MiAMI HERALD, at F1 (Sept. 12, 2002). The $100,000 penalty for
"willful" violations appears to have been detected primarily for two reasons: its failure to
develop a comprehensive BSA compliance program and the filing off a large number of
SARs with incomplete information, hampering any meaningful investigations. Id. In short,
were it not for banks' filing of incomplete SARs (as opposed to no SARs at all) the alleged
failure of the bank might still be waiting to be detected.
405 Note that currency-related SAR filings may be an exception, because the cash deposit
business might be less lucrative than other kinds of financial business from customers who
use less cash and make more transactions.
406 This is exactly what happened. See Bussey, supra note 404; Risen, supra note 355.
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that an individual SAR should trigger, but it is hard to defend a
system that appears to ignore (or consider only in passing) a large
proportion of SAR reports.4 °7 Nor can state law enforcement
agencies be relied upon to ensure that all SARs are analyzed, as only
a small fraction of states report any use of SARs at all in developing
investigations.4"8
To its credit, regulators at Treasury recognized some of the
limitations arising from the inherent subjectivity of the SAR system
and sought to remedy them by creating more explicit regulations
requiring banks in particular to "know" their customers. In contrast
with the existing regulations that do not specify exactly how banks
are supposed to "know" their customers, the proposed "know-your-
customer" regulations would have established a minimum set of
responsibilities that banks would have needed to fulfill in order to
understand patterns in the financial behavior of their customers.4"9
Banks aggressively opposed these changes and, with the help of
legislators supportive of banking interests and financial privacy,
effectively killed the proposal.4"'
Sometimes a SAR report is a diamond in the rough.4 1' But
because of the limited scope of regulations, there is no formalized
407 1 am not aware of any federal government report, analysis, or policy statement that
definitively establishes a means of ensuring that SAR reports are investigated. Although the
FBI claims that it reviews all SARs, other law enforcement officials dispute this-and the
FBI does not show up as one of the major requesters of SAR data. See supra notes 81, 224,
236, 405.
401 See 2001 SAR ACTIVITY REV., supra note 230, at 33 (indicating that even the most
frequent state and local users of SARs to start investigations, by state, did not use SARs to
start investigations more than about 35 cases a year).
409 One might imagine a comparison of the existing, relatively mild know-your-
customer requirements implicit in SAR regulations and the more extensive proposal to
formalize the process. From banks' perspective, the existing requirement makes it virtually
impossible for them to face liability, at least for specifically violating the subjective
standards in the regulations. In contrast, the proposed regulations would have created a
system making it much easier to compare banks' performance to their regulatory
responsibilities.
410 See David F. Scranton, Public Cried "No" to Know-Your-Customer Regulations,
NAT'L. L. J., at B5 (May 10, 1999) ("On March 23, federal banking regulators withdrew one
of their most controversial proposals in recent history: the 'know your customer' rules.").
The post-September II interest in disrupting criminal finance pushed Treasury to issue
requirements for customer identification in 2003. See Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept. of
the Treasury, Treasury and Federal Financial Regulators Issue Final Patriot Act Regulations
on Customers Identification (April 30, 2003) (available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/
releases/js335.htm). Some of these concerns are understandable. See infra notes 501-02.
411 Treasury claims that a SAR helped authorities nab former Peruvian intelligence chief
and fugitive from justice Vladimiro Montesinos. See 2002 SAR ACTIVITY REV., supra note
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system to detect suspicious activity. Movement in that direction, as
with know-your-customer rules proposed by Treasury in the late-
1990s, provoked marked political opposition. Obviously this leaves
investigators with less information about transactions that do not
involve physical currency. A more subtle point is that the existing
regulatory structure may not even be especially well-suited to
catching people laundering physical currency. The filing of a
currency transaction report (or the equivalent, which is Form 8300,
for a retail transaction) does not necessarily lead to an investigation.
Moreover, if someone is structuring deposits, then the only regulatory
mechanism that can lead to detection is a SAR, and given the almost
complete lack of government enforcement of SAR requirements
(because they are subjective). In short, the existing regulations have
quite a limited scope compared to the extent of authority vested in
regulators and the sorts of records that could (in principle) assist in
the detection and prosecution of criminal finance.
3. Result #3: Lax Enforcement of Existing Regulatory Authority
Leave aside now the fact that Treasury and other regulators only
use a fraction of the authority conferred to them, and that such
authority tends to focus disproportionately on currency reporting
instead of other kinds of reporting. Do the regulators at least enforce
these requirements aggressively? If anything, the same reasons that
help explain regulations of limited scope also suggest that even
existing regulations should be subject to lax enforcement. The
relevant regulators might lack the infrastructure-in terms of
personnel, information, and technical systems for centralizing and
reviewing information-necessary for aggressive enforcement of
existing regulations. To get that infrastructure, regulators would have
to overcome pressure from banks and other financial institutions
subject to regulations. That pressure would also rouse legislators and
officials in the executive branch sympathetic to the industry. The
predictable result is that existing regulations are enforced subject to
the existing organizational structure and its considerable limitations.
For starters, regulators took a substantial amount of time to
promulgate even the core currency reporting regulations of the fight
against money laundering and to implement plans for the
403 ("The investigation determined that Venero was a known associate for indicted former
Chief of the Peruvian Intelligence Service, Vladimiro Montensinos.").
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enforcement of these regulations.412  Even in the mid-1980s,
congressional oversight hearings produced some critiques of
Treasury's slow development of regulations establishing reporting
requirements and drawing up plans for their enforcement.413 More
recently, FinCEN took years to develop regulations that would apply
many of the amended Bank Secrecy Act requirements approved
under Annunzio-Wyile, including the requirement to file CTRs and
SARs to money services businesses.414
Then there is the issue of civil penalty enforcement. Until 1986,
Treasury did not even have the authority to compel regulated entities
(such as banks) to disclose the existence of Bank Secrecy Act
violations.4 5 Functional supervisory agencies such as the Federal
Reserve could use their supervisory authority to investigate
violations. Other options included the use of criminal statutes to
punish banks for flagrant violations, if they were detected.41 6 But
such punishments were exceedingly rare. The alternative approach
for more routine enforcement was to provide for the imposition of
civil penalties for violations, which could be imposed more easily
(subject to a civil standard of proof) and could serve to deter
violations. Following the creation of FinCEN in the mid-1980s,
Treasury and bank regulators created the following system.
Functional banking industry regulators (primarily the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve) would use
their supervisory power to detect civil penalty violations, and would
refer them to FinCEN. Then, depending on FinCEN's evaluation of
412 Treasury still frequently delays release of anti-money laundering related regulation,
even after September 11. See, e.g., Steve Cocheo, "An Uncommon War": Briefing-The
Money War, 1/1/03 A.B.A. BANKING J. 7 (2003) (discussing delay in issuance of § 326
regulations under USAPA).
413 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 572, S. 1335, and S. 1385, Before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 90 (1985) (Statement of Senator Joseph Biden) (excoriating
Treasury and other regulators for the meager pace at which regulations were being
developed and resources focused on their enforcement). Although the critiques that
Treasury received at this and other congressional hearings were severe, legislators only
rarely appear to have used their oversight powers to engage in much more than jawboning
regulators (in comparison, for example, to transferring resources or jurisdiction to other
agencies or otherwise punishing regulators).
414 See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the tortured history of the regulations for money
services businesses).
415 See John K. Villa, A Critical View of Bank Secrecy Act Enforcement and the Money
Laundering Statutes, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 489, 504 (1988).




the referral from the functional regulators and any additional
information it gleaned from reports already filed, Treasury would
impose a penalty on financial institutions. Yet since the system has
been operating in 1986, FinCEN developed a dismal record of delay
in imposing penalties. As the figure below shows, FinCEN
sometimes takes years to resolve civil penalty referrals, and perhaps
as a result has been receiving fewer civil penalty referrals each year
as regulators contemplate the substantial backlog of unresolved
referrals." 7 For example, in 1997 FinCEN received nearly forty new
referrals from the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, and other banking-related regulators indicating
probable reporting violations from banks. But FinCEN closed only
about twenty cases, or less than 20% of its accumulated total of
penalty referrals for the year, leaving 80% of penalty referrals
unresolved.'t 8 The predictable result is that most penalty referrals
take years to resolve.419
It is not immediately clear what to make of the dramatically
falling civil penalty referral rate, which may reflect among other
things a decline in the extent of enforcement by functional regulators
or a shift away from detection of reporting violations because they
long lacked authority to impose actual penalties without action from
FinCEN1 2' Either way, it is hard to believe that both the falling
penalty referral rate and the low rate of resolving cases means that
bank compliance with regulatory reporting requirements has
improved dramatically. The argument that enforcement has become
less necessary is hard to defend given that required filings under the
Bank Secrecy Act have been increasing at the same time that referrals
have been falling and the percentage of inventory closed has been
417 The Operations of the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network, Hearing Before the Subcommitee on General Oversight and Investigations,
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong. 102-04 (1998).
418 Id. at 103-04.
419 Id.
420 Perhaps the referral rate responds in part to public and legislative concern about
criminal finance. The statistics reported through 1997 show the referral rate peaked in 1986,
the year the original money laundering criminal statutes were passed partly in response to the
specter of drug kingpins profiting from the perceived epidemic. Recently regulators report
higher numbers of Bank Secrecy Act compliance audits, perhaps in reaction to September
11. See 2002 ANNUAL STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 9 n.5. But the figures released in that




falling.42' Although recent reports indicate that civil penalty
enforcement may be improving, the record covering most of
FinCEN's history highlights some of the limitations in ensuring that
banks comply with even the existing currency reporting
requirements. 2 Whatever problems Treasury faces in resolving civil
penalty referrals made against banks, its problems are exacerbated
when it comes to enforcing the new regulatory requirements on
money services businesses-where no functional regulator engages
in supervision that allows them to detect and refer potential
regulatory violations.
Chart 1
FinCEN Civil Penalty Enforcement Actions for Bank Secrecy Act
Violations, 1985-1997423
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The fate of Form 8300, the recordkeeping form that applies to
cash purchases of $10,000 or more, also highlights the limitations of
421 A skeptic might ascribe the larger amount of forms to greater compliance, but this
flies in the face of anecdotal evidence reporting substantial compliance problems, and does
not consider the impact of inflation on the number of cash transactions. A more plausible
assumption in the absence of any disconfirming information is that compliance rates have
stayed the same-which suggests that if the number of reportable transactions is increasing,
the actual amount of violations may be increasing.




existing regulatory enforcement.427 Businesses and service firms
accepting $10,000 or more in cash in return for goods or services
must file the form." 8 Federal law enforcement agencies appear to
rarely audit businesses to determine if they file Form 8300. In 1993,
only 117,000 were filled out, while banks filed millions of CTRs.
Even as CTR filings were rising (indicating the likelihood that more
cash was being used in the economy), Form 8300 filings were
declining.
4 29
A skeptic might suggest that the system could be in equilibrium,
so that a tiny amount of enforcement might still be enough to
maintain almost complete compliance by financial institutions. It is
certainly true that the limitations in the fight against money
laundering partly arise from the fact that not all reports result in
detection of laundering schemes, and not all laundering schemes even
yield required reports. But past cases indicate that banks and other
financial institutions do not always comply with anti-money
laundering reporting requirements.43 ° The fact that the shortcomings
in bank reporting are sometimes detected and lead to penalties may
bolster the argument that financial institutions probably improved
reporting practices. But any plausible model of financial institutions'
incentives must consider their judgments about the probability that
reporting problems will be detected.43' Even if we take the number of
open investigations as a baseline indicator of the possibility of being
detected, the number of investigations (as of 1998, for example) is
tiny when compared to the potential volume of transactions (over ten
million a year, judging by CTRs and similar currency transaction
reports actually filed). Moreover, the monetary sanctions faced if
427 Form 8300 was originally collected and administered by the IRS for tax enforcement
purposes. The IRS long resisted giving non-tax federal law enforcement agencies full
access to information collected from the forms. Under USAPA, Form 8300 requirements are
changed from the tax code to the Bank Secrecy Act, giving federal law enforcement agencies
unfettered access to the forms.
428 Regulations require filing where the cash is given in connection with a "single"
transaction. Thus, a client compensating a lawyer for legal representation in connection with
a single transaction must file the form if the amount paid exceeds $10,000. See 26 C.F.R. §
1.6050 1-1, (a)(3)(iii).
429 See OTA REP., supra note 29, at 36 n.4.
430 See Part I.B, supra.
431 Note that banks and other financial institutions may shift resources away from
compliance, not just because they may have incentives to maximize deposits (other things
being equal), but because they prefer to use compliance resources for some other purpose.
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civil penalties are actually imposed are relatively small.432 When tens
of thousands of financial institutions covered by reporting
requirements engage in hundreds of thousands of transactions every
day, it is implausible that penalty referrals as few as thirty a year
would serve as a meaningful deterrent.433
4. Result #4: Globalization of the Fight Against Money Laundering
The fourth result of the existing system is that it is being
implemented throughout the world, a trend documented earlier during
the discussion of the legal components of the fight against money
laundering.434 The trend arises in part from a recognition that
laundering is likely to involve transnational activity,4 35 and reflects
the efforts of U.S. officials and their allies in other developed
economies, working through organizations such as the FATF.
Increasingly, the U.S. and allied developed economies have
developed the organizational capacity to force less developed
countries and secrecy havens to adopt the core elements of the fight
against money laundering. Through the FATF, the United States and
its allies have threatened to sanction jurisdictions that do not adopt
minimum-anti money laundering standards.436 Countries can also
use regional organizations and even international financial
432 Since passage of USAPA, the Bank Secrecy Act has been amended to increase some
civil and criminal penalties to $1,000,000 per violation. See supra note 98, at § 353.
13' To expand this argument, suppose there were 365 penalty referrals a year, an average
of one penalty a day. Thousands of financial institutions engaged in hundreds of thousands
of transactions a day would face (under these assumptions) a risk profile where an average of
one penalty a day is given out. Moreover, although a civil penalty referral might lead to a
criminal investigation, the probability of this appears to be relatively low, as does the
possibility of significant reputational harm from a single penalty. If one makes different
assumptions the impact of civil penalties may loom larger. For example, one might imagine
that FinCEN and cooperating financial regulators would cooperate with prosecutors to levy
criminal sanctions but its not clear this happens. Moreover, even if the reputational cost of
civil penalties were a possible deterrent, that cost would have to be quite high in order to turn
such a small number of penalties into a big stick. Things may change in the post-September
II era, but it's not clear how much.
434 See Part I.C, supra.
435 See, e.g., William Gilmore, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO COM'BAT
MONEY LAUNDERING, xi (W.C. Gilmore, ed., 1992) (citing a Canadian estimate that more
than 80% of money laundering is transnational); U.N. COMMISSION ON CRIME PREVENTION
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, U.N. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, quoted in U.N. DRUG
CONTROL AND CRIME PREVENTION, WORLD DRUG REP'T 1997 at 141-42 (1998), available at
http://www.undcp.org/adhoc/worlddrugreport_1997/CH4/4.6pdf (last visited Apr. 8,
2003) (describing internationalization as a major trend in drug trafficking).
436 See Part I.C, supra.
[Vol. 93
TENUO US RELA TIONSHIP
institutions to promote objectives relating to money laundering. 437 It
would be difficult to argue that any of these measures violate
international law.438 Although laws and policies to address money
laundering in the U.S. and Western Europe once reflected differing
priorities, their approaches are increasingly converging.4 39
Developed bank secrecy havens appear to be making changes to
adopt this model-which includes adopting the major features of the
U.S. system described above.440  Finally, multilateral treaties on
matters ranging from narcotics to terrorist financing provide some
additional legitimacy for the contention that the fight against money
laundering should be global in scope.44" '
This diffusion of these laws and policies reflects a few forces.
At some level, the globalization of the fight against money
laundering probably has something to do with the development of
norms about the sorts of banking and financial policies considered
desirable for countries around the world.442  But a more rational
calculus is probably at work. Political actors within developed
economies probably have an interest in reducing criminal financial
activity as a means of reducing the impact of crime within their
jurisdiction. Moreover, to the extent that their domestic financial
sectors are subject to a host of regulatory requirements that increase
administrative costs and may reduce opportunities for some business,
domestic interest groups probably support the globalization of the
47 See generally Doyle, supra note 259.
438 None of the efforts to force countries to make anti-money laundering law or policy
changes technically violate their sovereignty. Virtually all the sanctioning mechanisms
involved for countries that do not comply with anti-money laundering standards involve
domestic law or policy changes by the threatening countries (or by international financial
institutions that have legal authority to change the structure of their relationship with debtor
countries). One might argue that the imposition of anti-laundering requirements violates
sovereignty in a deeper sense, but international law does not protect nations from political or
economic pressures to change their domestic laws. See MICHAEL JANIS, INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1997).
439 See 2002 ANNUAL STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 95.
440 See Part I.C, supra.
441 Id. See also Charles Clifton Leacock, Internationalization of Crime, 34 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. AND POL. 263 (2001).
442 See generally JOHN W. MEYER & RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS:
RITUAL AND RATIONALITY (1983) (suggesting that the development of world norms makes it
difficult for countries to avoid adopting organizational forms that convey legitimacy). Other
scholars have also written on organizational norm adoption (offering adaptive and bounded
rationality reasons why organizations choose policies).
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fight against money laundering.443 Meanwhile, the leadership in
smaller jurisdictions may seek to avoid the imposition of sanctions
and controls that have economic or political costs. What about the
political costs of adopting the fight against money laundering? The
preceding account of the fight against money laundering in the
United States shows how what looks like an airtight system from a
distance has a number of escape valves. The same is probably true
across jurisdictions. For the most part, where jurisdictions change
their laws and even regulations to conform to some standard-such
as FATF's minimum standard-the political authorities in the
impacted jurisdiction retain control over budgets, enforcement policy,
and prosecutorial discretion.444 This means that the political impact
of rule changes on constituencies ranging from offshore banks to
accountants depends on the way that the new legal provisions are
implemented, not just on the fact that the new legal provisions exist.
All of this lowers a jurisdiction's cost of joining the vaunted fight
against money laundering.
Notice where this leaves the many advocates of the globalization
of the fight against transnational crime (or, perhaps, against
anything). Without some compelling reason to believe otherwise,
one might expect that compliance with at least some emerging
international law norms, treaties, or even informal agreements and
pressures would not raise just one, but rather two questions for the
relevant jurisdiction: first, should a government (i.e., the Bahamas)
modify its laws to be in line with international pressure (i.e., FATF
Recommendations); and second, how should the laws be
implemented? The bolder the goal, the more the international legal
regime might have to engage in successive expansions of what is
regulated (i.e., prosecutors' salaries, number of regulatory
investigators, and so on) in order to achieve its objectives.
B. WHAT GOES UNDETECTED
So if the fight against money laundering has blind spots, where
exactly are they? The answer is that while the system produces
perhaps too much of a certain kind of enforcement-against people
already detected of committing predicate crimes and against some
443 See supra Part IIL.A (discussing the interest of domestic financial institutions in the
United States in globalizing the fight against money laundering).
444 See Bussey, supra note 406 (discussing the Bahamas' apparent failure to prioritize
anti-laundering enforcement, despite having signaled an interest in complying with
emerging international norms condemning laundering).
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people who leave a paper trail when handling criminally-derived
physical currency, perhaps the system also produces too little of
another kind of enforcement. In particular, the system seems on
balance less capable of detecting and punishing the sorts of offenses
that helped galvanize support for criminalizing money laundering:
sophisticated third-party laundering, and the use of criminally-
derived funds by the heads of trafficking networks and organized-
crime entities.
To begin with, probably only a tiny fraction of currency-related
acts of money laundering are detected. Despite the undercover
investigations, informants, and use of regulatory reports, investigators
seize less than $1 billion a year in the best of years, while even the
lowest estimates of the profits of drug trafficking alone exceed $50
billion.445  The higher the estimates of the amount of money
generated by drug crime, the more that the system is allowing to
leak.446 In part such leakage results because currency-focused
regulations are not aggressively enforced, probably resulting in gaps
in the filing of some currency reports.
On balance, though, the fight against money laundering is less
capable of detecting non-physical currency and third-party
laundering for a host of reasons. Obviously, more sophisticated
techniques used by third-party launderers, who are repeat players in
the nebulous underground world of criminal financing, are more
likely to evade detection. Moreover, people who engage in large-
scale public corruption or tend to have greater responsibility in
criminal networks often capture more of the surplus from the
organization's activity.47 The amount of money that corrupt public
officials in other countries or leaders of these organizations amass
445 See supra note 222 and accompanying text (discussing seizure statistics).
446 Not all of the money generated from drug sales necessarily ends up in financial
institutions, at least directly. Consider the case of drugs. Presumably, some faction of the
proceeds from drugs is spent as cash. But this is likely to be a relatively small fraction of the
total, because drug proceeds tend to be asymmetrically divided between more numerous
street distributors and less numerous smugglers (who are often, though not always, working
for some kind of transnational criminal network). It would be exceedingly questionable to
assume that traffickers are unwilling to assume the risk of placing proceeds in the financial
systern when (1) they have already assumed the risk of smuggling; (2) they must pay
suppliers and allies in the trafficking process, which is easier if money can be moved around
quickly; and (3) they are likely to amass larger concentrations of money, making the
marginal utility of cash decline (though certainly not to zero). Cf LEVITT & VENKATESIH,
supra note 81.
447 See supra notes 1-10 (discussing the financial returns generated from illegal activities
such as drug trafficking).
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probably increases their reliance on wire transfers and offshore
banking centers, which makes currency reporting requirements less
useful as means of detecting their laundering activity.448 Some might
argue that, while the leaders of organized criminal networks may be
able to outsource the risk of placing currency in the system, catching
the little guy structuring currency deposits can lead to the proverbial
bigger fish. Believing that story requires a host of assumptions that
are probably not warranted. A small-time launderer structuring
deposits must be willing to become an informant and able to navigate
the intervening layers in the organization. The higher-level targets
(i.e., the Pablo Escobars) may not even be within reach of
investigators, even if their conduct falls within the scope of a federal
criminal law with extraterritorial jurisdiction.449
Where currency is not involved and investigators do not know
who they are looking for, the only thing left is to look for the
predicate crime. That may be simple in some cases, as where a
business victimized by fraud chooses to report it and works with
investigators to detect the offender. In other cases it may be far more
difficult. Drug transactions may be possible to observe on the street
in some neighborhoods, but beyond that they are difficult to detect
because they are consensual. And some companies do not want to
report fraud because they do not want to attract attention to their
vulnerability. In summary, if someone is not explicitly being sought
by law enforcement, does not use currency, and does not commit a
predicate offense that is easy to detect, then one is not likely to be
detected. Whatever deterrent impact, the system would be
diminished by these limitations.
One example of an offense fitting this description is terrorist
financing. Although the government has started drawing some
distinctions between the challenges involved in fighting money
448 Consider, for example, the discovery of apparent laundering through the Republic
Bank of New York. The investigation uncovered about $7 billion in questionable transfers
that appeared to involve laundered money from Russia. Yet investigators were unable to
build a money laundering case. Even when the scheme itself was detected (in part because
the bank reported its existence), the origin of the money was unclear, making it difficult to
build a case on the basis of § 1956 (which requires a link to specified unlawful activity).
One reaction to this situation is to keep expanding the scope of specified unlawful activity.
But even then detection would be the larger challenge in building a money laundering case
not involving currency or someone already known to have committed a predicate crime. See
supra note 16.




laundering and disrupting terrorist financing, efforts to disrupt
terrorist financing are grafted onto a system of regulatory reports,
investigative activity, and criminal penalties originally designed to
combat money laundering.45 Yet there is no reason to assume that
perpetrators primarily use currency. Neither the financiers nor the
recipients of the money are necessarily known to law enforcement or
intelligence agencies in advance. Hardly anyone is likely to report
the financing of terrorism. Where the government blocks assets of
suspected terrorists, it is only because it suspects the organization or
person of being linked to terrorism, not (for the most part) because it
actually detects any kind of financial activity overtly connected to
terrorism.
Curiously, a careful assessment distinguishing what the anti-
money laundering system promises and what it delivers has never
really happened.45 ' If the government and financial institutions
developed a different system less tied to looking for physical
currency aggregations or to punishing known violators, some larger
proportion of criminal financial activity might be detected in
principle. The process of imagining how such a system would
450 See Part II, supra.
451 The 2002 ANNUAL STRATEGY, supra note 8, comes closest to admitting this, though
still a relatively oblique way. See id. at 3 ("We will analyze federal resources devoted to
anti-money laundering endeavors so that actual costs are understood and can shape future
budget allocations."). Id. at 9 ("What we cannot quantify easily are the results that can be
attributed to [anti-money laundering] efforts."). But see id. at 40 (making apparently
unsupported empirical claims such as "The mandatory filing of SARs has produced changes
in criminal behavior"). The 2002 ANNUAL STRATEGY'S revelations may reflect the influence
of banking and financial institutions in the Bush Administration's Treasury Department, or
simply a partial (if subtle) acknowledgement of the complexity involved in disrupting
criminal finance. But if it is the latter, then the Annual Strategy does not reflect it in its
discussion of the goal of disrupting terrorist financing. See id. at 18:
The emphasis for the United States Government must be on targeting the financial substructure
of terrorist organizations worldwide. The concentration will remain on A Qaeda support
networks, so as to prevent any further terrorist attacks against the United States, but it will also
focus on other terrorist networks, as appropriate, such as the FARC and AUC, that pose a grave
risk to U.S. interests around the world. The ultimate measure of success in this effort will be
designations [i.e., allowing the government block assets under Executive Order 13224] that
rupture terrorist financing flows and deter those who would otherwise provide material support
and financing for terrorists.
In short, the Annual Strategy that is most forthright about the lack of assessment that
pervades much of the government's efforts to disrupt criminal finance still explicitly states
an extraordinarily high expectation-that the government's efforts will allow it to contribute
to "preven[tion of] any further terrorist attacks against the United States." These high




function sheds light on how governments can continue keeping track
of money even in an age of international finance and growing
financial anonymity. Interest groups with reason to police
government overreaching can probably help constrain government
civil liberties abuses too, as they have for a long time in policing the
Bank Secrecy Act's expansion. This might render the law better able
to affect criminal finance and other gray market activity spilling
across borders and sectors. The real question left is not just whether
"society" is willing to pay the price to achieve such disruption, but
whether the various actors and interests with control over the fight
are willing or able to do so-and what price is paid if they do not.
IV. THE FATE OF EFFORTS TO DISRUPT CRIMINAL FINANCE
The preceding section suggests that the system is better at
detecting some kinds of currency-intensive laundering, especially if
it is clumsy or involves undercover sting operations, and at punishing
criminals for handling money even if what they are doing is difficult
to fit under a more colloquial definition of money laundering. This
implies there is a tenuous relationship between that fight and the
larger objective of disrupting criminal finance, since criminal finance
includes a range of money laundering activities that the system is less
able to detect and also encompasses the related problem of the
financing of crime-including terrorism-that the system is even less
capable of detecting. Which raises two important questions: (1) why
the disconnection between justification and reality?; and (2) how
could the system be modified to close the gap? Although it would
take separate projects to fully answer each of these questions, this
Part surveys the terrain those projects would have to address. That
terrain makes it plain that much of what shapes the fight against
laundering is a political economy of interests and incentives. Anyone
who wants to "fix" the fight against laundering would have to face
not only the pressures from the political economy of the fight against
laundering, but also the technical challenge and value questions
implicit in reshaping the financial architecture to capture and analyze
more information about who pays for what and with what money.
A. FORCES SHAPING THE SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
DISCRETIONARY ENFORCEMENT
Since the fight against money laundering can affect the interests
of various legal, political, and economic constituencies, a major force
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driving the reality of that fight is likely to be its political economy.452
By "political economy," I mean the political and economic incentives
encountered by the actors in the fight against laundering. Although
the impact of political economy on legal rules is frequently
recognized and remarked-upon in the regulatory context, 453 the
impact is less recognized in the criminal justice context.454 This is
striking, because the criminal justice system is itself just a specialized
example of a regulatory system-with the fight against money
laundering being a more obvious example because one of its major
components involves economic regulation. Although a full
discussion of the political economy of money laundering will have to
await another paper,455 it is worth briefly reviewing some of the
forces that might be at play here.
Begin with the legislature. Federal legislators are responsible for
the lion's share of the fight against money laundering. One might
expect them to care about pleasing interest groups on specific issues
that concern those groups,456 and about pleasing local constituents on
452 Cf Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,
91 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 245 (1997); John A. Hird, The Political Economy of Pork. Project
Selection at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 429 (1991).
453 For just a few interesting examples, see McNollgast, The Political Origins of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999) (providing a theory of the
political function served by the Administrative Procedure Act, with empirical analysis
supporting the theory); CHARLES SHIPAN, DESIGNING JUDICIAL REVIEW: INTEREST GROUPS,
CONGRESS, AND COMMUNICATIONS POLICY (1997) (discussing the political forces shaping
judicial review of regulatory policy in telecommunications); Robert A. Kagan, Political and
Legal Obstacles to Collaborative Ecosystem Planning, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 871 (1997)
(describing the political forces affecting environmental planning); Cass R. Susntein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985) (describing the role of interest
groups in litigation and legislation affecting regulatory policy); Barry R. Weingast, The
Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective (with Applications to
the SEC), 44 PUB. CHOICE 147 (1984) (assessing how changes in the composition of
congressional committees overseeing the Securities and Exchange Commission).
454 For some excellent notable exceptions, see Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note
301, at 523; William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997).
455 In particular, a separate paper might: (1) explain in detail the political logic behind the
use of "symbolic" statutes to address public concerns about criminal enforcement; (2)
discuss what symbols are likely to be politically effective; (3) explain how different law
enforcement entities and agencies might exert different kinds of pressures; and (4) develop
in more detail the political economy of the financial services industry's reaction to anti-
laundering regulation.
456 See generally Kay Lehman Schlozman & John T. Tiemey, More of the Same:
Washington Pressure Group Activity in a Decade of Change, 45 J. OF POLITICS 351 (1983)
(discussing the growing extent of interest group activity to influence federal legislators);
Ronald B. Rapoport, Walter J. Stone & Alan I. Abramowitz, Do Endorsements Matter?
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issues of common concern such as controlling crime."7 Take these
one at a time. Legislators' public constituencies might differ in a
host of ways, but they generally care about a host of symbolic and
concrete matters such as economic prosperity and crime control.4 8
On that score, even if federal legislators are not likely to be blamed
for local crime, as a matter of symbolic politics appearing "tough on
crime" seems to be a strategy that is hard to disparage for most
federal legislators.4 9  Legislators might be expected to emphasize
nuggets of information such as sentencing changes and passage of
new substantive criminal laws that are easy to explain in a speech or
a town meeting. For example, concern over carjackings fueled in
part by a high-profile incident in Maryland can encourage federal
legislators to pass a statute making carjacking a separate federal
offense, even though carjackings were already subject to criminal
penalties.46° With respect to interest groups, federal legislators are
likely to receive pressure from law enforcement interest groups and
financial institutions. Law enforcement interest groups, including
investigators, prosecutors, and the executive branch officials who
oversee them (and are often drawn from their ranks) are likely to
prefer broader criminal statutes to make their work easier.461
Meanwhile, although banks might occasionally have different
Group Influence in the 1984 Democratic Caucuses, 85 AM. POLl. Sci. REV. 193 (1991)
(finding that interest group endorsements from labor unions and teachers' groups have
substantial effects on the candidate choices of Democratic caucus attendees).
457 DAVID MAYTHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 139 (1974). For a
discussion of how voters "discipline" politicians, see John A. Ferejohn, Incumbent
Performance and Electoral Control, 50 Pub. Choice 5, 6-8 (1986).
458 Cf Paul Sniderman, Richard Brody & James Kuklinski, Policy Reasoning on
Political Values: The Problem of Racial Equality, 28 AM. J. OF POL. SCl. 75, 79-84 (1984)
(discussing the process through which individuals establish connection between their
preferences and the policies that may or may not realize them). See also NORMAN H. NIE,
SIDNEY VERBA, & JOHN R. PETROCICK, THE CHANGING AMERICAN VOTER 319 (1976)
(reviewing empirical research indicating that the electorate responds to psychological and
sociological predispositions but also to "the issues of the day and ... the way in which
candidates present those issues").
459 BENJAMIN 0. PAGE, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC 90-97 (1992) (discussing the impact of
perceptions of threat and crime rates on the public).
460 See, e.g., Don Terry, Cariacking: New Name for Old Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
1992, at A 18; 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1992) (criminalizing "carjacking").
461 To the extent that prosecutors and investigators want to keep the most favorable
possible ratio of convictions to work, or the most opportunity to achieve favorable plea
bargains, they would have a substantial incentive to obtain statutes providing more
discretion, which can enhance discretion to choose targets, engage in plea bargains favorable
to law enforcement, and introduce evidence that assists in building cases against people. Cf
Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 301.
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interests when compared to broker-dealers or other financial services
providers,"' on balance financial institutions would tend to prefer
meager regulation, or at least grants of regulatory authority giving
regulators the option of not exercising authority instead of strict
statutory requirements.463 This should lead legislators to be interested
in passing laws criminalizing a broad range of conduct (which
pleases prosecutors and investigators), laws authorizing but not
requiring substantial regulatory enforcement (which makes for good
symbolic politics without excessively rankling financial institutions),
and, at least on some occasions, holding hearings. Court decisions
narrowing the scope of laundering-related laws might provoke a
swift congressional overruling, as occurred after the Supreme Court
interpreted the leading anti-structuring statute as a specific intent
crime.4" Lawmakers might be less concerned about the details of
462 For instance, if banks see little likelihood of rolling back the suspicious activity and
cash transaction reporting requirements to which they are subject, then banks might prefer to
expand requirements to cover other financial services providers instead of the status quo.
This way, banks do not end up competing with non-bank financial services providers on the
basis of the resource cost of complying with the anti-laundering regulations or the lost
anonymity (which presumably matters substantially, but not exclusively, to customers
engaged in illicit activity).
463 For instance, after September 11, it became harder for banks and other financial
institutions to openly oppose efforts to pass changes in anti-laundering and related statutes
and regulations that were increasingly framed in Congress as being about security from
terrorism. Accordingly, banks and their allied institutions shifted from trying to
categorically oppose changes to supporting grants of regulatory authority, which would still
allow them an opportunity to oppose any substantive change in responsibility contemplated
by a regulatory agency. One press account specifically highlighted the strategy of leaving
the details to regulators:
The deep-pocketed banking industry has been lobbying for changes in the legislation. The
American Bankers Association, financial services giant Citigroup and investment banking firm
J.P. Morgan Chase are among those that want Congress to leave some of the details about what
banks can do up to the Treasury Department rather than spell out specifics in the law.
U.S. House Passes Bill to Fight Terrorist Financing, Money Laundering, Assoc. PRESS,
Oct. 17, 2001, available at 2001 WL 29080451. Eventually, the American Bankers
Association decided to support the legislation, apparently satisfied that (a) its opposition
would likely provoke derision and would be unlikely to slow down the statutory changes (as
occurred in 1970 with the original Bank Secrecy Act), and (b) it would have an opportunity
to shape the regulations ultimately imposed through the rulemaking process. See Barbara de
Lollis, Bankers Becoming New Weapon in War on Terrorism, GARNETT NEWS SERVICE, Oct.
23, 2001, ("The American Bankers Association supports the legislation, although it had
some ... concerns about language dealing with regulations that spell out future compliance
duties ... ").
46 See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1993) (holding that breaking up, or
"structuring" currency deposits to evade reporting requirements was an specific intent crime,
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant sought to violate the anti-
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regulatory implementation designed to target criminal finance,
because few among the public are likely to understand the value of it.
Lawmakers are also likely to be reluctant to pressure regulators to use
all their authority over financial institutions because they have reason
to avoid the ire of financial institutions who want to avoid regulation,
and indeed, some lawmakers may be actively opposed to some anti-
money laundering regulation,"' either because they benefit from
financial institutions' political support, because they are concerned
about privacy, or both.
Although no interest group necessarily has a fail-safe means of
blocking a legislator's reelection, the concerted opposition of an
interest group can frustrate a legislator's agenda and, to some degree,
her election prospects.466 By the same token, the ringing endorsement
of law enforcement interest groups-including, for example, retired
federal law enforcement officers' associations and subtle support
from prosecutors and investigators-might be valuable to a
legislator.467 There is thus an asymmetry, broadly consistent with the
sorts of political problems that arise when beneficiaries have
collective action problems-between interest groups' concern over
the technical details of regulatory and policy programs affecting an
industry and the voters' concern.
The reason for this asymmetry is that authorization and
appropriations decisions supporting law enforcement are more likely
to produce political benefits for legislators than decisions supporting
regulatory policy, which may be harder to explain as beneficial to law
enforcement and may provoke opposition from interest groups.
Legislative activity creating new crimes and appropriating resources
for law enforcement would tend to produce more political benefits to
legislators than decisions supporting regulatory enforcement. 68
structuring statute). In just a few months, Ratzlaf was overruled by Congress in Section 411
of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-325, §411, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994). Section 411 amended the anti-structuring statute
to delete the word "willfully" from the definition of the crime-essentially making it a strict
liability crime.
465 Before September 11, Banking Committee Chairman Phil Gramm, an ally of the
banking industry, consistently blocked virtually all the money laundering and terrorist
financing proposals eventually included USAPA Title III. After September 11, he appears to
have played only a minor role in shaping the legislation.
466 Cf Rapoport et al., supra note 456.
467 Cf Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 301.
468 Even prosecutors and investigators may be less interested in regulatory enforcement,
which might involve the transfer of resources to different bureaucracies and could require
them to hone new investigative or prosecutorial approaches. Executive branch officials
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Aggressive regulatory enforcement might produce opposition from
industries facing concentrated costs, such as financial institutions in
the case of the fight against money laundering.469 Of course, interest
groups ranging from meat packers to drug companies to banks may
recognize that it is too much to ask of the political process to avoid
any regulation whatsoever. But given a choice between detailed,
strict regulatory requirements imposed by statute and flexible
regulatory authority that can be whittled down to size through the
rulemaking process, industry representatives would tend to prefer the
latter.47 ° Unless legislators had intense, principled convictions that
aggressive regulatory enforcement is valuable for its own sake (a few
might), then even if public demand for policy output is high (i.e.,
safer food, more drug enforcement), legislators' tendency should be
to prefer to write statutes that give broad grants of regulatory
authority to the bureaucracy instead of engaging in a fight over the
narrow application of such authority. After passing a combination of
criminal statutes and statutes that merely allow for (but do not
require) exercise of regulatory authority, legislators have already
obtained the political payoff from supporting a statutory change. In
most cases, efforts to provide the public's desired policy outputs by
engaging in close oversight of the exercise of regulatory authority
would also be wary of private sector and diplomatic reactions that could arise from the use of
regulatory authority. See, e.g., Hudson Morgan, Treasury's Kid Gloves: Laundry Bag, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, April 14, 2003, at 16, 18.
469 By "aggressive regulatory enforcement," I mean simply a given policy of regulatory
enforcement that imposes, compared to other proposals, more costs and responsibilities on a
given industry than what the industry would prefer. See, e.g., Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 91 st
Cong. 73 (2d Sess. 1970), where a banking industry representative identified five problems
with the currency reporting requirements that were eventually accepted by banks: (1) the
possibility that the reporting requirements would invade privacy; (2) the existence of
provisions believed to adversely affect the strength of the dollar as an international currency;
(3) the difficulty in oversight of the delegated authority to the Treasury Department; (4)
operational difficulties and administrative costs to banks in implementing the Act's
provisions; and (5) the potential adverse effects of the bill on the trading in, and the market
for, American securities. Mr. Desch submitted proposed changes, but none were adopted at
the time. See also Michael Allen, Banking Authorities Likely to Abandon Proposal to Thwart
Money Laundering, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 1999, at A4 (describing an industry-led protest,
resulting in about 30,000 letters and emails, prompting regulators to abandon the more
explicit know-your-customer rules proposed).
470 The Administrative Procedure Act creates a structure that allows interest groups a
second opportunity to participate in the development of rules governing their industry when




probably have diminishing marginal returns.471 Political payoffs for
legislators sometimes depend on positions taken, not policy
outputs.472 Where regulatory authority is used to achieve a popular
objective-such as freezing terrorist assets or imposing a geographic
targeting order in New York-regulators and the executive branch
are likely to get more of the credit for a successful instance of
exercising discretion over the opposition of organized interests. So
other things being equal, legislators probably prefer avoiding attacks
on organized interest groups that can impair chances of reelection.
A fair inference is that legislators should tend to support broad
and open-ended criminal statutes creating liability to money
laundering,473 and substantial grants of authority to regulators.
Oversight hearings and funding overall might be affected by the
larger set of legislative priorities, but aggressive pro-regulation
oversight and funding for regulatory enforcement would probably
tend to be limited to some extent by interest group pressure from
affected industries.474 The funds for regulatory enforcement might
also be limited because of how much there is to do in enforcing the
regulations. If there are fewer regulatory requirements to enforce and
legislators' appropriations decisions are driven to any extent by
functional concerns, then less regulation to enforce should mean less
pressure on Congress to appropriate such funds.
Regulators probably want to avoid angering legislators, and are
forced to absorb the apprehensions of financial institutions because of
the legal architecture of the administrative state. 47' Although
47 There are exceptions to this. Sometimes legislators on committees overseeing
regulatory enforcement call oversight hearings to examine regulatory enforcement efforts.
But with a few notable exceptions (such as the hearings leading to the Annunzio-Wylie
legislation), holding hearings is equivalent to passing statutes that broaden criminal law or
increase regulatory authority without establishing many requirements-the hearings allow
legislators to claim credit for advancing a goal, without attracting full industry ire by
attempting to change the structure of the regulations.
472 The classic cite is Mayhew, supra note 457, at 13-19.
47 Cf Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 301, at 544-545 ("[l]f the Justice
Department says federal prosecutors need a given statute in order to punish serious
criminals, the claim will have immediate credibility with the public .... ").
474 Thus, if some legislators sought to double funding for regulatory enforcement
responsibilities under the Bank Secrecy Act, we might expect financial institutions to seek to
stop it, or to assuage the impact of this through some change in the applicable regulations.
475 Regulators may seem like dispassionate experts, but they face important political
constraints. See, e.g., SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACY THINK (1984); WILSON, supra




prosecutors and investigators could exert pressure on the other side
(for example, requesting strict audits to ensure bank employees are
filing enough suspicious activity reports), they have little incentive to
do so. Meanwhile, in most cases prosecutors should be less
concerned with crime detection and prevention than with the
punishment of people already detected (or at least suspected)-
which is the function that allows them to fulfill their institutional
mission and advance their careers.476 And with few exceptions,
investigators tend to develop skills, abilities, and proclivities wedded
to the detection methods already available-the familiar duo of "look
for the cash" and "follow the crime" strategies.477 Finally, judges
basically have no opportunity to encourage expansion of the
regulatory system beyond what the executive branch would want
(which is likely to be chilled by the industry), and would face an
uphill battle in trying to narrow the scope of anti-money laundering
criminal statutes that are broadly worded and used against unpopular
defendants.478
Assemble the pieces of the puzzle. The result is a system of
broad grants of discretion from legislators to regulators and
prosecutors, who are the ones that most directly administer the fight
against money laundering. The prevailing legal interpretations of the
core anti-money laundering statutes almost define away limits on
concepts such as "financial transaction," '479 making it cheap for
investigators and prosecutors to tack money laundering charges onto
virtually any federal criminal investigation that involves the
spending, receiving, transacting with, or touching of money.48
476 See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 301.
477 Supra notes 81, 224; Interview with Secret Service Agent #1, in Washington, D.C.,
(Nov. 8, 1998).
478 Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535,
555-556 (1999). Though it is hard to know what common denominator exists to explain
judges' motivations in interpreting statutes like the money laundering crimes, some scholars
and practitioners have suggested that judges do not like to be reversed or overridden. If so,
then Eskridge's research on legislative overrides to court statutory interpretation decisions is
relevant. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 362 (1991) (finding that between 1967 and 1990, Congress
overrode 18 Supreme Court decisions involving the interpretation of federal criminal
statues).
479 See supra notes 113-133 (discussing prevailing doctrine expanding the scope of
coverage of the core anti-money laundering statutes).
480 This makes it easier to play the plea bargaining game---even if the laundering charges
are ultimately dropped. Cf Robert G. Morvillo & Barry Bohrer, Checking the Balance:
Prosecutorial Power in an Age of Expansive Legislation, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 137, 142-43
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Meanwhile, regulatory enforcement would tend to be diluted because
no one has a strong, concentrated incentive to demand that regulators
use all or most of their regulatory authority or something like optimal
regulation to maximize deterrence.48' All of this is consistent,
moreover, with the tendency of investigators and prosecutors to use
the available criminal statutes and discretionary enforcement to
ratchet up penalties for offenders that are actually detected. Some
consequences of the proposed "political economy" of laundering
enforcement might be familiar to scholars of regulatory and
administrative politics, but perhaps less so to commentators focusing
on the politics of criminal justice, where the locus of explanation for
policy changes is often on overall public sentiment about crime rather
than interest groups and institutional politics.48 To wit: whatever the
shortcomings in the existing system, some people have argued that
September 11 "changed" it by making the disruption of criminal
finance into a major national priority. And in some ways there has
been a change. Statutory changes that had been in the works for a
half-generation but had been opposed by financial institutions or
individual government agencies were enacted in days. But virtually
all of this was regulatory authority that the agencies then must figure
out how to use, and while political concern over financial
enforcement may ebb,483 the design of the administrative state ensures
that interest groups get a second bite at the apple when it comes time
to drafting the regulations.484
(1995) (contending that prosecutors "assiduously" use money laundering charges to gain
leverage in plea negotiations and prosecute cases not connected to third-party money
laundering activity or organized criminal networks). For an interesting discussion of
prosecutors' incentives and their effect on the plea bargaining process, see generally Robert
E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992)
(emphasizing prosecutors' interest in obtaining relatively harsh sentences without a trial).
481 It is possible to build a theoretical model to discern some sort of "optimal" amount of
anti-money laundering regulation, but turning the results of such a model into a practical
guide for the administration of a statute is quite difficult. For example, this "optimal" level
may undercut a bank's desire to maintain the privacy of its clients. See Correspondent
Banking Hearing, supra note 209, at 145 (Bank of America explaining the value of allowing
it to maintain its clients' privacy).
482 But see Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 301 for a cogent account of such
institutional politics (particularly in the context of explaining state criminal law and
enforcement policy). See also WILSON, supra note 213 at 327-29 (discussing the
institutional politics of law enforcement bureaucracies).
483 Cf Stephen Labaton & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enthusiasm Waning for Tougher Post-
Enron Controls, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2002, at Al.
484 The Administrative Procedure Act defines the process through which participation is
channeled. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-556 (2001).
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B. CHANGES TO THE SYSTEM
The preceding discussions of how the system operates in practice
and what forces might be shaping that operation raises the question of
how it might change. After all, if we cannot expect the existing
system to do much to disrupt criminal finance-whether such
financial activities involve terrorism or drug trafficking-it is worth
considering briefly what might be the alternatives, and how a project
to assess those alternatives would proceed."'
1. Incremental Changes in Substantive Criminal Statutes and Regulatory
Policy
First is the matter of the criminal statutes themselves. In their
current form, federal anti-money laundering statutes are blunt
instruments that tend to serve the interests of prosecutors in
increasing punishment against people already detected.486 It would be
easier to defend statutes that were narrowly tailored to target major
sources of concern: significant third-party launderers, higher-level
figures in criminal organizations, financiers of crime. In some sense
the statutes' breadth may seem to be an advantage, because they
allow prosecutors to increase the sanction that defendants face at little
additional cost. But in a larger sense the "costs" are not entirely
trivial: the broad statutes and the resulting number of money
laundering charges create the impression that the existing fight is
making strides in disrupting criminal finance (when this is
questionable). Moreover, as discussed earlier, the use of the statutes
simply heightens the extent to which the criminal justice system
operates in a way that distorts the penalties defendants might face for
engaging in the predicate crime.487 As discussed earlier, judges can
do relatively little about this given the statutes' broad language and
precedents reifying their interpretations-except to the extent that the
facts of a case place it on the margin of what the statute might
defensibly be viewed as proscribing, thereby allowing even a judge
485 It would take a separate paper to discuss in detail: (I) why achieving the alleged
objectives of the fight against laundering would require drastic changes in the domestic and
international financial architecture; (2) what those changes would entail both technically and
legally; and (3) how one might resolve the difficult ethical questions that such a system
might raise. The discussion that follows is just an initial effort to survey the relevant issues.
486 But see Amann, supra note 250 (suggesting that RICO is "broader" than money
laundering laws).
487 See Part I1.B, supra.
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strongly committed to legal craft values to restrain the reflexive use
of laundering charges."'
The more circumscribed reach of substantive statutes (either
because they are amended or because they are interpreted narrowly
by judges in cases where the facts are close) would not do much by
itself to change how authorities detect laundering. That would
require substantial changes in regulatory authority, because
laundering detection depends primarily on information generated in
large measure through reporting requirements and private sector
vigilance imposed through regulatory enforcement. One might
imagine, for example, changes in the SAR system as one plausible
vehicle to improve the ability to detect laundering other than through
the predicate offense or through stumbling across a large aggregation
of currency. Regulators appear to have no formal system to validate,
audit, or test the existing SAR system. This is a problem, because the
remaining standard is entirely subjective. Not only does this dilute
the potential value of the reports (which are often ignored by law
enforcement, even though they are likely to contain at least some
valuable information), it also makes it tremendously difficult to tell
whether banks or other financial institutions are fulfilling their
regulatory responsibilities or not. Treasury could respond in at least
two (complementary) ways: by engaging in "sting" operations where
agents engage in suspicious activity that does not meet the currency
reporting threshold and assessing whether employees file the required
report, and by developing explicit standards of what constitutes
suspicious behavior that would give rise to reporting obligations.489
418 Judges appear to do this most in the sentencing phase, when deciding whether money
laundering guidelines or other guidelines should be used in calculating an offender's
penalty-which is part of what contributes to inconsistent laundering sentences. See supra
notes 375-377 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistencies in the application of
guidelines pertaining to laundering). Recent changes in the applicable guidelines narrow the
difference in sentence imposed by the laundering guidelines compared to what would be
imposed by the corresponding guideline for the predicate offense.
489 Of course, the more complex and numerous the patterns of suspicious behavior, the
more the standards would have to be updated dynamically to reflect what is learned about
the link between financial and criminal activity. This may seem troubling to privacy
advocates who might wonder if the use of formal standards in suspicious activity reporting
would turn into an excuse to extinguish financial privacy. That concern is worth taking
seriously. See infra notes 502-03 and accompanying text. Still, the existing system of
suspicious activity reporting has a troubling pair of characteristics. On the one hand, the
system is driven by subjective and potentially inconsistent impressions of private sector
workers. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. On the other hand, the reports become
part of a system that can help make discretionary law enforcement decisions look technical
and objective. See supra note 403.
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These changes go far beyond the preferred post-September 11
remedy of simply extending the scope of SAR reporting to new
domains (such as broker-dealers not affiliated with banks or bank
holding companies),49 ° and instead would probably require more trust
for, and resources from the federal government as well as compliance
from the private sector. Both would probably generate political
opposition. So if political resistance could be overcome enough to
impose revamped SAR reporting, one might wonder if more dramatic
changes might also be possible (or advisable).
2. Radical Changes (and the Questions Raised)
On that score, two more radical changes are worth mentioning
for the sake of provoking thought-even though a full consideration
of them lies beyond the scope of this paper.
The first radical change is to dramatically enhance the audit
trails that financial transactions leave behind. Transactions involving
cash, for example, interrupt the audit trail. If police suspect that
someone is a terrorist and want to track his movements, they can do
so if he paid for things by credit card (as did some of the September
11 hijackers). Similarly, if investigators determine that an account in
the U.S. may be used for money laundering and money in the account
was wired to an account in an offshore financial center (i.e., the
Cayman Islands), authorities cannot easily follow the so-called
money trail because Cayman Islands authorities may not easily allow
bank secrecy laws to be pierced.49
In light of this problem, the most radical approach would be to
virtually ban cash, or at least (for example) all notes above $20. The
purpose here would be two-fold: to force criminals to solve ever
greater logistical problems arising from relatively bulkier low-
denomination currency, and also to ensure that a greater proportion of
transactions leave an audit trail that could help build a case against a
wrongdoer. Similarly, the United States and its allies probably
possess the economic resources to subject offshore financial centers
to an even higher standard of openness than what has been currently
490 See New Treasury Rules for Broker-Dealers Impose Duty to Report Suspicious
Activity, 71 U.S. LAW WEEK 2029-30 (News, July 9, 2002).
491 The Cayman Islands boasts over 500 banks, including branches of 44 of the world's
50 largest banks, more than any cities except London and New York. Norman Peagan, A
Financial Centre with a Low Profile, EUROMONEY May 1, 1989. The question is not
whether it would ever be possible for authorities to get their hands on records from the
Cayman Islands, but what standard of proof would be required in order to achieve this.
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achieved.492 The advantages of this radical approach include that a
great many more transactions would leave behind audit trails, going
from a small-scale street vendor all the way through accounts in
offshore financial centers and to the destination account.493 The
disadvantages are virtually self-explanatory. The greenback is a
simple and convenient medium of exchange-it does not require a
database or anything else to function, except people's willingness to
accept it.494 Offshore finance, meanwhile, might be missed by some
users more than others-but squelching it completely is virtually a
pipe dream given the continuing innovation in financial technology
and the difficulty of imposing some policies across borders.495
If anything like these enhanced audit trails were ever created,
they would only exacerbate the pressure for authorities to "profile"
transactions especially likely to be tied to crime. Such "money
profiling" is premised on a simple insight: the key to picking targets
for financial investigation is to design a system capable of screening
certain kinds of transactions (for example, international wire
transfers) that have characteristics justifying some measure of
suspicion. Using computer algorithms and a substantial degree of
existing legal authority, the result (or at least the goal) would be a
system capable of profiling financial transactions-even if they do
not involve merely large physical currency movements. The
discussion below addresses how one might build a system to
"profile" money as a means of improving decisions about where to
focus law enforcement investigative resources. For example,
financial transactions such as wire transfers are accomplished
492 The chosen measures would be quite likely to survive scrutiny under existing
international law doctrine. See supra note 260 and accompanying text (discussing the
argument that the FATF's existing blacklist is compatible with international law).
493 The audit trails would not only be useful in ex post enforcement (i.e., to build a case
against a target that has already been identified). They might also be useful in building
profiles of suspicious activity that could later be used to identify transactions that merit
additional scrutiny, as discussed below.
494 See supra Part I (discussing the convenience of cash). But note that this is an
argument against the complete elimination of cash, not necessarily for the continued
existence of high-denomination notes.
495 Thus, efforts to squelch offshore finance are best analyzed in terms of the types of
offshore financial institutions that might be most likely to react to different specific policy
initiatives (i.e., restricting their ability to transact with U.S. financial institutions), and the
potential substitution by users of existing offshore finance from the more sensitive
institutions to the less sensitive ones. At the very least, though, restrictions on offshore
financial activity are likely to raise users' costs even when they can still substitute to use




because information-rather than physical currency-moves.4 " The
information necessary to complete a wire transfer includes the name
of the sender and the recipient, as well as the relevant banks. This
information, coupled with banks information about the sending or
receiving account, is enough with which to profile. Some
information on those variables can be obtained from U.S. banks
maintaining individual, corporate, or correspondent accounts.497
Although money does not physically cross any borders as it is
transferred from an account in a foreign bank to a U.S. bank account
or vice-versa, regulators could develop a standard to distinguish
cross-border transfers primarily on the basis of information already
contained in a standard international wire transfer form. 98
Suppose the focus of attention of the profiling system is
international wire transfers. Most international transactions are
conducted through CHIPS or SWIFT, systems that allow banks to
credit or debit different accounts across borders. CHIPS could be
forced to incorporate a profiling system. 499 In addition, CHIPS wire
transfers "carrying" money to U.S. banks nearly always pass through
the largest U.S. international banks in New York, such as Citibank,
Chase, and other institutions. These banks could be made part of the
money profiling network-and might even require money passports
(carrying the additional information most useful to the profiling
496 Wire transfers are movements of information about the value of different accounts
backed by a legal obligation for institutions to settle accounts or resolve disputes about such
settlements. See Raj Bhala, The Inverted Pyramid of Wire Transfer Law, 82 Ky. L.J. 347,
351 (1994) (describing the purposes of the funds transfer law and the system it serves as
"supporting growth and development in domestic and international financial markets"). U.S.
wire transfer systems handle hundreds of thousands of transactions every day. Taken as a
whole, the domestic transactions on the Federal Reserve's Fedwire system and the
international transactions primarily moving through the CHIPS and SWIFT systems set up
by bank consortia approach the vicinity of one million transactions a day. See OTA REP.,
supra note 29, at 64.
497 The requirements need not even be implemented through regulation of banks, for
banks are not the only choke-points for financial transactions. All wire transfers occurring
to or from U.S. accounts pass through one of three transaction clearinghouse systems-
Fedwire, responsible for the lion's share of domestic transactions, or CHIPS and SWIFT
(through which flow most cross-border transactions that end or begin in the U.S.).
498 Information on domestic transactions would require new regulations imposing
requirements on financial institutions (including many mid-size and smaller banks), forcing
them to keep information longer or submit it to the government. The Annunzio-Wylie Anti-
Money Laundering Act allows Treasury and the Federal Reserve to impose additional
recordkeeping requirements for wire transfers. The additional requirements could require
financial institutions to standardize the electronic records of wire transfers enough to allow
for money profiling.
499 See OTA REP., supra note 29, at 64.
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system) for higher-risk transactions. Obviously, whatever the chosen
chokepoint (or, if you prefer, checkpoint), money profiling depends
on some change in the means through which the institution chosen
keeps its records. But in contrast with the situation confronted by
Treasury and the Federal Reserve when they first contemplated
recordkeeping rules applying to wire transfers, most entities that
could serve as chokepoints already keep transaction records in some
electronic form.5"' Whatever the form, it would have to be rendered
compatible with the government's profiling information technology.
The extent of the change is a major factor driving money profiling's
total cost.
Profiling could be used in other contexts. Consider, for example,
the challenge faced by a country with a long history of corruption. If
an independent authority such as the Central Bank could use a formal
system to analyze the accounts of public officials, their families, and
their associates for unusual activity, it could be possible to detect a
range of potential corrupt activities. Of course, assuming a corrupt
public official knew about the surveillance and how to evade it, he
could still try to interfere with the surveillance on his account. A
persistent-enough corrupt official could also seek alternative means
of moving resources (i.e., barter, or an unknown person's account).
But these tasks add steps to the corrupt activity, and another
opportunity for detection."'
500 For example, federal wire records and bank wire records are in electronic form at
some point during a wire transfer transaction. See id. at 65 ("bank records ... originate in
electronic form").
50' The country in question would have to adapt the profiling system to its financial
architecture or work with the administrators of international wire transfer payment systems
(such as CHIPS and SWIFT) to implement surveillance. The larger question of whether it
would work is difficult to answer in a vacuum, but a number of existing approaches could be
adapted to the task. For example, Brian Jacob and Steven Levitt studied teacher cheating on
standardized tests in Chicago using a simple pattern recognition algorithm focusing on
changes in scores by classroom compared with suspicious answer strings. See Brian Jacob
& Steven Levitt, Teacher Cheating (Sept. 2001) (unpublished research paper draft, on file
with author). Although the analogy is not perfect, profiling for corrupt activity could also
assess some combination of changes in account balances of family and associates combined
with unusual transaction activity and even public information unrelated to (but potentially
valuable when viewed in concert with) financial activity. Cf D. Wayne Osgood et al.,
Routine Activities and Individual Deviant Behavior, 61 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 635 (1996)
(providing an empirical assessment of the relationship between routine activities and
criminal behavior among eighteen to twenty-six year olds, and finding that-even after
controlling for age, sex, and socioeconomic status-participation in a host of routine
activities was strongly associated with criminal behavior, heavy alcohol use, use of
marijuana and other illicit drugs, and dangerous driving). The question is not whether such a
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In any case, one should think of enhanced audit trails and money
profiling not as fully formed proposals but as ingredients that could
be mixed and matched depending on the particular deficiencies of
alternative law enforcement strategies (say, picking people to
investigate on the basis of race, an officer's intuition, or both), the
capacity to protect interests in individual autonomy and government
accountability, and the needs created by certain kinds of substantive
criminal or regulatory violations (say, Enron- or WorldCom-style
corporate fraud). Although figuring out how to implement either of
these proposals on a larger scale would be devilishly difficult, it
would be hard to argue that the changes would be impossible in
principle. For all its path dependence, the domestic and international
financial architecture is fundamentally contingent and malleable.
Cost is also a problem, but it would be difficult to argue that either
the financial costs or the technical challenges are intractable. The
architecture of the payments system is, of course, an architecture-
for all its path dependence, it can change and it is changing. Internet
finance is just one example of the continuous changes in the
payments system architecture that provide opportunities for more
formalized approaches to law enforcement.
The more difficult question is not whether an architecture for
money profiling could be designed in principle but whether such a
venture would be warranted. Some commentators have inveigled
against formalized approaches that rely on information technology
because these lack the measured ability to consider context that
humans bring to situations."2 Perhaps they fail to consider that
profiling system would be impossible to elude (it would not) or whether such a system
would fail to yield false positives (it would yield them). Instead, the proper question is
whether such a system is worth developing once we consider: (1) the benefit of raising
corrupt public officials' cost (to some degree) of engaging in corruption, (2) the false
positive rate (priced at some defensible rate), (3) the privacy risk generated by the system as
designed, and (4) the cost represented by the risk that the system will degenerate into
something more sinister. It seems hard to argue that the balancing of costs and benefits as
described above (even accepting the substantial practical and organizational problems in
assessing them) would routinely be a forgone conclusion.
502 Writing in the 1940s, sociologist Philip Selznick questioned whether "society" should
embrace the dangerous combination of bureaucracy, technology, and law that would render
virtually all violations of law possible to detect (and punish):
Do we need or want agencies of control so efficient and so impartial that every actual offense has
an equal chance of being known and processed? I am concerned that we do not respond too
eagerly and too well to the apparent need for more effective mechanisms of social control. In the
administration of justice, if anywhere, we need to guard human values and forestall the creation
of mindless machines for handling cases according to set routines. Here vigilance consists in
careful study of actual operations so that we may know what will be lost or gained.
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human suspicion is itself possessed of baggage that can overwhelm
context-ranging from racial prejudice to limited ability to evaluate
different variables. The point is not that information technology can
or should always replace human intuition in the fight against law
enforcement or in any other context. Instead the point is that a
computer algorithm may often provide keener insight than a bank
employee who looks at an arriving customer and decides her behavior
is suspicious on the basis of how she walks, or talks, or dresses.
Ultimately, whether we want to live in a world with enhanced
audit trails and money profiling depends much more on larger issues
that lurk in the background. First, what is the comparative advantage
of trying to detect crime using enhanced audit trails and money
profiling versus more traditional law enforcement methods?
Regardless of how one tries to analyze this question (i.e., empirically,
through computer simulations, or whatever), it should be noted that
the whole point of using audit trails and profiling for detection is to
understand things that our intuition cannot; if intuition yielded the
same list of suspects that a computer algorithm did, there would be
no need to use both. Which means intuitive guesses would tend to
miss the potential value of profiling. Second, assuming that
enhanced audit trails and money profiling were initially used only for
laudable purposes (i.e., to advance good faith efforts to catch
terrorists or other criminals), how should society evaluate the risk
that accepting these new tactics will eventually pose an affront to
privacy, due process, or any important value? Careless use of the
slippery slope metaphor probably tends to obscure the different
mechanics through which mild money profiling might become
pervasive financial surveillance, as well as the various means through
which those different slopes might be stopped. Forthright rejection
of such possible degeneration, on the other hand, would seem to miss
the point of this article, which is in part that a legal or administrative
architecture may not be used primarily for its stated purpose.
Anything beyond a mild symbolic change in the fight against
laundering demands that these questions be confronted.
CONCLUSION
Whatever one thinks of the enterprise of disrupting financial
activity related to crime, there is a tenuous relationship between the
draconian, aggressive prosecutorial efforts to punish money
Philip Selznick, Foundations of the Theory of Organization, AMER. Soc. REV. 13 (1948).
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laundering and the larger project of using criminal penalties,
regulation, and detection strategies to disrupt criminal finance. The
relationship is tenuous primarily because of limitations in what sort
of suspicious activity the system can detect, a limitation that becomes
obvious once the system is viewed as a product of statutes, rules, and
detection strategies. While the criminal statutes that govern who gets
charged, convicted, and sentenced for money laundering give
authorities tremendous power to call almost anything that involves
money from crime "money laundering," the regulatory program and
investigative strategies to ferret out criminal financial activity are
quite limited, giving authorities only a few ways of finding the people
who are gorging on profits from, and financing organized criminal
activity. In most ways, the larger universe of criminal financial
activity thus remains largely untouched by the fight against money
laundering.
It does seem plausible that targeting financial activity related to
crime may at times be an effective means of detecting and disrupting
the underlying crime. Currency reporting makes some traffickers
shyer about walking into a bank hefting a trash bag swollen with
cash. Those forced to "structure" their deposits in order to evade
reporting requirements probably face a marginally greater cost,
forcing cash into the financial system. A terrorist known to the
authorities who chooses to use her own name when opening a bank
account runs the risk that her account will be frozen. But beyond
some of these obvious stopgap measures, the rationale for targeting
criminal financial activity is remarkably disconnected from the
operation of the system.5 °3 Elements of the moralistic justification
are readily apparent in the legislative history of the criminal and
regulatory statutes that make up the fight against money laundering.
Since then, advocates for the fight against money laundering tend to
focus on how the fight can increase the costs of perpetrating crime or
the ease of detecting offenders-whether the offenders are drug
traffickers or terrorist financiers. Much of the argument makes sense
and finds support in anecdotal episodes. Indeed, some of the
consequentialist argument (i.e., justifying currency reporting
503 What is left as a justification for the reality of the fight against money laundering is
the general principle that people should not profit from (or finance) crimes, regardless of
whether they are major laundering figures or not-and that those who get caught doing so
should be punished severely. If this is to be the major justification, then perhaps it is ironic
that an enforcement strategy that is so often justified in the rationalistic language of raising




requirements) is almost impossible to dismiss because its premises
are so hard to refute (currency is bulky).
Still, the apparent institutional politics of the fight against money
laundering has made it into something that is both less and more than
what was promised. It is more than what was promised because the
statutes have been so useful to prosecutors in increasing the
punishment of predicate offenders ranging from fraudsters to
international drug traffickers to local neighborhood drug touts.
Whatever else the advocates of the fight against money laundering
promised, they did not say, "people who commit predicate crimes
deserve tougher punishments for doing those crimes, so let's pass
statutes that allow us to punish those people more severely for doing
anything with the money they get from their offenses." At the same
time, the fight provides less than what was promised for a few
interrelated reasons. Using money laundering charges against
criminals already punishable for the predicate crime is unlikely to
disrupt criminal finance, because predicate offenders already face
punishment and there is unlikely to be marginal value in additional
penalties for what is essentially still the predicate offense." 4 Beyond
this, we do not know exactly how much the fight increases the cost of
perpetrating a particular crime, and how much that increase in cost
actually lowers criminal activity. We can tell plausible stories about
why a world without any fight against money laundering would be
much more desirable for criminals. The system lacks a built-in
capacity to gather aggregate information and to allow for careful
evaluation. Third, the system turns out to have limited capacity to
detect and punish the third-party launderers and higher-level
criminals that so often figured in the justification. It appears even
less capable of detecting terrorist financing, which may bear no
connection to cash and only occasional links to non-terrorism
predicates. 5
504 This would be true unless, of course, one contends that the legislature is
systematically under-sanctioning predicate offenses relative to some optimal mix of
imprisonment and fines, but if anything the legislature has incentives to do the opposite. See
Part II.B, supra.
505 What's left is to expose the shortcomings in the existing fight against money
laundering, a fight that has become an increasingly prominent-and global-part of the
criminal justice arsenal. Exposing those flaws gives us purchase on profoundly important
questions about the reality of criminal justice. The questions that arise include: Who
actually gets punished for committing crimes? Is the process of allocating responsibility for
criminal offenses distorted by politics, leading to a disconnection between what justifies the
system and what that system achieves?
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This makes it hard to know, on balance, what to make of that
fight. The system is not an unmitigated disaster. It is possible and
perhaps even easy to accept that modem criminal and regulatory
statutes are rarely just defining an inherent wrong-and often are just
defining offenses that make it cheaper for the authorities to punish
people for activity related to, but not directly involving, the dreaded
harm of the predicate offense.5"6 If one assumes away questions
about the substantive offenses that are criminalized, then the system
looks like it has some benefits. It gives law enforcement the legal
authority to punish some aspects of criminal finance (i.e., a corrupt
banker who scoffs at all the currency reporting requirements to make
it easy for a known drug dealer to deposit his money). In principle,
some of the fight might allow law enforcement to make limited
strides against terrorist financing, because the framework for
suspicious activity reporting (though subjective) is at least something
that can help ferret out patently strange transactions, assuming the
employee wants to cooperate. Nor should one ignore the potential
benefits of the expressive condemnation of criminal finance-since
laundering can be understood in part as making society an ally in
enjoying profits from despised activity. Most of these benefits get
mentioned when executive branch officials or prosecutors trot out the
familiar cue-cards explaining the importance of fighting money
laundering." 7
Yet there are some trade-offs and shortcomings to the current
system that are not so familiar. Other things being equal, prosecutors
use money laundering statutes to punish predicate offenders, many of
whom are already subject to severe penalties. Investigators follow
physical currency and the money trails of offenders about which they
already know, not necessarily because these are the worst criminal
financiers or even the worst criminals, but simply because they are
the easy to find and to charge with laundering. Whether these parties
are the ones who most deserve to be punished for laundering gets lost
in the shuffle somewhere. Investigators' heavy reliance on
undercover investigations to detect money laundering even raises the
specter of government complicity in allowing money laundering to
proceed." 8 Regulators tend to resist promulgating rules that could
506 See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 301, at 519-520.
507 See Part I.B, supra.
508 The reliance on undercover operations resulted in the redrafting of § 1956 soon after
its initial passage, to ensure that investigators had explicit authorization for "sting"
operations. See OTA REP., supra 29, at 189 n.59.
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change this state of affairs by requiring more disclosure of
information that could be analyzed using information technology.
Their main objective appears not to have been to design the most
thorough means of detecting and disrupting financial activity linked
to crime, but to design and operate a politically efficient system that
survives the scrutiny of the political process. Ironically, the result is
that the fight against money laundering seems least suited to
detecting and punishing the sorts of figures that were so often cited as
among the major reasons for creating the system-higher-ups in
criminal organizations who do not deal in cash but in anonymous
bank accounts at secrecy havens, and professional launderers (even
those who deal in cash) expert enough to avoid being foiled by
informants or undercover investigations. In the meantime, the
elaborate legal machinery of this fight hums along, leading
superficial observers to believe that, in laundering enforcement and
its complements, the authorities have something like an ace in the
hole against drugs, corruption, and terrorism.
A simplistic response to all this is to acknowledge the system's
shortcomings but insist that they can be addressed. "Look," the
respondent might say, "the system has its problems, but it's not a
complete failure. Surely it can be fine-tuned. And what's more, do
you want criminals to walk away with money, anonymity, and the
power these bring?" Although this article has not comprehensively
resolved the question of how one can "fix" the system, portions of
Part IV note this is no mean feat. The architecture of the financial
system may be pliable, but it would have to be reshaped to store more
information about the people making transactions and the accounts
involved. Even if the technical challenges are overcome, we have to
live with the consequences of what we build-consequences that may
involve a gap between the reality of post-modem financial
enforcement made possible by the new architecture and the reasons
for building that architecture in the first place.
Which leads to a more complex response to the present critique,
focusing not on how to close the chasm between the anti-laundering
system's justification and its reality but on the reasons why that
chasm exists and the consequences that reverberate from such gaps in
the whole enterprise of criminal justice. 0 9 Is the gap between the
509 Perhaps there also a far more pessimistic response-that exposing the disconnection
between what an enforcement system promises and what it delivers is a lost cause, and we
would be better served by assuming that criminal enforcement strategies are pervasively
justified on one basis yet used in a different way. But even if the law's story is often one
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system's justification and performance a minor aberration, or a fairly
pervasive feature of criminal justice-where a statute's ostensible
justification is itself a sort of "laundering"? And how much should
authorities allow the ease with which someone can be detected for
engaging in illegal activity-whether laundering, corruption,
terrorism, regulatory violations or whatever-to drive the distribution
of punishments? As the fight against money laundering demonstrates
time and again, these questions are not just minor technical problems
to be solved before the real enforcement game begins. They are the
game.
involving this sort of bait-and-switch (whether planned or not), it seems altogether too
cynical to believe that it is a waste of time to draw attention to the disconnections between
justification and practical application-a disconnection that probably drives some of the
profound disparities in money laundering sentences. Some people (prosecutors?
legislators?) might say, "you know what? I don't care. It makes prosecutors' and
investigators' lives easier, and it makes politicians feel like they are contributing to the fight
against crime." If so, then perhaps they should have the courage of their convictions and
justify the fight on a basis that is more faithful to what agents, prosecutors, regulators, and
legislators actually do.
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